From Kalam to God?

Must the cause of the universe be timeless, spaceless, immaterial, enormously powerful, and personal? No. Here's why.

CLARIFICATION

Thanks to commenter Tym Miara for inviting this helpful clarification:

In the video, I argued that we cannot infer from the Kalam alone that the cause is spaceless. I began by using an example: “if, *for instance*, you’re only showing [in stage 1] that the past must be finite…” Using this example, I explained how we can’t then go on to infer that the cause of the beginning of (metric) time is spaceless.

I intended the points I made subsequently — about the epistemic possibility of there being some sort of space in which the first cause resides, etc. — to generalize to *other* ways of defending stage 1 of the Kalam, including the appeals to Big Bang cosmology. I wasn’t intending to impute to Craig the inference from ‘x causes the beginning of time’ to ‘x is therefore spaceless’. My point was, firstly, that *if* we only show in stage 1 that metric time is past-finite, *then* we cannot infer that the first cause(s) thereof is spaceless; and, furthermore, that the point about the epistemic possibility of some space in which the first cause(s) resides is a problem for *other* extant ways of defending stage 1, not just a way of defending stage 1 which only shows that the past must be finite. I used the finite-metric-past defense of stage 1 as an example to introduce the point which I intended to generalize more broadly.

So, then, the clarification is that I wasn't intending to say that Craig takes his spacelessness conclusion to be derived from the finitude of the past, though I can understand if what I said suggests that. I’m here canceling any such implicature, and explaining what I was intending to convey.

My point, instead, is precisely that *none* of the points in Craig's stage 1 case show that the cause is spaceless — even the points pertaining to Big Bang cosmology. They only show, at best, that the cause doesn't exist in the spatial framework of our local spatiotemporal manifold, i.e., the self-contained one that began to expand about 13.8 billion years ago. As I noted in the video, there may be a different space that exists causally prior to the beginning of metric time (and hence causally prior to the beginning of the spatial manifold associated with that metric time) and in which the cause resides. This space may be the same sort of space as our local spatiotemporal manifold's space (e.g., three-dimensional); or it may be some more exotic state space that various philosophers have proposed for the 'location' of the universal wavefunction; or it may be a higher dimensional spatial framework; and so on. The epistemic possibilities are boundless, and Craig — in claiming the cause must be spaceless — illegitimately assumes that none of these are the case. The crucial point is that they straightforwardly undercut the claim that the cause of our local spatiotemporal manifold must be spaceless, i.e., without any space.

And, of course, I think it's important to emphasize that Big Bang cosmology doesn't show that the universe, understood as all of physical reality, began to exist; for more on this, see Dr. Linford's dissertation here :)

LINKS

THE USUAL...

[MajestyofReason]

I've had this in the description for a while, but I figured I'd also put it here in case anyone misses it! And special thanks to commenter Tym Miara for inviting this helpful clarification:

In the video, I argued that we cannot infer from the Kalam alone that the cause is spaceless. I began by using an example: “if, *for instance*, you’re only showing [in stage 1] that the past must be finite…” Using this example, I explained how we can’t then go on to infer that the cause of the beginning of (metric) time is spaceless.

I intended the points I made subsequently — about the epistemic possibility of there being some sort of space in which the first cause resides, etc. — to generalize to *other* ways of defending stage 1 of the Kalam, including the appeals to Big Bang cosmology. I wasn’t intending to impute to Craig the inference from ‘x causes the beginning of time’ to ‘x is therefore spaceless’. My point was, firstly, that *if* we only show in stage 1 that metric time is past-finite, *then* we cannot infer that the first cause(s) thereof is spaceless; and, furthermore, that the point about the epistemic possibility of some space in which the first cause(s) resides is a problem for *other* extant ways of defending stage 1, not just a way of defending stage 1 which only shows that the past must be finite. I used the finite-metric-past defense of stage 1 as an example to introduce the point which I intended to generalize more broadly.

So, then, the clarification is that I wasn't intending to say that Craig takes his spacelessness conclusion to be derived from the finitude of the past, though I can understand if what I said suggests that. I’m here canceling any such implicature, and explaining what I was intending to convey.

