Panzers in Poland 1939 – Success, Failures & Losses

German Panzers in Poland 1939 were crucial in the success, but also suffered quite some losses and various shortcomings were detected.

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Jentz, Thomas L.: Panzertruppen – The complete guide to the Creation & Combat Employment of Germany’s Tank Force – 1933-1942

Citino, Robert M.: The German Way of War

Kennedy, Robert M.: The German Campagin in Poland (1939), Department of the Army

Frieser, Karl-Heinz: The Blitzkrieg Legend

Frieser, Karl-Heinz: The war in the West, 1939-1940: an unplanned Blitzkrieg. In: Cambridge History of the Second World War, Volume I: p. 287-314

Maier, Klaus; Rohde, Horst; Stegemann, Bernd; Umbreit, Hans: Die Errichtung der Hegemonie auf dem europäischen Kontient. Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg (DR2WK), Band 2.

Zaloga, Steven J. : Poland 1939 – The Birth of Blitzkrieg

Perrett, Bryan: German Light Panzers – 1932-42

Müller, Rolf-Dieter: Hitlers Wehrmacht, 1935-1945

[ariosarg]

About the strategic choice of the Polish commander, I recently read a Google book about it, it was a political choice which he knew was poor.
He had to defend the whole western border to reassure the government and the western population of Poland, also so that France and the United Kingdom would not have an excuse to not intervene as the Polish could be regarded as unwilling to fight against the Germans.
He, however, only assigned lighter and less experienced divisions to the least relevant areas, and as we well know now, neither France nor the United Kingdom turned out to have any interest to actually do anything about Germany.

[TedSCSI]

Such a high percentange of total losses of Panzer III during September campaign are often explained by the fact that they were deployed as a spearhead of attacking units. Notice that none of Pz-Bef III were lost completly, 13 of those were damaged but all of them repaired after campaign - so the tank with almost the same armour as ordinary PzIII but deployed in a different way did not suffered such a losses.

[vennonetes]

I'm just at minute 2 and I can see an improvement in aesthetics. (In my opinion) it makes the presentation more pleasant, bravo!

[rrynek]

I will rely on Polish books "PzKpfw III Ausf. A-D" and "PzKpfw III Aufs. E-H " by Janusz Ledwoch (ISBN 9788372193537 and 9788372193759).
According to him 33-34 PzKpfw III Ausf E took part in fights against Poland. The rest were older variants A-D. E variant suffered from reliability issues (faulty gearbox) and roughly 1/3 of them couldn't take part in combat to full extent. Out of 26 tanks lost only 3 were of E variant (9% of all Ausf E tanks). A-D models had thin armour so it might be a good explanation why they suffered quite high losses. Ledwoch also gave some information about distribution of those tanks amongst various units. 1. Panzer-Division had 26 Ausf A-D tanks (20 in the 1St Regiment and 6 in 2nd Regiment) and it lost 11 of them. As far as I know this division was part of 10th Army and it was one of main units sent towards Warsaw so those tanks were used against main Polish units defending the city. Since those tanks had guns capable of firing HE shells they were more likely to be used at the spearhead of the assault. Combined with weak armour this would mean high losses. 2.Panzer-Division had 6 Ausf. B-C tanks. This unit took part in fights in Souther Poland- they fought against Polish 10th Motorized Cavalry Brigade, one of few Polish units equipped with tanks (Vickers E in this case). 5. Panzer Division had 3 Ausf D tanks, 10. Panzer Division had 3 B and C tanks. Ledwoch also mentioned that amongst 26 lost tanks 7 were not completely destroyed but they were damaged beyond repair and had to be written off.

[GraemeBray]

You have to laugh at YouTube algorithm, the "Up Next" suggested video is Wolter's World, "Visiting Poland - The Don'ts of Poland". Maybe invasion with a panzer army is one of those don'ts?

[ewoksarecool]

I love the attention to proper sourcing

[Skiskiski]

Around half--a--dozen Polish generals left the Polish military in protest of the "self--promotion" of Rydz--Smigly to the rank of the Marshal of Poland and the head of the Polish armed forces. In spite of the flaws as a commander-in-chief, Rydz-Smigly did start necessarily slow modernization of the Polish armed forces in 1935.
The Polish deployment of the forces to every corner of Western Poland was caused by the slow curving of Czechoslovakia. It ended up curved out of existence. However, Marshal Rydz--Smigly did overdo it. General Władysław Bortnowski in charge of the army defending the Polish (Kashubian) Corridor as soon as the plan was drawn two weeks before the war, even before his army got mobilized and deployed, started sending requests to the Polish High Command to allow him to move two infantry divisions and one cavalry brigade out of the very corridor. Bortnowski was right. All the above--mentioned units were destroyed and he lost 1/3rd of his army. Bortnowski has to be noted for subordinating himself to another general in charge of another army, General Kutrzeba and making the Battle of Bzura (Kutno) possible. Coming back to the issue of defending every inch of Poland. Getting 15, 000 of the Coastal Defence infantry stuck by Gdynia sea port was another unwise decision of Rydz-Smigly. The defensive works in the area could be manned by no more than 5, 000 soldiers. The biggest mistake of Rydz-Smigly was not securing the path of retreat into the Romanian Bridgehead as well as not defending the very bridgehead from the Soviet aggression. When the Poles could not afford to fight both the Germans and the Soviets, they could have gotten ready to defend a relatively small area of the very bridgehead. The before mentioned two infantry division, one cavalry brigade, and 10, 000 Coastal Defence infantry could have been deployed at Piotrkow Trybunalski, Tomaszow Lubelski, Lviv (Lwow), and Stryj. Polish Minister Beck argued before the very war that Lviv should become a secondary capital of Poland and a military stronghold in the case of war. As to the Western Allies, they should have not allowed for the Czechoslovak equipment and the military factories to fall into the Germans hands. Poland definitely could have used the Czechoslovak tank and armored car factories as well as 244 Czechoslovak LT-35 tanks as well as 27 LT-34 tanks as well as 40 tankettes and other military equipment.

