Marco di Feo - Ontological Foundations of Collective Intentionality

The husserlian (1900-1901) notion of intentionality expresses the fundamental correlation between conscious subject and experienced object. Everything exists as a perceptible, knowable, thinkable, intuitable, appreciable (or deplorable) and predictable phenomenon, by means of this correlation. In a realistic framework, intentionality lets conscious subjectivity be in the presence of the thing itself, through several kinds of acts (perceptive, cognitive, linguistic, intuitive, etc.). In every intentional act we find a fundamental structure, which is composed of three intrinsically connected parts: a noetic pole (the subject), an intentional modality (the act) and a noematic pole (the object). Therefore, the notion of collective intentionality imposes the following question: What kind of consciousness occupies the place of its noetic pole? Through a preliminary analysis and comparison between different types of intentionality (individual, intersubjective and collective), I intend to demonstrate that a real collective intentionality can belong to individual subjects to the extent that they are members of a collective. According to me, the status of member is rooted in the normative plot that structures and organizes several kinds of collective subjects. By becoming part of their network of obligations and rights, the persons are no longer ontologically independent individualities, but become socially and mutually non-independent parties. The condition of social non-independence configures a real ontological positioning (status) that, in turn, motivates and establishes a series of corresponding intentional stances. We-intentions (Sellars, 1974; Tuomela and Miller, 1988; Tuomela, 2007) are not mere psycho-physical or mental faculties, merely subjective and arbitrary, but modes of correlation with reality that are rooted in the ontological positioning of the subject within her/his collectives. If the “we” (pronounced, experienced, felt, etc., by two or more subjects) expresses a real collective consciousness, then it’s the source of co-dependent intentional acts, which are rooted in the co-dependence ontological relationships between the members of the collective. In summary: (i) if there is a correlation between the ontological condition of the subject and his/her intentional way of relating to the surrounding world; and (ii) if the social bonds establish a particular ontological-social positioning; (iii) then collective intentionality is a particular intentional modality. That is, it’s the type of consciousness that acts in collective experiences, being rooted in the relationships of co-belonging that ontologically generate and structure the different types of collective subjects. The intentional acts of the members express then the collective consciousness of their own groups of belonging, reflect their normative structure and express their axiological hierarchy. Therefore, through the intentional acts of their constituent parts, the entire collective subjects take a stand in the world.