NTSB Releases Initial DCA Midair Findings

The NTSB hasn’t released its initial report but did verify that they’ve recovered the black boxes from both aircraft and initial data analysis confirmed the route of flight of both aircraft until the midair and that the Blackhawk was at an altitude of 300 feet when it collided with the CRJ, 100 feet higher than the maximum allowed when flying on Helicopter Route 4.

NTSB also said that their initial data analysis showed that about nineteen seconds before impact, the crew of flight 5342 received an automated traffic advisory alert from the TCAS system. Data from the flight recorder showed the PSA jet pitched up about one second before impact, but investigators did not say whether this was an attempted evasive maneuver by the PSA pilots.

And as an audiobook here:

[MarcPagan]

Thanks -from a former CRJ pilot.
My opinion:
Chopper pilots, tower, the FAA, and city light pollution all contributed to the "Swiss Cheese holes" lining up in the error chain.
RIP.

Yes, we always have to see and avoid -- when possible,
within results repeated and tested biological reaction time limits, and aerodynamics/control input lags.

The CRJ did everything by the book.
Impossible to scan for traffic to the right at one's altitude or below, while making a dog leg left turn.

Based upon human limitations,
pilots should never have to look for traffic when we're on final/below 1000 feet at a towered airport, traveling about a football field per second.

It's impossible to see, then avoid, any object within X feet when traveling at Y knts. At Z height above the ground, options are even more limited.

That's on tower/ATC to clear a path, and other aircraft too
-- to comply with tower/ATC instructions, and with regs.

Especially while on an instrument approach,
and in this case, complicated by a circle-to-land, in city lights.

All pilots that night accepting a circle-to-land?
-- Were experiencing amongst the highest workloads one can experience,
short of an emergency.

At a minimum they were watching runway alignment outside,
monitoring speed, height, descent rate, and power in the cockpit.

The chopper was likely on Route 1, then 4.
200 max height published.
The chopper killed everyone on the CRJ at 300+ feet.
RIP.

A published 200 AGL route belongs nowhere near short final.
From FAF/FAP to touchdown, I want at least a 500 foot clearance between me, and any aircraft transitioning.

I'm shocked that route wasn't NOTAM'd/temp closed due to circle-to-land approaches on 33.
That's on the FAA/ATC for keeping the route open.

ATC gave commands to look for traffic, yet no direction.
"Look for CRJ the bridge" or something similar, rather than "Look for CRJ at your 11 O'clock"

Better yet, ATC would have instructed the chopper to -
"Look for CRJ traffic at your 11O'clock descending through 800 feet,
on circle-to-land 33".

Landmarks like "the bridge" given to scan for traffic are add-ons.
Clock direction, height, and altitude are standard.

[Papershields]

I was at Dangerfield Island yesterday and and watched them unload chunks of the wing from barge to land near the end of runway 1. Seeing the shredded wreckage really turned this horrible accident from an academic thing to a real thing. It’s truly tragic.

[charlesdavis]

Best summary of the event I’ve seen yet. Fact based, respectful, and thorough.

[BBHoffman-uroy]

Anyone that was questioning the decision of the CRJ pilot that chose to "go around" the day prior to the collision, when faced with a similar situation, was swiftly put in their place. I guarantee everyone that knows that pilot is now congratulating him on his stellar decision to abort that landing.
BTW--The fact that ATC acted so surprised that that pilot would go around tells me at least some of the ATC members had become way too complacent with the importance of their role to keep traffic well separated.

[jingle]

Wow, even if everyone was where they were supposed to be, that would have still been a very dangerous situation.

[FlightMedic]

This is classic “tombstone mentality”, where enough people have to die before anything is done. I’ve flown into DCA many times throughout my career, and any pilot that is being honest will tell you that this was gonna happen eventually. Ten pounds of crap in a five pound bag.

[andrewtaylor]

She was not being check rided as a copilot. She was a PiC and was almost certainly being evaluated as such. The Warrant Officer was handling communications so he was pilot monitoring when this happened. Now with that said, the approaches around Ronald Reagan were clearly highly dangerous. But had become normalized. This collision was always going to happen, it just happened to be this crew that rolled craps and all the cheese lined up. It almost happened the night before to a Republic Embraer vs TAC11. That flight was only saved by the Embraer’s TCAS alarming and the pilots initiating a climb, turn and go around. Much to ATC’s annoyance, who got a bit passive aggressive with them. “Well okay if YOU want to go around that’s YOUR call.” ATC clearly did not see an issue even though PAT11 triggered flashing red CA’s on his screens with 2 different airliners within a 5 minute period. Yes, the Blackhawk crew was out of their designated lane. High and farther out in the river than they should be. But the root problem was there was no margin of error between aircraft around the airport. There was less than 200’ margin of vertical separation in those approach paths. With one of the aircraft in a descent for landing.

[alanwatts]

Comprehensive facts and not speculation, plus a respectful tone for the victims of this accident. Its why I come to this channel to get my aviation news.

[ltdees]

As a retired Air Force C-130 loadmaster, 1969-1980...my heart goes out to all families 💖

[JankAt]

Just watching that footage of the collision just hits hard, there's 64 people on that plane that thought they were going to land smoothly as planned, then complete chaos and destruction, then crashing into the water, terrifying!

[darinhusk]

Thank you for honoring our service members. Prayers for the families of all souls of both aircraft.

[jasongrisham]

The fact that a mere 100 foot deviation from the "flight corridor" meant the difference between their life and death tells you all you need to know about the situation these pilots were forced into.

[Jon_Bass]

The tone and tenor, and fact-based commentary, couldn’t be more appropriate. Thank you, Ward.

[MikePasqqsaPekiM]

So sad. Pilots have a challenging job on even the best days, it seems. May all the souls involved Rest in Peace.

[demonsofrazg]

200ft helicopter route and 300ft short-final is nowhere near enough separation.

[scintillavertex]

Clear, concise and respectful…. Sticking to the current facts without conjecture…. Thank you Ward🙏💪

[abugden]

A respectful report. Thank you sir. Sincerest sympathies to the families.

[frankgulla]

Thank you, Ward, for those excellent visuals and commentary.

[bruzfisher]

A real report about what really or supposedly happened with real intel without the media spin is refreshing. Thanks, always appreciate your show and its integrity.

[johnbolwell]

Looking at it from a UK perspective, this was an accident waiting to happen because R4 conflicts with the 33 approach. The US practice of VFR inside controlled airspace removes the IFR safeguards in an environment where surface lights could easily confuse. The radar tracks suggest that in the seconds leading up to the collision the CRJ was only just left of the nose - 11 O'clock, and obviously at the same altitude. The fact that neither of the helicopter crew visually recognised there was a conflict with the CRJ is disturbing and raises questions about VFR separations from landing traffic at a critical stage of the approach. (One wonders whether night-vision had a part to play in that.) A similar "visual separation" incident occurred just 24 hours before, in which a TCAS resolution advisory saved the day. In the UK, there would be a more active resolution of the conflict by using a visual holding point on R4 that is separated to the north of the 33 approach.