Why you may not understand Nietzsche at all well -- it isn't your fault.

In his final works Nietzsche recast his metaphysics into a form that is unrecognised by most interpreters and philosophers. The task here is to convey his final philosophy in a form that makes some sense. An accompanying paper (that covers more) is here:

[santacruzman]

Outstanding commentary. This student thanks you for sharing your interpretation, especially the exposure of Kaufmann's preconceptions.

[ninertactics]

That was really good explanation. A lot of young men misinterpret Nietzsche and base their worldview on what they think is the Ubermensch and Will to power . Interestingly enough, Julius Evola, proposed a corrected Ubermensch which seems more grounded.

[kubhlaikhan]

There is an obvious comparison with Freudianism, presumably because Freud was influenced by Nietzsche rather than the other way round, particualrly his definitions of id, ego and superego. But (so far as I know) Freud never dealt with the cessation of will or thought it possible. Derivative writers however sometimes acknowledged that a sufficient development of the ego ultimately removed the function of the superego (or superego/id duality) and the ideological thinking that stems from it. It is clearly no accident that Nietzsche's thought swung in that direction when he was himself more mature.

[nassifahmad]

Thank you Dr Heathcote, interesting lecture.

[costadev]

In your paper, you say that in Nietzsche's final view of will to power, this idea of will to power no longer held central importance in his thought and that, in fact, it "rested on a mistake". You then cite a passage from Twilight of the Idols where Nietzsche supposedly said that:

"The whole of the old-style psychology, the psychology of will, has as its precondition the desire of its authors, the priests at the head of the ancient communities, to create for themselves a right to ordain punishments — or their desire to create for God a right to do so... Men were thought of as ‘free’ so that they could become guilty: consequently, every action had to be thought of as willed, the origin of every action as lying in the consciousness (— whereby the most fundamental falsification in psychologicis was made into the very principle of psychology)"

However, in this passage, with the word "will" Nietzsche is actually referring to the ideia of "free will", not to the ideia of "will to power". These are two different concepts. It seems to me that you are confusing and conflating these two concepts, "free will" and "will to power, " thinking that Nietzsche is talking about "will to power" when, in fact, he is addressing "free will" in this passage. Free will was rested on a mistake, not will to power.

[afonsoluis]

This clearly not contradicts the will to power proposed by him because, by assumption, it admits no I to act; He already negates the idea of absolute free-will on his previous works or that we “will”. But he does not negate the capacity for this will: this is the will to power or, better put, the will to will ; Zaratustra teaches this form of will;Therefore, he does not contradict himself like you said; read Deuleuze for better understanding

[_sidereal]

Thank you for giving your interpretation of Nietzsche's work. I have watched your recent videos on his philosophy and read the accompanying paper, and would like to respond to the ideas discussed and propose a means of reconciling the apparent contradictions. I'm not of opinion that Nietzsche's 1888 works were a rejection of his early-mid 1880s ideas, only a refinement and a reexamination of certain topics from a new angle, meant to avoid the narrowness of a fixed perspective. With a subtle reading, nothing from Nietzsche's final works seems to refute the ideas expressed in his "middle period" works.
1. I agree that by the current definitions of the terms, Nietzsche's philosophy would be considered more agnostic than atheistic. He rejected the philosophical underpinnings of Christianity, and the morality associated with it, but never sought to prove the impossibility of any sort of god. The Death of God was not a statement about the actual existence or non-existence of gods, but a prediction of the loss of religious belief in European society leading to a period of nihilism.
2. The "will faculty" that Nietzsche dismisses in Twilight of the Idols is distinct from the concept of Will to Power proposed in his mid-1880s works and notebooks. The Will to Power is not a faculty or a conscious motive of the ego, but a tendency towards expansion, towards the accumulation and discharge of power, present in all of nature. In his notes, he characterized it as a "pathos" (Will to Power 635) and explicitly distinguishes it from the conventional understanding of "the will" present in the philosophy and psychology of his day, that of a general faculty of desiring and commanding which causes action (Will to Power 692). He calls this definition of will an unjustifiable generalization, claiming that once the content of the will is subtracted, it becomes an empty word. Even if you don't believe he was convinced of the Will to Power idea at the end of his career, it is still helpful to know that he had always distinguished it from the common understanding of the will, and that the passage from Twilight of the Idols is not necessarily a dismissal of his earlier thoughts. If all becoming is an expression of Will to Power, it is still compatible with the "holism" and "monism" of Twilight of the Idols. In this case, Will to Power is not a controlling force separate from the whole, as in the typical understanding of the will, but Nietzsche's preferred way to conceptualize its nature, in contrast to the prevailing idea of obedience to natural law. It's possible that he grew skeptical of this sort of generalization, due to his general distrust of metaphysics and system-building, but at the very least, the Will to Power still had a place in his philosophy as a psychological concept and "virtue", as it is mentioned in segment 2 of The Antichrist ("What is good? - Whatever augments the feeling of power, the Will to Power, power itself, in man.")
3. The chapter of Twilight of the Idols about the "improvers of mankind" is not a refutation of the idea that man can be changed in any meaningful way, but an exposition of the fact that every attempt at mankind's "moral improvement" has been accomplished through thoroughly "immoral" means. If a species is not a definite, immutable category, its attributes are in flux like the rest of nature. Nietzsche explains that modern Europeans have become more pacifistic, altruistic, and pitying after over a millennia of Christian morality, but sees this change as decline rather improvement (Twilight of the Idols, Skirmishes of an Untimely Man, aphorism 38). He suggests in the same chapter (aphorism 47) that the beauty, grace, and even tendency towards genius in a race or lineage is the result of work accumulated over generations, through self-discipline and favorable marriages. In the reflection on The Birth of Tragedy in Ecce Homo, Nietzsche expresses hope that "a new party of life advocates" in the distant future will undertake the task of the elevation and perfection of mankind, bringing about the superabundance of life necessary for a new Dionysian age. The idea that mankind should not find its purpose in a notion of progress, but in its highest examples, is present throughout Nietzsche's philosophy, and it does not appear that he ever abandoned it. The Übermensch is scarcely mentioned outside of Zarathustra, and considering Nietzsche's commentary on the concept in Ecce Homo, it would be reasonable to suggest that he is primarily a poetic representation of higher man.
4. Lastly, whenever Nietzsche had a significant change of perspective, as he did on Wagner and Schopenhauer, he made a point to express his new opinions on the subject and even to explain why he was once mistaken. Both the preface to the 1886 version of The Birth of Tragedy, and his reflections on the book in Ecce Homo, are critical of its Wagnerism and its use of Schopenhauerian and Kantian formulae. If he had rejected the Will to Power, or any other middle period ideas, it seems likely to me that he would have made his change of opinion clear to avoid any misunderstandings, especially given his concern for posterity. That the Will to Power was not a significant part of Nietzsche's 1888 works may indicate that he was undecided about the idea or that he intended to return to it at later time, but all of this is in the realm of speculation.

