Kripke's Wittgenstein Lecture

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This lecture is about a skeptical problem developed by Kripke according to his reading of Wittgenstein. Students will be able to identify the skeptical problem, learn about dispositionalism and the normativity thesis of meaning, and explore a possible solution to the skeptical problem.

[MyRobertallen]

Forget about Tarski's truth-schema: it is part of a semantic thesis and, thus, does not yield the 'metaphysical fact' Kripkenstein is looking for. Dispositionalism is the way to go. It is a natural fact that training and practice inculcate what Aristotle called 'habits' or 'tendencies.' The training for quaddition must be, by hypothesis, distinct from what one undergoes to add. Thus, unless someone has received the former type of instruction, there is no reason to suspect him of quadding.

[pontifrancesco]

It seems to me that premise 2 should be " there are no facts which accord ONLY with Jones actual uses of the term 'plus' ", so the problem is to not to find a unique fact that accords only with the use of plus, since there are many facts which accord with the use of plus, the point is that they can be also considered as quaddition operation.
About the second part It seems to me that premise 1 actually is: " if Jones means addition by plus, then additioning by plus is required in order for Jones to addionate by plus( since saying mathematically correct presupposes already addition)

[kirbyurner]

There's no rule that says people get to mean whatever they want by "plus". The premise that Jones has this privilege is suspect. Were he to come back and say, "oh, I never meant by my plus, what ya'll meant by your plus" we could retort "when did you acquire the power to mean any ol' thing you want, by using our public word?" As if Jones had said "by 'sparrow' I shall mean 'potato in bright sunlight' from now on." Oh really? Must we believe him?

[lukasdonald]

"Addition" and "sum" aren't contested in this. Maybe because it goes without saying that 4 is the sum of 2 and 2 regardless of the linguistic operations we use to demonstrate the calculation. This is a truth, no matter how normative it might be. What is contested is whether "Jones" means addition by plus - well, how about 1. looking at the numbers, and 2. asking Jones?
I don't see the philosophical relevance of any of this.