Determinism & Free Will

A few clips of Peter van Inwagen, John Martin Fischer, and Susan Wolf discussing determinism and its apparent threat to free will. Among other things, van Inwagen's famous consequence argument is discussed. The clips come from a program on free will as part of the series called the Examined Life.

"Among the grandest of philosophical puzzles is a riddle about moral responsibility. Almost all of us believe that each one of us is, has been, or will be responsible for at least some of our behavior. But how can this be so if determinism is true and all our thoughts, decisions, choices, and actions are simply droplets in a river of deterministic events that began its flow long, long before we were ever born? The specter of determinism, as it were, devours agents, for if determinism is true, then arguably we never initiate or control our actions; there is no driver in the driver's seat; we are simply one transitional link in an extended deterministic chain originating long before our time. The puzzle is tantalizingly gripping and ever so perplexing — because even if determinism is false, responsibility seems impossible: how can we be morally accountable for behavior that issues from an 'actional pathway' in which there is an indeterministic break? Such a break might free us from domination or regulation by the past, but how can it possibly help to ensure that the reins of control are now in our hands?" Ishtiyaque Haji

#Philosophy #FreeWill #Determinism

[petrospaulos]

I didn't want to make a comment on this video but it was determined at the big bang...

[tomisaacson]

"Your desire is not to be determined"

I think this line gets to the heart of the confusion in the idea that causal determinism is irreconcilable with any conception of freedom. To make any choice or any action is to determine oneself in a particular way. Once you've done it, it's never going to be the case that you haven't done it. My choice to type this comment is determined by physical processes which will have causal origins beyond my knowledge and control. It is also determined by many conscious phenomena. The fixation on the physical causes of the causes of the causes (and so on) subtly changes the question from "am I free enough to be held responsible?" to "am I ultimately free in some metaphysical sense?" And I think it only makes sense to be agnostic to the latter question. I'm not sure what ultimate freedom even means or why it's even desirable. I want to be determined in very particular ways. I'm always making choices that remove the possibility of other choices (that's just what it means to make a choice) and I want to be able to do that for good reasons. When I choose to go to bed at 11, I'm removing the possibility of making choices that would keep me up too late because I don't want to be tired the next day.

There's another subtle shift occurring in the conception of the self being employed. Is the self that made the choice to start typing this comment identical with the self that made the choice to subscribe to Philosophy Overdose? Or the self that decided to investigate the question of free will vs determinism? And what the about the self typing this question mark here? There are causal connections between all of them. A choice creates the conditions for the possibility of another choice. If I never subscribed to this channel I likely wouldn't have seen this video. If I never started typing this comment I wouldn't have typed that question mark.

If there is any freedom worth wanting, it will never be located through asking questions that presuppose all effects arise from prior necessary causes that ultimately reduce to a domino effect of particles. A category error occurs when one asks "where is the freedom in this neurotransmitter binding to this receptor? Or in the particles that happened to be around when you were being conceived and. If there is none, then freedom doesn't exist". It's also confused to think that our freedom consists in quantum indeterminacy. You would be no more free if all your choices were random.

It's a subjective phenomena that alternative choices appear to me and that I can alter my decisions by reflecting on their justifications. The freedom consists in a subject's capacity for that.

[jeremiahblum]

If our action is freely determined it is still determined. We are part of nature and our consciousness naturally determines its actions. The only possible alternative to deterministic free will is irrational random action which we don't see in sane humans

[johnnyroycerichardsoniii]

Excellent blunt points, and clean arguments. Thanks for sharing!!

[rorymatthews]

It always interests me to watch very smart people tying themselves in knots trying to escape this idea. I think a good example is Schopenhauer saying something so seemingly unequivocally anti free-will as "A man can do as he wills, but not will as he wills” and yet still, somehow, going on to paint a more or less compatibilist picture of things. Although it’s instinctively scary, I don’t think it needs to be. I don’t think we need to escape it, and in fact I think embracing it will make the world a better place in the long run.

[caricue]

Whoever decided that it was a good idea to use a word that referred to mental processes to describe physical interactions? I can determine the best course of action, or I can be determined to find a solution, I might even show great determinism in completing a task, but atoms don't determine anything. They are passive objects that react to whatever circumstances in which they find themselves.

[TheOtherMwalimu]

Determinism suggests that there is only one correct path or 'calling' in life– such as a straight road, rather than branches of a tree in which all the branches can be the "correct" one.

[SantaIsMyLord]

Hello! Would you mind telling me what documentary this video clip is from?

[jaccrystal]

Who would want free will not to be bound by the constraints of conscience.

[rustyshimstock]

Newtonian mechanics does not determine cause and effect at the scale of atomic particles. In fact, the position of particles is a field of possiblilities. Position can't be determined un, ess/until observed.

[Untilitpases]

Myopic take. How can one employ the notion of "want" or "argument for" while "seeking to" disprove free will?

[quanwan]

To be dialectic and dynamic is a good way.

[saulorocha]

That’s why we don’t need probability, such a silly science. Determinity now will run the business. Nothing is random all is determined. I feel such a relief…all my anxiety is gone now I know it was always meant to be.

[jasongillis]

If determinism is true, and you believe determinism is true, then you didn't arrive at that conclusion rationally. You were simply determined to believe determinism is true. It gets even better because if you reject determinism and determinism is true, then similarly, you didn't arrive at that conclusion rationally either; you were simply determined to reject determinism, lol!

[fredahwiwu]

We are all conditioned to behave and act from the time we are born free will is an illusion

[DawsonNeece]

I wrote a paper about this topic for my psychology class! My argument was free will is actually an objective truth

[sameerarora]

Karma theory includes both ...it empowers peope

[martialartistmindset]

Hard determinism relies on as many unfounded assertions as free will libertarianism.

[richardatkinson]

Atoms are not deterministic. Where is there room for determinism in modern physics?

[attackman]

This is completely misguided - Are these people fake? A compatibilist should say that morals are distinctly different from physics. It has been shown time and time again that one cannot derive an 'is' from an 'ought'. It *is* the moral responsibility of the causal factors that influenced your actions BUT it *ought* to be your responsibility for your actions because we can develop a moral system from this which functions. Since we ought to have free will, and morality is concerned with that which we ought, we must have free will. To deny the concept of free will based on what the world is can only be done if we prove how an 'is' makes an 'ought' in a way that justifies this reasoning.