[christopherhamilton]

Thanks so much: puts the popular & conventional views on FN in proper light.

[hammerdureason]

neitzsche has become an archetype of the truth-seeking sufferer, a secular form of the ascetic saint. a trusted companio/guide on the going no where jouney of aloneness, isolation '& self-indugent madness living in a cave whose of indulgences ( physical, psychological, philosophical, social ... )

[michaelmcclure]

Well, that was extremely interesting and insightful. Just to notice the radical departure that Nietzsche took in his later work. As you say, he really does seem to have embraced a Heraclitan metaphysics in its entirety, not just its Panta Rhei aspect, but logos and Oneness (inseparable wholeness) too. There is also a similar negation of a causal will and an individual ego that you find in Schopenhaur and in eastern doctrines like Shunyavada Buddhism or Advaita Vedanta. I must say i like this Nietzsche much better than the usual depiction of him based on the earlier work.

I look forward to listening to your earlier videos, especially on my favourite Parmenides.

[AuspiciousdissenT]

I have read only 3 of Nietzsche's works yet (BGE, GoM, Zarathustra), despite this I relatively confidently can say of a lifetime interested in literature no one I've come across has a fraction of N's IQ

[The_Wanderer_And_His_Shadow]

Thank you for your video! Your voice sounds a little bit like Arthur Holmes the Wheaton College professor.

[danielhopkins]

Sextus is said to have the first attestation of the rope imagined to be a snake motif later attributed to Nagarjuna's disciple Aryadeva but Pyrrho may have picked this line up from the Infian gymnosophists

[TheCocoaisCongealed]

Nietzsche didnt reject Will except on the conception of a metaphysical certainty. He believed in belief not on the basis of Truth, but apperance, and for him, Will was an integral foundation to the elevation of man. You have to take Nietzsche's philosophy not just in parts, but as a whole, which includes his moral and psychic philosophy. The Will to Power is very thorough, and much the notes were going to be composed into a lengthy conclusion of transvaluation, where he constructs a new, pagan moral base. In Will to Power, he makes very clear all of the things mentioned, more, what they entail, and how they ought to be overcome. He rejects radical skeptism as cowardice.

[wanderingpoet]

Mahayana Buddhism allows for a will less willing so to speak, the Bodhisattva aspires to lead all beings towards enlightenment while at the same time having no thought constructions of beings to be saved or of a goal to be reached. If Nietzsche had embraced such a paradox he could have kept the will to power it's not clear to me whether he did this or not...

[AquariusGate]

Nietzsche spoke on the spirit of meaning, far more than many before and since. He did not seem to care much for the language of definition, and words that lock up paradox in their use.
Dichotomy was big in his day... Doesn't such a perception require a third perspective, a trinity of sorts?

[amorfati]

Nietzsche was Too Naïve and his aphorism was Too hip hop which I liked.

[jamesmoran]

Strange he didn't mention aristotle

[RitamBuchwald]

The uber-mensch always did seem like a hopeful idea. Looks like Nietzsche went from uber-mensch to uber-soup in motion.

[juvenalhahne]

O que fica dessa exposição do pensamento de Nietzsche é que ele se refez até seu fim, abandonando assim aa ideias pelas quais é mais conhecido, as ideias da vontade de poder e a do super homem...
Mas como Nietzsche parou de pensar aos 44 anos de idade, da para imaginar o que continuaria pensando se mantivesse sua lucidez após os 44 anos...
Mais: se um pensamento que se refaz, na ausência no entanto fundamental da ilusão, para ele, da metafísica, se desenvolve a si mesmo a partir de qualquer origem, agora impossível?