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Simultaneous First-Price Auctions with Preferences over Combinations
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Motivated by the empirical prevalence of simultaneous bidding across a wide range of auction markets, Tatiana Komarova presents a structural model of strategic interaction in simultaneous first-price auctions when objects are heterogeneous and bidders have preferences over combinations.
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