Powerful Qualities and the Metaphysics of Mind: Towards a Neutral Monism by Alexander Carruth

In recent years, the debate concerning the ontology of mind and body has been structured around an opposition between monistic, physicalist ontologies (both reductive and non-reductive) and some form of dualism (both of property types and of kinds of substance). This, however, has not always been the case. In the early twentieth century, a monistic, but non-physicalist, ontology-
neutral monism was also considered a serious contender, favoured especially by theorists working within what James characterises as the radical empiricist tradition. This paper outlines a new version of this third species of position in the mind-body debate. Unlike its predecessors, however, this version of neutral monism is motivated not by primarily epistemological considerations, but on the basis of recent developments on the ontology of properties. It is argued that, if one adopts the "powerful qualities" account of properties which was originally formulated by
C. B. Martin and developed by Martin and by John Heil, then neutral monism is the most natural position for one to adopt in the mind-body debate. The first section of this paper outlines the powerful qualities account of properties. It goes on to briefly summarise the core commitments of neutral monism, situating these within the historical development of the theory, as elaborated by Ernst Mach, William James, Bertrand Russel and, most recently, Kenneth Sayre and David Chalmers. The second section elaborates the new version of neutral monism, which is argued to be the natural position to adopt concerning the ontology of mind and body if one accepts the interpretation of the powerful qualities view outlined in section one. This paper does far less than present a fully-fledged theory of mind and body or account of the place of consciusness in the natural world. Rather, it outlines the shape which such a theory should take if one adopts the powerful qualities account of properties; and identifies the direction that future work on the topic ought to take. Following this, the paper examines the space occupied by this version of neutral monism in the conceptual landscape of the mind-body debate, exploring how it relates to other monisms, both mental- and physicalistic; to emergent dualism and to panpsychism. Responses are then given to some objections often raised to neutral monism. It concludes with a brief look at the advantages of adopting this version of neutral monism, and at potential areas of application. Prima facie, the version of neutral monism sketched has the potential to make headway on difficult questions in the philosophy of mind, including the problems of mental causation, and in metaphysics more generally. On these grounds it merits serious consideration.