[gunnarherzog]

4:38 "Achievement Unlocked: Wall of Text" LMAO

[HPMlangdale]

"But lets be honest here. This is clearly not complicated enough."

[derrickthewhite]

I think I now understand why people stopped putting machine guns on tanks as their main armament. Tanks want to deal with things that threaten them first, and It'd never occurred to me that a machine gun is a poor weapon to attack field guns or anti-tank riffles. A very interesting video. Now I'm curious about the evolution of tanks through the war.

[Skiskiski]

Question about the Polish tanks: Poland had around 120 single--turret 9.9 ton 7Tp or PT-7 tanks that were the development of Vickers E 6 tons (by 1939, twin turret version was used only in the training companies). The Polish tanks had Bofors 37 MM AT and Polish Gundlach's telescope*. Moreover, Poles operated around 50 Renault R.35 which they judged inferior to the Polish design before the Polish Defensive War in 1939, and inferior to even Vickers E 6 tons after the very campaign. Poles used a couple dozen of Vickers E 6 tons as well. In addition, the Poles used FT-17 either as tanks or in barricades. The most numerous Polish armoured vehicle was a tankette (over 500), but only a couple dozen was built with 20 mm 38FK antitank autocannon. In addition, the Poles used some armoured cars.*--Known in Great Britain as Vickers Tank Periscope MK.IV and in the Soviet Union as MK-4 and used by other armies. It was allowing 360--degree view without the need to turn around.

[TSmith-yycc]

Top quality, reliably sourced content as usual. You run a great channel, thank you for the hard work!

[Skiskiski]

It is possible that the high losses of the Panzer III were caused by the German tactic of deploying heavier tanks in front of the lighter tanks during an attack against the Polish artillery positions. The Panzer IV's frontal armour was more capable of surviving hits from the Polish Bofors 37 mm cannons and 75 field guns shooting stop--a-gap anti-tank rounds. Also, the Polish anti-tank rifle's bullet was designed to disintegrate and transfer the energy causing spalling inside the tank. The fact that they could penetrate the armour of the Panzer I and Panzer II was not optimal.

[maciejniedzielski]

@ Military History Visualised thank you for remembering 01 September 1939. 78th anniversary.

[sevenproxies]

Have you considered making an in-depth video about the Battle of Wizna? Also theatrically referred to as "The Polish Battle of Thermopylae"?

I think your meticulous attention to facts and detail on this specific battle would result in a very interesting video about the effects and end results of that battle in particular.

[beyoss]

Invasion of half of the Poland, do not forget it. Dozens of tanks and amrored vehicles were distroyed by polish armored trains, witch did suprisingly well (according to book "Polskie pociągi pancerne 1939"). Also lets not forget about PZL 23 Karaś bomber and 133 (fiew?) 7-TP tank (37mm canon). So not only anti tank rifle and guns.

[antyteista]

The purpose of relocating Polish forces alongside whole western border was to show to France and Britain that 'we are defending' because those countries were obligated to help Poland only when it will defend against agressors. Rydz-Śmigły wanted those countries to have 'no doubt' about it. That is why he made such a stupid decision instead of relocating the army on the Wehrmacht's main offensive directions. It was political decision. Unfortunetly France and Britain never came. You should mention that this was political decision in the video. For now, it looks like he was pretty stupid commander which is not true.

[creepystares]

wow. each episode I watch, I'm more impressed. thank you.

[timonsolus]

I disagree strongly with your assertion that the Panzer I and Panzer II were intended only for training.

If this had been the case, why were they constructed with real homogeneous armour plate? Why not build them out of mild steel, which was much cheaper? Like the first 2 Neubaufahrzeug prototypes?

In actual fact, the German Army initially ordered 150 training versions of the Panzer I, followed by 1, 000 of the combat-ready version (the Ausf. A). Only 15 out of 150 training versions (without turrets) were actually delivered before production switched to the Ausf A, of which 800 were built. Finally 684 of the improved Ausf B model were built, along with 200+ of the command tank version.

It was a superior fighting machine to the Italian and Polish tankettes that were its contemporaries.

The Panzer II was also a combat-ready tank. Even the 125 pre-series, the Ausf a, b, and c.

The Wehrmacht interpretation of a training tank is one that is considered unfit for combat. The Panzer I did not fall into that category, as it was sent into combat in Spain, Poland, Norway, the Low Countries, France, the Balkans, North Africa and Russia, up until late 1941. The Panzer II was still in service in 1945.

[gianlucaborg]

For the Panzer III, check out armour thickness vs AT rounds. The Pzr 3 was used like IV but had weaker armour, so got banged up more.
Note: it was shorter ranged

I stand to be corrected.