Post Office Scandal - Gareth Jenkins

Some critical analysis on what might have been revealed by Gareth Jenkins' testimony to the Post Office Horizon IT Inquiry.
00:00 - Start
02:10 - Dirty wizard or
absent-minded
professor
05:55 - 1. Move fast and break things
09:31 - 2. The moralisation of technology
11:46 - 3. Computer code is moral code
17:14 - Conclusion

[studio]

I'm also currently working in an educational establishment where we are obliged to use two - yes TWO - systems side-by-side for safeguarding reasons. We were promised that the systems would eventually talk to one another, but of course, they now tell us they won't be able to make that happen. About 1/5th of each lesson is spent logging students onto both systems. When I asked if we could have systems which actually worked for us, rather than the other way round, my question was dismissed as a bit of light humour, but now that the systems have been purchased they HAVE to work, and we have to work for them, irrespective of the time-wasting which, of course, impacts the quality of education delivered.

[corringhamdepot]

I worked on a very large government IT system that was 25 years old. I saw long serving IT people, who had been there so long that they were "untouchable". There are two power structures in this type of IT organisation. The official management structure, and then the IT staff who been around for decades. They have so much undocumented technical knowledge in their heads, that the management dare not mess with them. I think that Gareth Jenkins had a lot more power in the company, than it looks like on paper. I suspect that if management wanted anything done, it had to be done the Gareth Jenkins way, or it wouldn't get done at all.

[Doris]

When we finally heard from Gareth Jenkins, I thought he was going to be an awful person… but he wasn’t. He had his witness statements altered by others, he had a pretty one track mind - great in IT but knew nothing about law - possibly on the spectrum - but wanting to get things “right”- I put that in quotes because he was told his witness statements weren’t allowed to include mention of bugs errors and defects - so he thought ok - they want me to leave that out..,

The second sight guys had a breakthrough with their investigation because Gareth Jenkins told them all about the bugs errors and defects - because they asked him - so in a way, this whole house of cards came down because of his honesty - Ian warmington from second sight said he was one of the most honest people they talked to

[Markhnz]

Thanks Paul - NZ here. Things I noticed: When NZ flight NZ901 crashed on Mt Erebus the airline was owned by the government and a cover up ensued. The public enquiry described the cover up as an "orchestrated litany of lies" to mislead investigators. The videos of the witnesses have similar "I don't remember" patterns as the PO Inquiry.

Government run/owned businesses seem to have a weaknesses in this area - your thoughts on why this might be would be interesting.

My background is software, network engineering, business management and also formal psychology study.

The contract between POL and ICL Pathway and later Fujitsu was for POL to provide the spec and Fujitsu coded - it's common in industry. Fujitsu didn't have suitable software so they developed one based on what POL asked for - likely Fujitsu had limited experience in this area.

POL could not provide a suitable spec as they were not competent to define a software system; postal mail companies are still very low tech, this was also part of where people failed. POL may have tried to replicate the paper based system they were familiar with - but paper systems have some inherent security and audit features.

POL used a contact that outsourced all risk to the SPMs, so there was no incentives to solve Horizon issues - they just charged everything back to the SPMs - so no losses and no questions.

Had POL brought in one of the big four accounting firms to work with Fujitsu, a better and auditable system that protected users (SPMS) could have been created. I suspect this is how govt control to keep spending down factored in.

The other angle is that all software has bugs, this includes all the banks and retail chains, but they manage the liability differently and so solve the issues rather than pursuing the staff to recover missing money errors.

[nickjung]

Having set a precedent, it is time that the Directorate, management and administration of the NHS is subject to a similar enquiry.

[zugzwang]

Fujitsu turning a blind eye (with a view to minimising product liability) may be the crucial observation, because it leads to the question how Mr Jenkins was selected for his role of expert witness of fact (but, if possible, not an expert witness).

It is hard to avoid the thought that he combined deep knowledge of the Horizon software with almost complete personal blindness as to the meaning and consequences of the Horizon faults and of his own participation in prosecutions. He was the ideal intelligent idiot, so it would not be surprising to find he had been chosen just because of that. Moreover, as his evidence to the Inquiry unfolded, he turned out to be someone whose evidence in the prosecutions was easily deniable, in the sense that he never had first hand knowledge of the corporate processes surrounding the Fujitsu contract. And, if he could be offered as a witness of fact, he wouldn't have all those inconvenient extra obligations to the Court. So our sympathy for him is engaged, as it is for any other patsy. But his oblivious attitude then demolishes our sympathy (if not our credulity).

As for the morality of Fujitsu's approach to coding (and of the Post Office's attitude to procuring the system) this is, if anything, worse and more cynical than it has been portrayed. The system was not robust; it was fragile. It was expected to produce flawed output, probably for some time after it was rolled out, and consequently equipped with various ways of fudging the output from a safe remote location. It may have been hoped that bugs would be few and easy to spot, but there was a safety net for Fujitsu, that would operate at the expense of the postmasters. The moral issue for Fujitsu is that it was quite happy with this as a basis for delivering a turnkey system. It is not clear that Fujitsu expected the Post Office to prosecute the postmasters when Fujitsu fudged the branch accounts; probably Fujitsu was initially as surprised as anybody that this happened, once a week for years and years. When that happened, it turned to the oblivious Mr Jenkins.

