Pershing Lecture Series | When Stalemate Equals Victory: The Battle of Jutland - John Kuehn

The Battle of Jutland in the North Sea on May 31 – June 1, 1916 was the largest sea battle since the Battle of Lepanto in the Mediterranean nearly 350 years earlier. Dr. John Kuehn sails through the naval operations that led to and included this engagement – which was the last of its size in terms of numbers of battleships engaging each other within line of sight in history – between Great Britain’s Royal Navy Grand Fleet and Imperial Germany’s High Seas Fleet.

[dirtydieselguy]

History doesn't repeat, it rhymes, is an excellent point of view

[bonetiredtoo]

‘The German Fleet has assaulted its jailer, but it is still in jail.’ A famous quote but sums up Jutland perfectly. A couple of other points which are worth mentioning. In English Law dead men can't sue so I suspect that any attempt to sue for reputational damage would fail. Secondly, and this is pertinent to the US, a key thing that happened after the US declaration of war in April 1917 is the sending of Battleship Division Nine to Scapa in Nov 1917. That added four dreadnaughts to the strength of the Grand Fleet ...

[davidduma]

No one in the audience got the Frau Blücher joke?

[cragnamorra]

I'd always been a little ambivalent with the typical conventional wisdom that Jutland was "indecisive" or "inconclusive"; thanks for that perspective on its larger significance. It's easy to see why that perception dominates, of course. And it's easy to see how British opinion - whether among the public at large or within the UK govt and RN - was rather dissatisfied. But, "continuation of a status quo in which your navy already decisively dominates anyway" has to be counted as a strategic success, does it not? No matter how unsatisfying it may have been on an operational or tactical level.

Another way to look at it might be that Jutland could not have been anything OTHER than strategically "indecisive", regardless of tactical outcome. If Jellicoe does win the tactically "decisive" victory which so many have said for a century that he should have, does that really change anything in the big picture? It's hard to see how it would have. It's not as if Britain would have been able to "blockade harder" than it was doing anyway. It's also not as if it was really the HSF which primarily denied a realistic amphibious threat to Germany's North Sea and Baltic coasts...submarines, mines, robust coastal defenses/artillery, and simple geography/hydrography seem to have been larger - or at very least equal - factors.

It seems to me that a "decisive" (and necessarily far bloodier) Jutland would still have meant just what it did in the actual event: preservation - but no real improvement - of a status quo which already heavily favored Britain. So the only real difference would have been "merely" a lot more ships sunk and many thousands more British and German sailors killed. One could perhaps argue that Jutland's historical outcome - relatively light losses given the mammoth forces involved - was actually the best-case result for both navies. Short of the battle simply not having been fought at all, of course.

Very much a "hindsight 20/20" take from a century-later perspective, I admit.

[christianfournier]

(31:45) The Grand Fleet, expecting a torpedo attack, turns away from the Hochseeflotte when it makes an about turn – and thus loses contact.
A 'Jutland watcher' for many years, I only recently learned in another YT video that turning away from a torpedo attack was the Standard Operating Procedure in the Royal Navy at the time of Jutland.
Of course, the pertinence of that SOP is a matter of debate (a torpedo hit in the propellers is the worst thing that can happen to a battleship), but for a Navy man a SOP is a SOP!
If it is true that turning away was the SOP at the time of Jutland – and I wish Dr Kuehn could confirm – I can't see how Jellicoe could be blamed for implementing it in such critical circumstances.

[flashgordon]

Jellico could’ve been right and the Germans may have counter struck, the British Grand fleet with torpedo volleys and followed that up with a mass attack.
At the very least that would’ve caused massive confusion and irreparable damage, to the their Grand fleet.
Jellico’s first priority, was protecting the Grand fleet, above the destruction of Germany’s High fleet. He must’ve calculated the damages that were inflicted upon both fleets and knew that the British shipyards, could resolve Britain’s fleet damages, better and easier than Germany’s shipyards could theirs.
He knew that the odds already swung in Britain’s favour, far more in another future battle. Than the odds to risk ratio, in chasing down Germany’s fleet after Jutland.
He calculated all the risks and made the right decision.

Perhaps this is where the saying was coined? “Better safe than sorry.” Or, “He who fights and runs away, lives to fight another day.”

Thanks for a fantastic presentation. I really sensed the confusion and adrenaline that must’ve been surging and swaying at Jutland, and I learned a great deal from this.

Please do a program, about the roles and operations, of the other major powers, in and around WW1 if possible. I was particularly curious about what the French, Russian and Turkish navies were up to, while Jutland was happening.

Lastly, though Britain went against, their classic warfare strategy, in sending a massive land army, to fight the static war in France. Had we not done so, France would’ve been overrun by Germany, with disastrous consequences, for the outcome of the war.
Germany could’ve kept its military and industry going indefinitely and not been forced to surrender. They would’ve likely been able to pose far greater threats to the Riyal Navy, successfully blockaded Britain, stopped US military assistance, helped the Turkish Empire, to defend the Middle East and forced Italy to truce.
And once Britain fell, the rest of the world was next in line.
I don’t agree with, how WW1 was fought, in the fields of France. But it was a crucial theatre in WW1, bc Russia wasn’t able to withstand Germany after 1917. Had the British army, not already been in place to defend France. Nothing would’ve stopped the Germans getting to Paris and onwards to victory.

[jayhawk]

What victory for the RN? This was at best a draw and if you compare losses and on top expectations, it was a humuliation for the RN

[alganhar]

Never really agreed with the Easterners, those among the British who wanted to fight in the 'classic' British way.

Fact is the Western Front was the primary and main land front of the war. Had the British NOT sent so many men to fight in France and Belgium it is debatable whether France could have held on. Had France been knocked out of WWI then it was lost....

I think the Easterners, both then and now fail to realise that fact.

[nealthompson]

Don’t like Billy Mitchell, ‘eh? He probably wouldn’t like you either l! 🤣🤣

[cpawp]

A stalemate - questionable.
Germany could not change the blockade, the strategic situation remained unchanged, but by counts of men and ships lost Scheer won that battle, sry.
Plse do not mix the tactical outcome of a battle and he strategic situation of a war. Otherwise you have to declare the bloody defeat at the Somme as a victory as well.
Battle lost for the Brits - not by far a decisive loss for them neither a decisive win for Kaiser' battlefleet.