The Counterattack Begins

After seven months, Ukraine's counterattack is finally underway. This video examines how Ukraine shaped the battlefield in preparation. Russia has been starved of manpower. Unable to thin the front lines much further, it appears that Russia has instead drawn from its mobile secondary units. However, this builds an enormous tension on the battlefield: if Ukraine were to achieve a rapid breakthrough, there may not be much in the way to stop further losses.

0:00 Ukraine's Counteroffensive
1:28 The Role of Secondary Units
6:20 Ukraine's Shaping Operations
8:02 Secrecy and Operational Security
8:56 Russia's Dilemma
12:28 Russia's Unattractive Alternatives
15:42 So Long, Steven Seagal!

The appearance of U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) visual information does not imply or constitute DoD endorsement.

From Ukraine Ministry of Defense:

From Rept0n1x:

[krisfrederick]

Every news network keeps asking, "What's Ukraine's strategy?" Ukraine's strategy is to keep everyone in the WORLD asking "What's Ukraine's strategy??" And it's working BRILLIANTLY. 💙💛

[surfingonmars]

“Do not give your enemies problems; give them HIMARS.”

[mrkuilko]

Ukraine: “please don’t report too much about the front, we will make the Russian guess our next move”
Every war blogger and YouTuber: “here is a minute by minute, mile by mile look at every single action taken today by the Ukrainians”

[sa.t.]

Former tanker here. I think there is a misunderstanding of the difficulty of what the Ukranians are attempting. The attention on the Russian defenses has tended to focus on the obvious - trenches lightly manned by minimally trained, unmotivated soldiers and lightweight dragon’s teeth. Neither one is a serious impediment to the Ukranian armor.

What is a serious impediment are most probably tens of millions of anti-tank mines in belts kilometers deep, covered by artillery. That takes a lot of training and combat engineer support to breech. You need enough resources to push multiple lanes that can support each other and have enough resources and leadership to keep pushing when you lose vehicles and men.

I never trained for this as a tanker in Germany during the First Gulf War timeframe. We did go to Iraq (1st Armored Division). By the time my battalion crossed the border after the ground war started the sand berm and shallow minefields had been breeched and multiple lanes marked. Then our only real limitation in terms of speed of advance was our own logistics and one or two brief stands by Iraqi armor which were annihilated. We had air supremacy and every technical and tactical advantage. The Ukranians do not have that.

Once they punch through the minefields I have no doubt they will rout the Russians. But breaking through will be difficult and I hope they have the trained manpower and enough specialized equipment.

One thing I have not seen much of in videos during the war is use of smoke. You can get it through artillery smoke shells, smoke pots, vehicle smoke by spraying diesel on the exhaust manifold, or defensive smoke grenade salvoes fired from the smoke grenade launchers on the turrets of tanks and IFVs. I suspect most western armies stopped stockpiling smoke pots and maybe even smoke artillery shells to a large extent to save money. Those types of munitions would really help the Ukranians now.

[NovemberOrWhatever]

I think the combination of asking for a social media blackout while also providing a decent amount of information from state-run sources is trying to force Russian war planners into a dilemma by either choosing to plan based on Ukrainian propaganda and therefor be more vulnerable to trickery, or to just completely ignore it and then be left with very little information overall. It seems like an effective approach

[maluinthes]

"Create dilemmas, not problems."
-Ryan Macbeth, local cigar smoking, whiskey drinking Jersey man.

[gfrewqpoiu]

That end with the final line was just beautiful. Love your analysis of the war. Thank you for keeping us all informed.

[ketsuekikumori]

I actually applied the "Create dilemmas, not problems" principle with the recent System Shock remake. I managed to beat the chess puzzle on my own (with save scumming) without using an external chess ai to beat the internal ai. Combining that with always having pieces covering other pieces, it finally clicked for me why chess is considered a "King's Game", i.e. supposed to teach strategy.

[skeetamacgyver]

The Allies were faces with exactly the same conundrum at the end of WW1. The British Army used the rail system to move Australian soldiers from hot spot to hot spot until they were deployed at Villes Bretonneux where the Australian soldiers met with the attacking spearhead of the German Army and effectively broke them.

[richardcamp]

How's that counter offensive going?

[VVV]

Ukraine: but we cannot attack without aviation.
Nato: Here's a night vision device for you. GO GO GO!

[imnackeredsirnackered]

My guess for Ukraine's strategy is to hit as many places as possible. The first phase is to attack as many places at once over-stretching Russia's artillery fire superiority and over-stretching Russia's terrible logistics. These multiple attacks will really stress Russian defensive capabilities and search for a weak spot. The loss of 2 leopards and Bradley already shows me that Russia's far western flank is quite strong and Ukraine has had little success. So soon Ukraine will begin phase 2 and start prioritizing attacking the positions that are much weaker.

[archersterling]

I'm a little confused. Ukraine's offensive cost them 10k plus troops and over 50% of the armor in that region. Russia also has control of air in that sector as well. So I'm a little confused at how exactly this is a Russian nightmare when pretty much everything has fallen flat for the Ukraine offensive?

[garfunkel]

I don't know if you have something against the word "reserves" but you literally explained the concept and usage of operational level reserves without ever saying the word itself, which is pretty impressive! :)

[davidmacro]

Great analysis as always! @Gametheory101: small addendum I'd like to make:

Path dependency is more than just "the present being the result of the past". Path dependency refers to the idea that once a path is chosen, it becomes difficult to deviate from it due to positive feedback loops. Any analysis of a present state of affairs nessecitates an analysis of the feedback mechanisms that (re)produce it, as well as an analysis of the increasing costs of switching to any alternative system.

[fdllicks]

What I learned here: attack where it is hard, or timeconsuming, for Russia to race in their reserve force.
That is where to send in the "thrust"
Excellent analysis, and accurate.

[humbugswangkerton]

It is easier said than done to "just" relocate troops to concentrate for a breakthrough. It only works if you are considerably more mechanized and aren't harassed by artillery or air power.

[mikedrop]

Yeah we can all thank Ryan Macbeth for the whole dilemma not problems meme. He definitely started it by saying it constantly. Good job Ryan, this shows you're making a difference.

[rorychivers]

15:42 I looked up to Mr Schwarzenegger, Mr Glover, Mr Van Damme, Mr Chan, Mr Weathers, Mr Lee, Mr Stallone and Mr Lundgren when I was growing up, and I still do as an adult.

I never looked up to Mr Seagal, and since he's so intent on filming all his new 'movies' sitting down, I guess I will never have to, thanks Steven for making it easy for me to carry on looking down on you!

[kingace]

Great video. Thanks to our love for Lines on Maps, this channel has grown a lot over this past year. I loved this outro and the finishing line, too.