For Mr Jenkins this was an unending nightmare, clearly. The only way he could cope with it was by denying the fragility of Horizon and thrusting out of his consciousness the impact of his brief career as an expert witness. The limitations of his memory were surely as much real as they were deliberate; he has had to spend 15 years preserving his own sanity. That does not excuse, in any degree, the way that he failed to take elementary steps to verify the sweeping assurances he gave about the robustness of the system, rarity of hardware failures and so on, when appearing before the Court. But that oblivious lack of care was what one might expect from such a carefully chosen stooge. The greater guilt lies elsewhere.

[davidmills]

A fabulous presentation! Erudite and informative on the wider issues outside the P.O. debacle.

[morphix]

The wide angle lens shows me a legacy of empire, it’s ancient heritage in the everyday fabric of life. But the tectonic drift is shedding all liabilities within the public asset basket, monetising everything that moves as prescribed by King John. Before I left Post Office a mantra of monetisation meant that every estate was leased back after being sold, not even the tyres on the largest fleet of vans in Europe was owned by post office. Asset stripping had a problem to do the same for post office counters. They needed a plan to coerce.

[ianlove]

you make me think about the world more when I watch your vlog. So thank you.

[raymondlund]

Dr. DUCKET
Your calm, logical argument I find inspiring and something l am trying to instil into my own approach to discussions . You are one of a small number of contributers, I follow, who have the ability to make the listener think and arrive at the solutions themselves and not to take things at face value. I thank you for that! It may stop me from being drawn into heated arguments.

[cherieshaw]

Wow! Super glad, I found your channel. I have been following the Public inquiry (also from Australia) partly because I lived in the UK from 1999 - 2007. I find the inquiry as a whole, fascinating and engrossing. I enjoyed your video and it has opened my eyes to yet more insights that I not even considered. Thank you.

[BoadiceanRevenge]

Oh this was brilliant! Thank you so much for your comprehensible explanation of technology related issues, especially concerning Horizon and players in the scandal! You know, if and when there are any prosecutions arising from the scandal I think your videos should be played to the Juries in Court! It would help them and others to understand what went so badly wrong! 🙋👍🙏⚖️🙏

[SteveRoyal-ubcx]

Very enlightening video, I now have more understanding of why things went wrong with Horizon. Thanks

[TNT-projects]

So I used a computer system designed in 1989 in a major uk utility firm. Everything i did had a used ID and time stamp.
Even if I looked up a customer or an address it was recorded..
After a shooting, a number of curious people looked up the shooter, and got reprimanded.
The idea that you could change a balance without a data stamp and user ID is madness…

Even if the system changed a balance. The system should assign its on ID.

[stevespencer]

I like your gentle, accessible approach to analysis of the Post Office / Horizon issues. Very helpful. Thank you.

[jma]

Dear Dr Paul…

The thing that struck me about Gareth Jenkins’ testimony was about the standard Fujitsu witness statement by himself and Penny Thomas and Andy Dunks that the computer was “working correctly”. Gareth pointed out this wasn’t the Horizon system/computer but was the computer used by them to extract the audit data. I thought that was a significant point that I had not appreciated or considered previously, and I don’t think the Inquiry had considered either.

[allisonstandley]

As a former contract manager I have always hated the adversarial form of contracts, rather than a collaborative style. I know it’s very hard to achieve. It does not serve either party when severe and threatening clauses make it impossible to be honest with the buyer about issues. This clearly happened here, the PO screwed the price down so much that the operational side couldn’t afford the testing and monitoring involved. They couldn’t speak openly about issues and it encouraged them to lie about how the system was working.

[sprecklesville]

I strongly believe this whole issue was a people and culture problem. Horizon is no different to any computer system - Jenkins is right about that - they all incur bugs and defects. It was the persistent culture of denial - primarily to protect the brand that is at issue.

[maitaimik]

In your conclusion, you were able to reduce the scandal to the essential problems, nicely done !

[bobsanders]

I think there are several factors that might explain Gareth Jenkins contribution to the Horizon scandal. First, he appears to be what we now call a nerd or a geek. He is obviously an accomplished IT engineer - hence the Distinguished Engineer title. People who are very good with numbers (mathematicians, statisticians, accountants, data scientists) are sometimes lacking in another critical area - words. These people often feel more comfortable processing numbers (calculations, equations, coding, etc) than talking to others or expressing ideas or opinions unrelated to their specialisation. To his credit, Jenkins answered all questions put to him in the inquiry patiently, clearly and (surprisingly) concisely. He considered every question carefully and gave accurate and consistent answers. It is clear why Fujitsu chose him to be the expert witness.

The second factor that may help in understanding his behaviour is loyalty. Jenkins had essentially worked for the same organisation his whole professional life. To use a hackneyed phrase, he was a company man. He owed them.

The third factor is pride. He had the Distinguished Engineer title bestowed upon him by Fujitsu. To criticise Fujitsu or Horizon is to criticise himself. Also, he was instrumental in designing the Horizon system - which he continued to defend throughout the inquiry. To accept that the system was faulty meant admitting that he had failed in his role or had been negligent. Neither was palatable. From his standpoint, the system worked as it should. BEDs were at an acceptably low level. The only problem was that the consequences of those BEDs were convictions of real people. And "people" was an unfamiliar concept to Jenkins.