Game Theory 101 (#79): Pooling Equilibrium

This lecture explains pooling equilibrium, a type of perfect Bayesian equilibrium used in signaling games. In a pooling equilibrium, the different types play the same strategy. Thus, the uninformed player cannot update their information based on the strategy they observe. We begin with a very simple example in this lecture before tackling some problems that can pop up next time.

[johnames]

Great video series. Small mistake on the SPNE/backwards induction... If Strong type reveals, she would not fight, she would quit. 0 > -1

[dirojas]

This is seriously one of the best explanations around for this type of games thanks

[herrjaimejimenez]

I feel as empty as when you have watched such an amazing show on TV and the last episode from the last season ends...

[jackchen]

just wanna say thank you William, I've watched all your Game Theory videos and read your book. they are really amazing and help me understand the materials better. -from an Econ student

[booyneextdoor]

damn these videos are better than 2h long lectures, I wonder why I still go to university

[PunmasterSTP]

Pooling? More like "cool"-ing, because this stuff is so neat! Equilibrium? More like awesome-librium! Hiding? More like deriving...a lot of enjoyment and satisfaction from this series! Hiding, more like...

Actually, I think it's best to stop here. 😎

[ssssssstssssssss]

Thanks. I've been following through your lectures while reading through the textbook Multiagent Systems and your lectures have been quite helpful.

[sevdasattari]

Thanks a lot! I could understand it finally!

[Maja]

Great tutorials! When is the next video about off the path believes coming?!

[selinamei]

When is the next one coming? So desparate to see it!

[fredgui]

It helps me so much, current U of R graduate

[alirezataqdiri]

Impatiently waiting for your next videos. We really enjoyed the recent videos. Wonder if there is any schedule for releasing future lectures regarding Semi-separate equilibrium, Sequential ones etc. Thanks a lot!

[chohomarco]

thanks will. May I ask, if it is matter for pooling which side of the game in the very first place?

[tobiromano]

It's 1 am and I am not sure whether I am just tired, but at 1:35 you say that -1 is better than 0 and player 2 would chose to fight if player 1 was strong and had revealed himself. That has to be wrong right?

[wolfgangi]

Do you arbitrarily think of the game as separating or pooling and solve accordingly? If that's not the case how would we know if it's a separating game or a pooling game?

[chrisspyropoulos]

Hi, what should I do if I need to check for profitable deviations and the other side of the extensive form is an information set (i.e. player 2 has an information set after the strong and weak type play reveal)?

[dronesect.]

Thanks Will, Game Theory is so interesting! :)
Is this similar to the 'quiche or beer' dueling game?

[rozkadose]

you speak to fast ... its difficult to follow you for non english speakers... please speak with low pace

[vedoboundry]

your voice sounds angrier compared to your first video

[gold_apple_vn]

This peticular lecture is not cover in university according to your own believe