My point, instead, is precisely that none of the points in Craig's stage 1 case show that the cause is spaceless — even the points pertaining to big bang cosmology. They only show, at best, that the cause doesn't exist in the spatial framework of our local spatiotemporal manifold, i.e., the self-contained one that began to expand about 13.8 billion years ago. As I noted in the video, there may be a different space that exists causally prior to the beginning of metric time (and hence causally prior to the beginning of the spatial manifold associated with that metric time) and in which the cause resides. This space may be the same sort of space as our local spatiotemporal manifold's space (e.g., three-dimensional); or it may be some more exotic state space that various philosophers have proposed for the 'location' of the universal wavefunction; or it may be a higher dimensional spatial framework; and so on. The epistemic possibilities are boundless, and Craig — in claiming the cause must be spaceless — illegitimately assumes that none of these are the case. The crucial point is that they straightforwardly undercut the claim that the cause of our local spatiotemporal manifold must be spaceless, i.e., without any space.

And, of course, I think it's important to emphasize that big bang cosmology doesn't show that the universe, understood as all of physical reality, began to exist; for more on this, see Dr. Linford dissertation here :)

[utubepunk]

More like the KaLAME cosmological argument, amirite? 😎

[DarkArcticTV]

im not a proponent of the kalam as a theist, but at about 6 minutes into the video you give a list of other potential candidates that could things other than a mind or an abstract object, but i think craig's point was that minds and abstract objects are the only things that we uncontroversially *know of*. not saying this is sound but i think that's what he's probably getting at, to be as charitable as possible.

[thinkingchristian]

Fodor made an interesting point in his book “Unreasonable Faith” which was asking the question “why did the cause have to be personal?” as opposed to impersonal like the Dao or something. I’m curious what Craig’s take on that would be because I’ve always thought there was a “leap” there to get to a personal God.

[sneakysnake]

It would be crazy if you and WLC could have a dialogue on the Kalam.

[matthieulavagna]

Man I would pay 50$ to see you debate Craig. I really want him to engage with these objections.

[johannmatthee]

@majesty of reason, I really respect you as a philosopher, and as a Christian your content is always challenging and refreshing, although I think, this is my lamen opinion, if you approach the supposed origen of the universe you need to take into account the physics surrounding it.

: Space Time
A core observation in support of the big bang model is the dact that space is expanding, numerous cosmologist would argue that from the data space, the literal void/fabric of reality is expanding ever more rapidly. It follows quite easily that if time did began, and if space is expanding( meaning from moment tot moment the distances between atoms increase), it follows that space was atleast smaller every moment prior to the current moment. Couple that with the singularity theory, that space started at a particular point, point in physics usually means dimentionless object or area, then you have 2 observation at the core of moder physics that seem to make it more probable than not that space did in fact also begin at a singular point.

I am mostlikely wrong, idk but I just wanted to share some thoughts.

[CallTruthChannel]

You should really look into the theology of the shaykh of Islam Ibn Taymiyyah. He was a physicalist who believed that all ontological exitsents must be spatiotemporal, including angels, souls, the Resurrection, and Paradise and Hellfire. Even God Himself is a tremendous Creator being who is greater than the entirety of creation in a spatial sense and who has a spatial location outside the created world, such that we literally raise our hands towards God in prayer. Yes, he refrained from using the term "body" to describe God as it is non-scriptural, but he nevertheless believed that the meaning intended can be correct. He instead used scriptural terminology such as God is "above His creation", "has created Adam in His image", and is "upon His throne", arguing that the early Muslims believed that they will literally see the face of God above them when they enter Paradise, just as we today see the sun and the moon in the sky, and that this will be the most joyful experience in Paradise.

Moreover, Ibn Taymiyyah believed that God must be described with successive volitions and acts that subsist in His essence and which call His created effects into existence in the world. This is because the world cannot be changing if its Cause is atemporal and motionless. He also committed to the necessity of perpetual divine activity. That is, God must have been acting voluntarily from the eternal past and must continue to act voluntarily into the infinite future, in full accordance with His perfect wisdom and mercy. He believed that it is impossible for God to start doing things after having not been doing anything at all from past eternity, because firstly, that is an imperfection that implies that God needed something to become more perfect, and secondly, it contradicts the very principle of causality on which the cosmological arguments for God's existence ought to be predicated in the first place.

