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Is Free Will Compatible with God's Omniscience? (Dr. Taylor Cyr)
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00:00-3:22 Introduction
3:23-4:43 what do we mean by ‘God’?
4:44-5:55 what is it for God to be eternal?
5:55-7:00 what is it for God to be essentially omniscient?
7:01-9:00 what is free will?
9:01-9:43 What’s the general idea about why free will and divine foreknowledge are incompatible?
9:43-12:09 What is the main argument for the incompatibility of free will and divine foreknowledge?
12:10-12:56 What is it to have a choice about something?
12:57-14:07 How does the main argument generalize to other actions?
14:07-17:13 Is the argument valid? What is validity?
17:14-18:34 Is the premise plausible that we don’t have a choice about what God believes a thousand years ago? What is the fixity of the past?
18:35-19:57 Does the argument involve backward causation?
19:57-22:00 Is the second premise (that God’s believing X will occur entails that X will occur) of the main argument plausible?
22:01-25:35 Can we say that since human foreknowledge allows free will, so does divine free will? How are human foreknowledge and divine foreknowledge different?
25:35-29:45 Why isn’t Molinism a solution to the problem of divine foreknowledge and free will?
29:46-30:43 What are, broadly, the compatibilist and incompatibilist responses to the main argument?
30:44-31:32 How are the terms ‘compatibilism’ and incompatibilism’ used in different ways?
31:33-34:09 What is the timelessness response to the main argument?
34:10-36:45 Why does the timelessness response not sufficiently deal with the puzzle? How can we revise the main argument to avoid the timelessness response?
36:45-38:52 How is there an analogue of the fixity of the past principle in a revised version of the main argument (designed to deal with the timelessness response?)
38:52-43:00 What is Ockhamism? What is the difference between hard and soft facts?
43:01-44:20 How does Ockhamism apply to the main argument?
44:21-48:08 What is the first problem with the Ockhamist response?
48:09-50:28 What is the second problem with the Ockhamist response?
50:28-55:58 What is the Dependence view?
55:59-59:29 What is an objection to the Dependence view?
59:30-59:46 What are the incompatibilist responses?
59:47-1:02:06 What is open theism?
1:02:07-1:04:10 Which premise does the open theist attack?
1:04:11-1:05:24 How is free will relevant to the problem of evil?
1:05:25-1:06:35 Does the open theist give up the view that God is omniscient?
1:06:35-1:08:35 What are the two versions of open theism: open futurism and limited foreknowledge?
1:08:36-1:10:54 Does God have a mechanism for knowing? How does God know what he knows?
1:10:55-1:12:56 What are some objections to open theism?
1:12:57-1:14:30 What is the semi-compatibilism?
1:14:30-1:18:30 What are Frankfurt counterexamples and how do they support semi-compatibilism?
1:18:31-1:20:52 What is PAP (the principle of alternative possibilities)?
1:20:53-1:23:30 What is an objection to semi-compatibilism?
1:23:30-1:27:00 What’s an overall summary of the discussion?
1:27:01-1:27:37 Why do Dr. Cyr and Jordan Hampton look like nemeses?
1:27:38-1:34:07 Does God have the ability to do otherwise?
1:34:08-1:37:35 Why do you prefer semi-compatibilism to source libertarianism?
1:37:36-1:40:11 If God knows the future, then can God be free?
1:40:12-1:41:58 How, on Molinism, can there be alternate possibilities in specific circumstances?
1:41:59-1:45:27 Why not be a presentist? Doesn’t eternalism lead to a weird view of persons?
1:45:27-1:49:01 Is Dr. Cyr reformed?
Theists are faced with a puzzle. If God's foreknows that I will do something before I do it, then is it the case that I must do that thing? And If I must do that thing, am I really free?
In this interview, Dr. Taylor Cyr (pronounced "seer") joins me to discuss various solutions to this puzzle. He is a philosophy professor at Samford University. For more information, check out his website linked below.
3:23-4:43 what do we mean by ‘God’?
4:44-5:55 what is it for God to be eternal?
5:55-7:00 what is it for God to be essentially omniscient?
7:01-9:00 what is free will?
9:01-9:43 What’s the general idea about why free will and divine foreknowledge are incompatible?
9:43-12:09 What is the main argument for the incompatibility of free will and divine foreknowledge?
12:10-12:56 What is it to have a choice about something?
12:57-14:07 How does the main argument generalize to other actions?
14:07-17:13 Is the argument valid? What is validity?
17:14-18:34 Is the premise plausible that we don’t have a choice about what God believes a thousand years ago? What is the fixity of the past?
18:35-19:57 Does the argument involve backward causation?
19:57-22:00 Is the second premise (that God’s believing X will occur entails that X will occur) of the main argument plausible?
22:01-25:35 Can we say that since human foreknowledge allows free will, so does divine free will? How are human foreknowledge and divine foreknowledge different?
25:35-29:45 Why isn’t Molinism a solution to the problem of divine foreknowledge and free will?
29:46-30:43 What are, broadly, the compatibilist and incompatibilist responses to the main argument?
30:44-31:32 How are the terms ‘compatibilism’ and incompatibilism’ used in different ways?
31:33-34:09 What is the timelessness response to the main argument?
34:10-36:45 Why does the timelessness response not sufficiently deal with the puzzle? How can we revise the main argument to avoid the timelessness response?
36:45-38:52 How is there an analogue of the fixity of the past principle in a revised version of the main argument (designed to deal with the timelessness response?)
38:52-43:00 What is Ockhamism? What is the difference between hard and soft facts?
43:01-44:20 How does Ockhamism apply to the main argument?
44:21-48:08 What is the first problem with the Ockhamist response?
48:09-50:28 What is the second problem with the Ockhamist response?
50:28-55:58 What is the Dependence view?
55:59-59:29 What is an objection to the Dependence view?
59:30-59:46 What are the incompatibilist responses?
59:47-1:02:06 What is open theism?
1:02:07-1:04:10 Which premise does the open theist attack?
1:04:11-1:05:24 How is free will relevant to the problem of evil?
1:05:25-1:06:35 Does the open theist give up the view that God is omniscient?
1:06:35-1:08:35 What are the two versions of open theism: open futurism and limited foreknowledge?
1:08:36-1:10:54 Does God have a mechanism for knowing? How does God know what he knows?
1:10:55-1:12:56 What are some objections to open theism?
1:12:57-1:14:30 What is the semi-compatibilism?
1:14:30-1:18:30 What are Frankfurt counterexamples and how do they support semi-compatibilism?
1:18:31-1:20:52 What is PAP (the principle of alternative possibilities)?
1:20:53-1:23:30 What is an objection to semi-compatibilism?
1:23:30-1:27:00 What’s an overall summary of the discussion?
1:27:01-1:27:37 Why do Dr. Cyr and Jordan Hampton look like nemeses?
1:27:38-1:34:07 Does God have the ability to do otherwise?
1:34:08-1:37:35 Why do you prefer semi-compatibilism to source libertarianism?
1:37:36-1:40:11 If God knows the future, then can God be free?
1:40:12-1:41:58 How, on Molinism, can there be alternate possibilities in specific circumstances?
1:41:59-1:45:27 Why not be a presentist? Doesn’t eternalism lead to a weird view of persons?
1:45:27-1:49:01 Is Dr. Cyr reformed?
Theists are faced with a puzzle. If God's foreknows that I will do something before I do it, then is it the case that I must do that thing? And If I must do that thing, am I really free?
In this interview, Dr. Taylor Cyr (pronounced "seer") joins me to discuss various solutions to this puzzle. He is a philosophy professor at Samford University. For more information, check out his website linked below.
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