Who is Heidegger’s Dasein?

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[camillococcia]

I always think of Heidegger when I read Kierkegaards passage in Sickness unto death. 'The self is a relation, which relates to itself, or is precisely that in the relation that the relation relates to itself; the self is not the relation but that the relation relates to itself.

Subject is not a relation, it is that which relates

[keegster]

That makes sense! That helps a lot. Especially bc it was an adverb that he uses as a noun lol.

[o.s.h.]

Spectacular commentary. If you’ve the time, I would also like to prompt your thoughts on the relation or unspoken influence of Heidegger on the middle Deleuze, particularly in Difference & Repetition. Of course, it’s always difficult to honestly express what I mean by that; in short-form, I’ve always come to interpret the latent subject in the Deleuzian dialectic as a “social buffer” that blocks the understanding between the so-called “evanescent events”/impulses (as I understand it, a field of pure intensity, functionally similar to Heidegger’s description of the ontic, that which cannot be subdued with anything resembling a anthropocentric meaning) to the individual/stable “thing” [Ding], or as Heidegger could put it, the bearer of the machinic; that is, this is the very Repetition which blocks the “complete concept” that Deleuze describes early in his book. These evanescent impulses of the social are repeated in the machine, if we understand the machine as “generative desire, ” that which produces the desire which precedes itself and brings it forth as something suspended only in such a context; Deleuze describes Difference as that which exists between these evanescent events (he also calls them Singularities), and this Difference is a will-to-will—a radicalization of the will to power as the unmediated behaviour of a desiring-machine which already precedes it. The will is the thing repeated and, in its repetition, is expressed at once in the machine which itself enters an “impulsive” dialectic to pick apart and recontextualize collective expressions of desire relevant to this historical context. In this way, the ego, or that individual, stable thing [Ding], “buoys up” the social reciprocally in what essentially forms a hermeneutic circle. It’s this seeming circularity that I personally approach Deleuzian repetition with the Heideggerian view that it’s a “precarious armastice” between machines as functionally-bulldozing pieces in a circulative enframing.

To put all that more succinctly, the stabilized individual suspends the pre-social “impulse of affections”/evanescent events, separated by Difference/will-to-will, which in turn contains a “natural” social buffer that prompts and urges these impulses to come forth so that they can form the very individual that provided the condition of the possibility for their own emergence to begin with, and in this hermeneutic circularity, we find what I can only describe as a “self-referential web” of interrelations (grounded in the social) that reference each other, and in fact only exist by reference to each other (as the late Heidegger says, the Thing exists only at its boundary with the world; it “pours itself out, ”) which we could intepret as circular enframing. Put in a slightly more obscure way, the Deleuzian evanescent, fragmentary field of intensity, what he calls a Life or dissolved pre-ego, or what Heidegger later calls Earth, blocks a violent “Why?” which through a generative “strife” presents us with an individual-in-a-world, i.e. one in a clearing.

This may come off as a bastardization of the Fourfold, but I’m curious what you can glean from this example. It comes across to me that Deleuze simply presents a more explicitly socially-grounded ontology that essentially says the same things that Heidegger’s does.

Edit: One more way I could phrase it, solely in the language of Deleuze, is that rather than the Platonic dialectic, which begins with a contrary perception invoking a perplexion in a knower, which prompts a recollection, which in turns draws out a transcendental memory to form Ideas, Deleuze’s dialectic begins with a field of Intensity or of free Difference, which invokes a violence unto the transcendental sensibility (latent subject, pre-ego, pre-Dasein if you will) which prompts a fragmentary encounter with this intensity, and draws out a repetition of fragments into the faculties to form Ideas. This dialectic therein gives us his so-called dynamic genesis which forms as imagination, memory, and thought (his three syntheses), and constitute the fragments of a dissolved Self. To me, this reminds me of nothing more than a more sociological reimagining of Heidegger’s description of the Fourfold in the formation and stabilization of the Thing. My only issue is that Deleuze seems to refuse to generalize this ontologically to all Things, and rather wishes to phrase this in terms of the conscious and epistemological.

[valdeswright]

The pertinent question after watching this clip and reading these comments is, do modern professional philosophers play any role in shaping society?

[Omulosi]

Adverbial is a good way of putting it.
There's a line: "history has its possibility in the future" which sound contradictory until you recognise that by future is meant not so much "future" as concept, even less future as "the future", but future as *constitutive* of Dasein: that without which Dasein couldn't be what it is. One could call Dasein a 'thing' in the sense H sometime uses that term indiscriminately for *anything* that can appear to thought, as in Introduction to Metaphysics and What is a Thing. Obviously that would include the sign 'Dasein' as much as what it denotes the Dasein that is always mine, unless I means yours or Dasein generally or merely the word itself lol.

[gn]

As an adverb Dasein modifies the verb. If so then Dasein represents no-actuality of a substantive, therefore Dasein is a non-fact modifier/attribute. But a modifier of what or who? This would be my question.