Russell's Theory of Descriptions 2 - Frege & Meinong

This series is a basic introduction to Russell's theory of descriptions. In this video, we examine two important theories that preceded and inspired Russell's: those of Gottlob Frege and Alexius Meinong.

Some notes to the video:

I've briefly noted some of Russell's criticisms of Frege's and Meinong's theories. There are, of course, plenty of other criticisms; you can find more detailed criticisms of Frege in any good introduction to philosophy of language. Meinong doesn't get so much coverage, perhaps largely because his theory has, for most of the last century, been almost universally rejected and regarded as untenable. This attitude is unfair in my opinion, and is arguably based on misunderstanding. Thus Lycan in his "Philosophy of Language" writes:

"Alexius Meinong insist[s] ... that any possible object of thought - even a self-contradictory one - has being of a sort even though only a few such things are so lucky as to exist in reality as well."

Kenneth Taylor, in "Truth and Meaning": "... there do not exist any non-existent objects, but there do, [Meinong] insists, subsist such objects. ... It is of subsistent objects that we speak when we say truly that the golden mountain does not exist."

Alex Miller, in "Philosophy of Language": "The King of France, even though he doesn't exist, nevertheless subsists."

These quotes describe Russell's earlier theory, not Meinong's theory! It is unfortunate that what are otherwise very fine introductions to philosophy of language are marred by blatant misrepresentations of the views of an important figure. On the other hand, I suppose they can be commended for bothering to attempt to explain Meinong's views (even if only in the space of a few lines), which can't be said of all such introductions (e.g. Devitt & Sterelny's).

[MarkFredrickGravesJr]

I've lately fallen in love with Meinong's ontology, and I think I can shed light on what he means by being. Imagine instead of saying "being" that we substitute in the word real. Objects can be real, i.e. chairs, tables, etc. But so can the relationships between objects, even though relationships don't physically exist. There is a real state of affairs of pickles being in my fridge. A method is a real way of doing something, i.e. you can follow the scientific method to discover truth about the physical world. You can't hold a method, or numbers, or states of affairs, or relationships. Now, from my understanding Meinong was a realist, and I'm a nominalist, so I may not have the same interpretation that he does, but I feel his ontology works for both realists and nominalists, and its very powerful way of categorizing existence. I love how I have three words that invoke a more meaningful conversation than just "existing" or "not-existing". Meinong gets two of my thumbs, way way up for this.

[DigitalGnosis]

LMAO when you're describing Meinong and you just straight out say "I don't know what this means etc..." when it seems like he is just making stuff up in his ontology! I love learning from you man!

[leocossham]

Sein is "to be" in German and is pronounced sine like a sine function.

[desyinymaarie]

wow these videos helped me tremendously in writing my essay and having a better understanding of their theories. Thank You!

[mickeywang]

I take that Meinong uses existence as in "existing in time and space" and subsistence to mean "existing outside of time and space" (as in how we normally think of the term 'exist').

[RamismTamoid]

I find this to be a quite lucid explanation. I took screenshots and of course I have to really concentrate to grasp the totality of the presentation. I understand Meinong's Ontology to refer to 'Aristotelian Idealism'; for lack of a better term; 'Whatever exists is not real (does not have being), and whatever is real (has being) does not exist'. This is actually, I believe the basic tenet of all 'Idealism'. That is what I understand by idealism and I think it goes back to Aristotle.

[musicalcolin]

I've never read Meinong, and this is really useful. I have two question: (1) I don't see how the statements at 19:06 are compatible. If objects that are non spatio-temporal subsist and (presumably) objects that are spatio-temporal exist, then how can some objects that subist also exist? (2) You say something like some objects that absist also have the property of existence. But that seems in tension with your explanation of Meinong's distinction between sein and sosein. If everything that is a property can either exist are absist, then existence can't be one of those properties. Am I missing something. 

[peaceandllov]

There might be golden mountains on other planets. There probably is

[laurenpadron]

The way I differentiate existence and being is that when something exists it is a concrete object or at least it can be one whereas simply being doesn't necessitate existence (you don't need a body to be a number, you don't need to represent the number two with this symbol: 2, numbers have a being in that we can still find them in nature, reality, in thought though they have no body). So, simply being involves abstract objects that have properties in the world (the number 2 has the property of being two things grouped together - or some other definition would be better - and we can study the number in mathematics, we can even use it to describe areas and other tangible things). Objects that exist and have being are concrete objects, they have properties in the world, they maybe have abstract properties as well (one's mind).

