Is Free Will Compatible with God's Omniscience? (Dr. Taylor Cyr)

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00:00-3:22 Introduction
3:23-4:43 what do we mean by ‘God’?
4:44-5:55 what is it for God to be eternal?
5:55-7:00 what is it for God to be essentially omniscient?
7:01-9:00 what is free will?
9:01-9:43 What’s the general idea about why free will and divine foreknowledge are incompatible?
9:43-12:09 What is the main argument for the incompatibility of free will and divine foreknowledge?
12:10-12:56 What is it to have a choice about something?
12:57-14:07 How does the main argument generalize to other actions?
14:07-17:13 Is the argument valid? What is validity?
17:14-18:34 Is the premise plausible that we don’t have a choice about what God believes a thousand years ago? What is the fixity of the past?
18:35-19:57 Does the argument involve backward causation?
19:57-22:00 Is the second premise (that God’s believing X will occur entails that X will occur) of the main argument plausible?
22:01-25:35 Can we say that since human foreknowledge allows free will, so does divine free will? How are human foreknowledge and divine foreknowledge different?
25:35-29:45 Why isn’t Molinism a solution to the problem of divine foreknowledge and free will?
29:46-30:43 What are, broadly, the compatibilist and incompatibilist responses to the main argument?
30:44-31:32 How are the terms ‘compatibilism’ and incompatibilism’ used in different ways?
31:33-34:09 What is the timelessness response to the main argument?
34:10-36:45 Why does the timelessness response not sufficiently deal with the puzzle? How can we revise the main argument to avoid the timelessness response?
36:45-38:52 How is there an analogue of the fixity of the past principle in a revised version of the main argument (designed to deal with the timelessness response?)
38:52-43:00 What is Ockhamism? What is the difference between hard and soft facts?
43:01-44:20 How does Ockhamism apply to the main argument?
44:21-48:08 What is the first problem with the Ockhamist response?
48:09-50:28 What is the second problem with the Ockhamist response?
50:28-55:58 What is the Dependence view?
55:59-59:29 What is an objection to the Dependence view?
59:30-59:46 What are the incompatibilist responses?
59:47-1:02:06 What is open theism?
1:02:07-1:04:10 Which premise does the open theist attack?
1:04:11-1:05:24 How is free will relevant to the problem of evil?
1:05:25-1:06:35 Does the open theist give up the view that God is omniscient?
1:06:35-1:08:35 What are the two versions of open theism: open futurism and limited foreknowledge?
1:08:36-1:10:54 Does God have a mechanism for knowing? How does God know what he knows?
1:10:55-1:12:56 What are some objections to open theism?
1:12:57-1:14:30 What is the semi-compatibilism?
1:14:30-1:18:30 What are Frankfurt counterexamples and how do they support semi-compatibilism?
1:18:31-1:20:52 What is PAP (the principle of alternative possibilities)?
1:20:53-1:23:30 What is an objection to semi-compatibilism?
1:23:30-1:27:00 What’s an overall summary of the discussion?
1:27:01-1:27:37 Why do Dr. Cyr and Jordan Hampton look like nemeses?
1:27:38-1:34:07 Does God have the ability to do otherwise?
1:34:08-1:37:35 Why do you prefer semi-compatibilism to source libertarianism?
1:37:36-1:40:11 If God knows the future, then can God be free?
1:40:12-1:41:58 How, on Molinism, can there be alternate possibilities in specific circumstances?
1:41:59-1:45:27 Why not be a presentist? Doesn’t eternalism lead to a weird view of persons?
1:45:27-1:49:01 Is Dr. Cyr reformed?

Theists are faced with a puzzle. If God's foreknows that I will do something before I do it, then is it the case that I must do that thing? And If I must do that thing, am I really free?

In this interview, Dr. Taylor Cyr (pronounced "seer") joins me to discuss various solutions to this puzzle. He is a philosophy professor at Samford University. For more information, check out his website linked below.

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Great video this topic is very interesting to me so I loved it 👍

lowkeytheology
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God's absolute sovereignty is of utmost importance because we cannot die without God's decree

Over-for-now
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21:35 Regarding the question, inspired by WL Craig, about the argument's invalidity, note that you can make the argument valid by just adding this principle, commonly known in the free will literature as Beta: "If I have no choice about p, and necessarily, (if p then q), then I have no choice about q." It's not uncontroversial, but I think it's very, very plausible. I think it was safe to assume it for this discussion.

andrewmoon
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The modified "timeless" premises are flawed because they're still arguing God's timelessness from a time perspective. It's the same argument with different words, it doesn't actually comport with God's timelessness.

MineStrongth
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I really appreciated this conversation, I was really hoping for a sound answer but it seems, in less words, his view was "not really". Unless you take on an entirely non theist view of semi compatiblism which is on par with Sam Harris and Dan Dennetts view of compatiblism. Two hard atheist.

CounterApologeticsWithNara
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God chooses freewill then that is the basis for his choice for us.

donhaddix
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If our choices make certain things true, and God only believes true things, then our choices do affect God's beliefs, timeless or otherwise.

quad
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Can someone explain to me how does Okhamism not entail middle knowledge? We are talking about God not only knowing the future but also acting in the future and planing the future (at least some aspects of it e.g. Jesus' death). If we say that God _chooses_ his actions, then that seems to imply that he _considers_ some alternative (e.g. not acting). But if he considers some alternative, then that produces a whole counter-factual branch in his knowledge. This sounds like Molinism already. How does Okhamism conjoined with the fact that God chooses His actions not entail Molinism?

tymmiara
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Would it be more accurate to say “God knew” rather than “God believed”? Is it really appropriate to speak of God having “beliefs.”

delbert
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What's the difference between ockhamism and the dependence view. Can you hold both?

Joshtheigbo
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In context of this interview how would one from each view point break down these verses from 1 Peter...and others like it? …15For it is God’s will that by doing good you should silence the ignorance of foolish men. 16Live in freedom, but do not use your freedom as a cover-up for evil; live as servants of God. 17Treat everyone with high regard: Love the brotherhood of believers, fear God, honor the king.…
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kylesellers
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If I ask God what if I will raise my hand in the next 10 seconds or he doesn't know and he tells me and I do the opposite with my free will, God is fallible. If God tells me he doesn't know, God is not all-knowing.

gabrielteo
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did your channel name used to be Crash Course Apologetics?

daman
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But it could also be that if he sees it, does he or anyone have the freewill to change what he sees? If what is seen is what will be done then where is freewill?

TomAnderson_
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I'll be having a free will debate Friday 2-17-23 at 7pm central live on my channel if you or anyone else is interested.

CounterApologeticsWithNara
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God did not believe 1, 000 years ago that I would watch this video when I did.

willcd
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God's Omniscience isn't even compatible with God's omniscience.

sqlblindman