Panpsychism & the Hard Problem of Consciousness

We discuss two kinds of emergence, our evolved ‘theory of mind’ module, our epistemological foundations regarding the intrinsic nature of matter, élan vital, niftiness, the objective/subjective distinction, and how it all relates to panpsychism and the hard problem of consciousness.

[MaddSpazz]

This video is genius! Cant believe this has less than 1000 views

[Hakajin]

Excellent video; I think you explained it very clearly! I kind of "invented" the hard problem and panpsychism for myself during a huge existential crisis I had in college... Lol, the argument that consciousness is an illusion has always seemed like nonsense to me: like, what does "illusion" even mean without an observer?

I do differ on a couple of points, though. I'm more of a panentheist, in part because of the combination problem. Specifically, why should there be boundaries at all? Why is the universe not a single conscious entity? Not that we know it isn't, but if it is, why do less complex consciousnesses exist within it? We perceive boundaries, but that's situated knowledge, I think. An entity the size of a galaxy would probably see us the same as we see atoms. Why should atoms, even, be the smallest unit that's conscious? Why not sub-atomic particles, or quarks? Or simply vibrations? How do you even distinguish where one vibration ends and another begins? In the end, I think all of these differentiations are subjective: without us making distinctions, the universe is a swirling sea of undifferentiated substance. It may coalesce in certain places, have areas of higher and lower energy. But why should any of that lead to any kind of individuation? Then again, am I not one organized consciousness, but one of many in conversation with each other? If one conscious entity cannot have the experience of being another, and if it's the material itself that's conscious, how experience be shared in any way at all?

I think it's more likely that consciousness is a property of the time-space continuum than the material itself. Or at least, that's how it used to seem to me. Having familiarized myself some with Alfred North Whitehead, I'm not entirely sure there's a meaningful difference between time-space and the material... In other words, what if it's not even a matter of monism or dualism? That kind of thinking in and of itself seems dualistic to me. But what if experience is an intra-action between one state of being (space-time) and another (the material)? Perhaps lower levels of material (molecules, electrons, etc.) are conscious in their own way, but they are experienced together as a whole by a more unified consciousness? Or what if consciousness is not a part of any substance at all, but just exists as what it is on a fundamental level (perception, experience [or the capacity for these things])? I'm just spit-balling here, but the point is, I don't think the kind of monism you're talking about is the most logical scenario.

I'm vaguely familiar with arguments about how consciousness does not seem to work as a force at subatomic levels, but it seems to me that, if the material constitutes (at least one kind of) experience, there may not be enough material intra-action to constitute any meaningful experience. In that sense, conscious experience could still be thought of as an emergent phenomenon. The other reason is the "supernatural." Near death experiences in particular are something I'm deeply familiar with, and... There are instances, such as being able to accurately report things happening in other rooms, where the only explanation that doesn't involve non-local consciousness is, everyone involved is lying. I can't rule that out as a possibility, of course, but the point is that I don't think it's fair to assume that's the case, either. I think the reason such possibilities tend to be excluded is that the scientific community at large tends to come from a perspective of strict materialism, and so it was precluded from the start. I also think there's an emphasis on empiricism coming out of the Enlightenment, to the extent that hard physical proof is the only way of knowing that's taken seriously. There's an unjustified dismissal of subjective experience that contradicts, and... Yes, I know the arguments, like, Occam's Razor. But coming from the perspective that physical events are insufficient cause for conscious experience in the first place, I don't see any reason to assume that alternative explanations are always the simplest ones; in fact, I think they often depend on huge coincidence and on people behaving in absurd ways (going back to ndes, the explanation that people simply hear what's going on, there's a level of detail there I don't think makes sense: what, did the medical personnel describe their appearance, equipment, and procedures?). I don't think we should take these claims the same way we take hard scientific proof, but... I also don't think it's scientific to act as if we know we've already explained what's going on. After all, science depends on observation, and subjective experience is unobservable by fact of being observation itself. I think there's a tendency to want to distance ourselves from such "ridiculous" claims so we'll be taken seriously when we talk about panpsychism, but... I really think we're putting epistemology before ontology, in practice if not in creed. I think that, unlike strict materialism, there are logical ways it could work. And, too, logic can only take you so far. I recently found out that even Bertrand Russell, the father of the school of Logic, had a similar mindset to me. What I realized through the anxious obsession of my existential crisis is that logic recognizes its own limit: to think that I can figure out the entire universe through logic is not logical at all, but is, on the contrary, insanity. We should take it as far as we can, but I think there is a point where we hit a wall: that's the jumping off point into the mystical. Which, I was REALLY surprised that Russell also had an interest there; I don't think his approach was the same as mine, but...

[adamtokay]

Is the conscious experience of an ant more, less or equally as complex as yours?

[Iam]

Who's the me? Thrs none.

The irony of a Human Including me.