31 | Raymond Geuss: Realism in Political Theory

In this episode we work through some of the ideas laid out in Part 1 of Raymond Geuss’ 2008 Philosophy and Real Politics. It’s a refreshingly clear-eyed argument for what he calls the realist approach in political philosophy, which tries to attend to the messiness of actually existing societies, the opaque and invested people who make them up, and the shifting, contradictory values they hold. We’re talking Hobbes meets Lenin meets Nietzsche here, folks. Leave your rational decision theory and normative idealism at the door.

⬇️ 𝙂𝙚𝙩 𝙢𝙤𝙧𝙚:

📚𝙍𝙚𝙛𝙚𝙧𝙚𝙣𝙘𝙚𝙨:

Raymond Geuss, Philosophy and Real Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).

🎧𝙁𝙞𝙣𝙙 𝙩𝙝𝙚 𝙥𝙤𝙙𝙘𝙖𝙨𝙩:

🎙𝘼𝙗𝙤𝙪𝙩 𝙩𝙝𝙚 𝙋𝙤𝙙𝙘𝙖𝙨𝙩:

What’s Left of Philosophy is a podcast where four leftist friends get together to talk about concepts, thinkers, and texts from the history of philosophy and political theory.

Sometimes we talk about how good and useful certain ideas are for left theory and practice. Sometimes we mercilessly dunk on bourgeois idealism dressed up as radical thought. Sometimes we’re joined by extremely cool guests. We love concepts and long for an emancipated existence!

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[pelicans]

This was a great intro to Geuss, picked up Philosophy and Real Politics after listening to this the first time and it didn't disappoint. I'm always saying, "who whom?"

[anthonysepheku]

I think Geuss makes an argument for "why" a value is relevant NOW, and begs an interest in the importance of our participation in the role of a mechanism of enforcement to justify what is relevant.

The state is a good example of an enforcement mechanism, because Geuss thinks realism is a practice of engaging a form of coercion (compulsion) to comply to what best serves the majority based on what has happened in fact/history. That is especially after evaluative processes in institutions of enforcement help us show that a competing/conflicting interests is developed by some degree of reconciliation with what is normatively relevant at a point in time. This process entail the creation of shared interests while appreciative of the fact that politics constitutes decision making that is pressed with time.

This approach is intended to relax the ways normative frameworks (ideals we imagine as capable of realising) often resist criticism by shutting down the question of "why that is of value right now?" It draws attention to the burden of convincing others that a value is relevant.

The point is that where an apparent requirement for change/revision is made without reference to lived experience of the formation of a shared interests, Geuss then accepts some form of normativity because coercion is implicit and always present to either sustain a relevant norm or review it; rather that realizing change/development from our capability to just reason. @55:33 reckoning with our partiality.

I think he captures this view in his book History and Illusion in Politics.