New research identifies major TTE network vulnerability for space, aviation, energy industries

A new attack discovered by the University of Michigan and NASA exploits a trusted network technology to create unexpected and potentially catastrophic behavior. The technology is widely used in critical infrastructures such as spacecraft, aircraft, energy generation systems and industrial control systems.

Called time-triggered ethernet, or TTE, the technology greatly reduces costs in high-risk settings by allowing mission-critical devices (like flight controls and life support systems) and less important devices (like passenger WiFi or data collection) to coexist on the same network hardware. This blend of devices on a single network arose as part of a push by many industries to reduce network costs and boost efficiency.

That coexistence has been considered safe for more than a decade, predicated on a design that prevented the two types of network traffic from interfering with one another. The team's attack, called PCspooF, was the first of its kind to break this isolation.

In one compelling demonstration, the team used real NASA hardware to recreate a planned Asteroid Redirection Test. The experimental setup controlled a simulated crewed capsule, specifically at the point in the mission when the capsule prepared to dock with a robotic spacecraft.

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Baris Kasikci is the Morris Wellman Faculty Development Assistant Professor of Computer Science and Engineering in the Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science at the University of Michigan.

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[jaimelima]

The type of attack described could be malicious or just caused by malfunctioning of a device (of non-malicious nature). It is hard to believe that existing DO-254 standards do not offer some level of protection for these cases. Usually the access to a physical layer ithat includes critical componentes is done only via certified devices, at least in commecial aviation.

[AverageDood]

Is it just a question of time when network starts working completely optically with no usage of copper installation???