Are Minds Just Brains? Psychoneural Identity Theory

In which we discuss JJC Smart's "Sensations and Brain Processes," we get to hear a bit of Patricia Churchland, do a bit of modal metaphysics, and a bit of Merleau-Ponty's embodied phenomenology.

[mkraulis]

I enjoyed your presentation. Well done.

[Sleeplessstars]

20:15 We could say that some neurons are specialized for processing specific colors. When we observe objects, the light reflected from them enters our eyes and activates neurons in the visual cortex that are tuned to specific wavelengths of light. For example, when we see an object that predominantly reflects light in the blue wavelength, neurons specialized for processing blue light are activated, allowing us to perceive the object as blue.

[Sleeplessstars]

Does the mind-brain identity theory necessarily assume that the brain is a stable, unchanging entity? It seems so, and if this is true, then neuroplasticity may pose a challenge to the theory. We now have good reasons to believe that the brain is not stable due to neuroplasticity. Even if we try to establish a causal link, let's say, between the sensation of seeing a red object and activation in particular brain area X, the observation that some patients with damage to X can still develop the ability to see red objects suggests that such a causal link may not be possible. Therefore, neuroplasticity might serve as an objection to the mind-brain identity theory.

[dangerousideas]

I never heard about Merleau-Ponty before, this has to be a good read. I cannot omit the notion that every brain measured is actually a content of perception, not a container. But I guess it is a chicken/egg problem. What comes first? The matter or the perception of matter. It seems to be an axiom, which cannot be proven, or disproven. Although I find more reasonable the claim that perception is fundamental, because it does not beg the question. It could be formulated a lot of ways but anyway...Would there be any physics or brains, c-fibers, neurons etc. measured if no consciousness would perceive them?
As we cannot disprove reason, using reason, we cannot disprove consciousness, using consciousness...

[MonisticIdealism]

*Premise 1:* If consciousness is identical to the physical, then identifying the physical identifies what it is like to be the subject.
*Premise 2:* Identifying the physical does not identify what it is like to be the subject.
*Conclusion:* Consciousness is not identical to the physical.

If what it is like to be the subject is identical to the brain, or whatever physical phenomenon one identifies consciousness with, then identifying the brain necessarily identifies what it is like to be the subject since they are the exact same thing and without distinction. However, our identification of the brain only yields structural, dynamical, and functional combinations of basic elements (neurons and their activities) and fails to provide the qualitative and subjective aspects of conscious experience. We are only able to identify the subjective and qualitative aspects of conscious experience from the first-person. In order to identify what it is like to be that creature you must be that creature, and that's not possible if we're identifying consciousness to something more basic than itself.