Ibn Taymiyyah also accepted towards the end of his life that God necessarily originates things ex materia, and that the notion of ex nihilo is metaphysically impossible. See "Ibn Taymiyyah on Creation ex Materia" for more information. Whenever God wishes to originate a substance after its nonexitsence, He necessarily prepares its prior causes and material conditions beforehand. Yes, the genus of material conditions is eternal according to Ibn Taymiyyah, but no particular matter accompanies God from eternity. Rather, God has been perpetually bringing things into existence in place of other conditions which He removes from existence entirely, such that God is the only eternal and necessarily existing being, and everything besides Him is created after its nonexistence.

This beautiful theology goes hand in hand with the concerns of modern-day naturalists. There is no need to maintain that God breaks any necessary laws of physics as He creates things. Miracles such as splitting the moon and the sea and resurrecting the dead can be deemed physically possible.
Yes, Abrahamic monotheism is incompatible with the notion of a deterministic universe, as such a view requires that there is only one way the universe can evolve, such that each state of the universe necessitates exactly one later state of the universe. Abrahamic monotheism, on the other hand, entails that God is able to miraculously change the world and keep it in existence forever. However, I am convinced that if one comes to accept that the universe is indeterministic, he would not be required to contradict the strong version of the PSR. This is because one can still commit to Ibn Taymiyyah's theological determinism, such that God necessarily preponderates one course of evolution of the universe over another course of evolution of the universe, from a prior state of the universe that carried the potential for both courses of evolution.

I wish you all the best. May God guide you and show you the way.

[queencabbage]

Good ol' Bill. Our favorite parrot

[jobinkoshy]

I want to see a discussion btw Joe and Craig, like Craig had with Cosmic Skeptic

[logicalliberty]

"the KAW-lawm cosmological argument"

frank turek manages to hit new lows even when pronouncing things

[japexican]

Professing themselves to be wise, they became fools, And changed the glory of the uncorruptible God into an image made like to corruptible man, and to birds, and fourfooted beasts, and creeping things. Wherefore God also gave them up to uncleanness through the lusts of their own hearts, to dishonour their own bodies between themselves: who changed the truth of God into a lie, and worshipped and served the creature more than the Creator, who is blessed for ever. Amen. Romans 1:22-25 KJV

[bengreen]

I think it was the famous thinker Odegaard who said, "just because Jesus inspires us, doesn't mean we're going to win the league"...

[nemdenemam]

4:23 'in order to get a temporal effect from a Timeless cause you need something like a spontaneous free decision'
What does 'decision' mean without temporality? Isn't temporality what orders cause and causation? What does non-random decision of creation mean if not that in reaction of being aware of non existence he caused existence? Does Craig (or anyone else) provide any argumentation of what decision is without temporality? Or does the ordering of cause-causation not necessitate temporality?

[Opposite]

-If Presentism is the case, then this seems to imply a error theory about the past.
-Positive propositions about the past can not correspond to reality if the past doesn’t exist.
-This implies that there is no truth about whether the past is infinite or finite.
-One could translate this into „there is no such thing that is the past and that is infinite“ and „there is no such thing that is the past and that is finite“.
-The question „is the past finite or not?“ is similar to the question „is the present King of France bald or not?“.

[robertsimonuy]

Which specific argument are we talking about here? Because it seems that your objections work for some but fail for other cosmological arguments.

[christopherp.]

Do you think causality only exists in a temporal space (like infinite regress)? Or is there a possibility of a timeless cause? Just curious what you think in that regard

[MetroidTheorist]

I wonder what your thoughts would be on the notion of space-time being emergent. There's an article from Scientific American called What is Spacetime Really Made Of? that speaks on the AdS/CFT correspondence. Space-time as fundamental reality is questioned.

[akhan]

The Cosmological Argument/Contingent Argument was put forward by Imam Ghazali, A Muslim Scholar and Philosopher

[bearartist]

love your videos, can you please explain more about abstract objects outside the mind what about maths