Ought implies can

According to the "ought implies can" principle, an agent has a moral obligation to do X only if the agent is able to do X. This video outlines some challenges to this principle.

[neoepicurean]

The first objection - the problem with excuses and apologies - I wrote about a similar point in an essay on moral dilemmas - Williams (1973, cited in Conee, 1982, p.90) claims that we should not expect 'ought implies can' to ‘eliminate from the scene the ‘ought’ which one cannot act on’. Given human psychology, it is perfectly plausible that an agent should still feel residue of regret or remorse related to the ‘eliminated’ ‘ought’. An hence would still feel the urge to apologise. 'Moral residue' as Williams terms it.

[ahmedbellankas]

1- d is an impossible ideal to be for any individual ;
2- john is an individual;
3- all individuals are rational, an individual i is rational iff that individual i acts according to his prefered want;
4- john knows 1;
5- if an individual s wants preferedly to p then individual s will act to arrive at doing p in accordance with his knowledge or best-estimated belief;
6- if the antecedent of 5 and the consequent of 5 then an individual wants preferedly p only if he knows or best-estimatedly believes it's possible for him to do p or at least epistemically open for him that he can do p;
C- so, john won't want preferedly to be d.
So, individuals won't run after impossible ideals if they know or best-estimatedly believe that those ideals are impossible.

[WackyConundrum]

I have a problem with what I call an explosion of obligations. Let's say that I agree that I have some reasonable obligations and that ought implies can. I can say that I have an obligation to give to charity, let's say. And I can do that. But then I may list a practically infinite number of things such that for each x I have an obligation to do x and I can do x. But it's obviously impossible to do all of those xs. How can one approach such a problem?

[desnir]

The second objection : "OIC trivializes moral obligations"

What a "OIC denier" respond to the fact that when we ought to do X we also ought to do everything possible to do X ? Putting ourseleves in the position where we are unable to fulfill the obligation is wrong....

Is there any contradiction with the OIC principle ?

[einwd]

it depends on the person and it's also just a problem of tone

[Ansatz]

From a consequentialist perspective, this issue seems trivial. We ought to do whichever among our options leads to the best outcome. Clearly anything that is beyond our capabilities would not be among our options and therefore such things could not be obligated. Instead this issue seems to be firmly centered upon a deontologist perspective where we are trying to determine whether the moral rules might include rules that apply even to people who are incapable of following those rules.

Deontology seems to be a misguided approximation of consequentialism. We all really expect good actions to lead to good outcomes. Some of us have mistakenly elevated the rules that guide our actions into being the true nature of morality, while really the rules are merely techniques that are aimed at achieving good outcomes and we only respect the rules for the sake of those good outcomes. If the rules stopped producing good outcomes, then even the deontologists would stop considering those rules to be moral. Deontologists probably would not become consequentialists and admit that outcomes are truly what define morality, but they would likely admit that their understanding of the moral rules has improved and that their previous moral rules were incorrect and that these new moral rules are closer to the truth, almost as if the good outcomes that obviously motivated this shift in rules were purely coincidental.

Assuming that the above is correct and that deontology truly is just an attempted approximation of consequentialism, then it seems that a deontology that more closely approximates consequentialism would be better than than a loose approximation. Therefore a successful deontology would most likely follow the rule that ought implies can whenever possible, since that is the consequentialist way.

7:13 "1. Sometimes when we fail to fulfill our obligations, we will give apologies or excuses that cite our inability to act."

If something prevents us from acting in a way that we otherwise ought to act, then the blame for our inaction should fall upon that thing instead of upon us. Therefore we will want to explain the situation to anyone who might be tempted into blaming us for something which was beyond our control.

12:20 "2. OIC trivializes moral obligations because it allows agents to escape from obligations by simply placing themselves in circumstances where they are unable to fulfil them."

When we are obligated to do a thing, we're also obligated to perform every necessary step along the path to making that thing happen, including not putting ourselves in circumstances where we are unable to fulfill the obligation. This strategy for avoiding one obligation can only work by violating some other obligation, so it is quite pointless.

17:02 "3. Promises in general create a problem for OIC."

It's obvious why a deontologist might come to the conclusion that we are obligated to keep promises that are beyond our abilities, since keeping promises is a fair guide to generating good outcomes in many situations, but it makes far more sense to obligate people to only make promises within their means rather than obligating people to do things beyond their means.

20:51 "4. Moral dilemmas. A lifeguard sees two people drowning, but can only save one."

The reason that this is a serious dilemma is because we know that this choice has grave moral consequences and yet we clearly do not have enough information to know how we should act to achieve the best consequences. The lifeguard has no idea who these people are. Maybe one is a doctor who will discover a cure for a terrible illness. Maybe one has a family with small children. Maybe one of them is a criminal that brings misery to many lives. Because we're not in possession of enough information, we're in great danger of making a grave mistake and that danger is sure to trouble most lifeguards. This does not suggest that the lifeguard is obligated to do the impossible.

24:07 "5. Epistemic obligations."

Epistemic obligations are very different from moral obligations. When we ought to believe something, it usually just means that belief in that thing is justified. It's a different sense of the word "ought" without the moral implications and where the rule that "ought implies can" does not apply.

Usually moral obligations only apply to our actions and not our beliefs, though it may happen that someone might say that we ought to believe something using the moral sense of the word. This seems most likely to occur in a religious context where beliefs are sometimes expected to have a direct impact upon outcomes. In that case, the rule of "ought implies can" would still apply and most likely a person who says we ought to believe a thing will also hold that we can believe it.

27:30 "6. Obligatory feelings."

Things that we ought to feel are very much akin to things that we ought to believe. It usually means that a certain feeling is justified, not that it is morally good, and as a result there's no reason to expect OIC to apply to obligatory feelings.

[WackyConundrum]

Would you be up to examining some ethical positions of some YouTubers? Maybe you would find it interesting, and your viewers too.