Hope that made sense, I'm not very clear on my terms maybe but perhaps you understood what I meant. Please respond when you can, this would be a great discussion and maybe we could both learn more.

[iamkevinhuang]

Hello, there's something wrong with the video. It can't be watched..
Could you please re-upload it? I'm a student with an interest in philosophy and I've found your videos really inspiring.

[kabirinaganti]

Hi,

I was hoping you could answer a couple of questions that have been bothering me lately.

1.Is there a difference between the principle of bivalence and the principle of excluded middle?

2. I am a layperson, so forgive my naivete in asking why Russel and a few others considered principle of excluded middle to be inviolable and so important? Thanks for your lovely videos. They help me tremendously in formulating some ideas I have been working on as an artist.

[leocossham]

Around about 18 mins you say you don't get why Meinong doesn't just go with non-spatial, non-temporal existence. But I read it as being implied that for something to exist it has to do so in some space, at some point in time, so to have non-spatial and non-temporal existence would be a contradiction.

[ThinkingThomasNotions]

Kane, I'm wondering if one could perhaps construe the distinction between subsistence and existence on the analogy of the distinction between the essential and the existential? That is, subsistence correlates with the being of something like a structural underpinning or 'nature': necessary, but not sufficient to being, or put otherwise, formality. Existence, by contrast, is marked by the fulfillment of the formal with matter, i.e., spatio-temporal or 'material' or 'historical' being. In this regard, obviously I'm echoing some Aristotelian tact: being arises in virtue of a certain coincidence of form and matter. But what of "absistence"? Perhaps one could see absistent entities as divisible into three further categories: proto-subsistive, the proto-material, and the proto-existent with, for proto-subsistive entities are of a being whose formal architecture precludes attainment of material realization because of a certain incoherence - the squared circle being paradigmatic. The proto-material absistents, by contrast, may be formally coherent, but lack material grounding (such as fictional characters). The third category would enclose entities enclose represent absistents that are deficient in both regards, but can be entertained...for instance, a drawing of a squared circle. (N.b., this would also include all proto-subsistents, but not the proto-material entitiies. Put otherwise, being has various modes, of which existence is one, but whose realization necessitates the realization of the more primitive modes of subsistence and absistence.

[brianpreller]

The series is great but you really do take your time explaining. I saw another guy who did in about 15 minutes what took you over an hour. Just a recommendation for future videos.

[thomaspayne]

Perhaps Meinong's ontology would be less problematic if we think of being and existence as the same thing only with different modes. Things that "exist" have the modal property of extension whereas things that "subsist" have the modal property of non-extension. So numbers exist insofar as they have an unextended mode of being and chairs exist insofar as they have an extended mode of being.

[Marsipaanimies]

I think subsistence means things that are mind-dependent like justice, poverty and the number three. Actually I think you got it wrong that merely possible objects absist. It would make much more sense if absistence only refers to impossible objects and other oddities.

[KaneB]

King_Smirgel - for some reason there is no "reply" button under your comment, so I'll reply here. For Meinong, those things that have nontemporal being subsist but don't exist. Everything that exists also subsists, so subsistence isn't about mind-dependence.

As for possible-but-nonactual and impossible objects, I can see why some people might want to say impossible objects only absist and possible-but-nonactual objects either subsist or exist (Colin McGinn, in "Logical Properties", outlines a somewhat Meinongian theory on which possible-but-nonactual objects exist). But this is definitely not Meinong's view. Neither impossible nor possible-but-nonactual objects exist or subsist according to Meinong.

As I mention in the video, my own view is that Meinongianism will be more reasonable if we get rid of different "levels of being" and just say that some objects have being and some do not. This is the theory defended by Richard Routley/Sylvan (in "Exploring Meinong's Jungle") and Graham Priest (in "Towards Non-Being").

[brucemarvonek]

Existing things could be wiped out and reality would still persist. Subsisting things could be wiped out but something would remain. The eradication of absisting things would entail the end of comic books.

[pretor]

Could we perhaps graph 'Exists, subsists and absists' onto 'actual, possible and impossible', respectively? That way, 'to be' is explicable by saying that some things be, some things could be, and some things couldn't be. 

[AbbasBagwala]

Thank you. Please keep up the good work.