Alfred Mele: Two Theories of Free Will (Royal Institute of Philosophy)

Part of the Royal Institute of Philosophy's London Lecture series 2015: The Philosophy of Action

Alfred Mele: Two Theories of Free Will: or Why Event-causal Libertarians Should Prefer My Daring Libertarian View to Robert Kane’s View

Libertarianism about free will is the conjunction of two theses: the existence of free will is incompatible with the truth of determinism, and at least some human beings sometimes exercise free will. Some libertarian views – so-called event-causal views – appeal to indeterministic causation by events and states. This article explores the relative merits of two different views of this kind. One is Robert Kane’s well-known view, and the other is the “daring libertarian” view I floated in Free Will and Luck. I say “floated” because I am not a libertarian. I do not endorse incompatibilism; instead, I am agnostic about it. But if I were a libertarian, I would embrace my daring libertarian view. This lecture’s thesis is that event-causal libertarians should prefer my daring libertarian view to Kane’s “dual or multiple efforts” view. Special attention is paid to a problem that luck poses for libertarian theories – a problem that Kane and I attempt to solve in different ways.