4 Duopolies: Collusion, Cournot, Stackelberg, and Bertrand

This is a worked out problem in which I solve for firm quantity and market price in 4 different industry competitive structures: collusion, Cournot, Stackelberg, and Bertrand competition. This is appropriate for an Intermediate Microeconomics course without calculus, as well as for an Industrial Organization course.

[mayaframe]

Matt Birch you single handedly are gonna be the only reason I pass my Intermediate Econ Class.

[sabeernarula]

This is the most helpful video I have watched for these duopoly models - thank you so much!

[TheXozin]

Wow thank you! Exam in 3 days this cleared it all up, best explanation I've found on YouTube!

[jajadaba]

Great work explaining these four methods so succinctly.

Just watched an MIT professor spend 20 minutes on Cournot with less clarity than you spending the same time on four models.

Good stuff mate.

[justinomartinez]

Great video. Currently I'm Industrial Organization and needed a refresher.

[TYable]

Great, concise and clearly understandable explanations with proper links to core elements of each market version. thanks!

[gabrielasoler]

Very helpful! Great explanation. 100% recommend

[Summer-zbrw]

this is an amazing video, awesome explanation!

[muhammadirfanislami]

2:08 is normal to assume Qtotal splitted to 60:40?

[misslola]

Thank you for all your videos! They have been helping all of us so so much. I have a question concerning the MR in Cournot (and also at the Collusion): Why does P=500-2Q1-2Q2 become 500-4Q1-2Q2...how do I know that with the MR, the 2 becomes a 4?

[rodreckdellainemindisi]

wow I'm very grateful for your explanations. keep up the good work... thank you

[dropgamer]

You explained everything very well. Great teacher imo if your looking into that profession

[olivernummi]

In the Stackelberg model how did the 2Q(1) come when you made MR=MC. Meaning when the function after that is 260-2Q=20?

[Mo-utxb]

my final exam is in 20 minutes thank you so much!!

[BLINKBOXYT]

excellent video, i have on question. How do you know Q1 will equal Q2 for the Betrand problem.

[espiritu_santu]

Perfect explanation. Cournot, forth row. You say - here I’m gonna double the the slope and you write down 4Q instead of 2 and continue. Why do you do that, why double, why not triple, you just move on. I wonder what we should think here…

[alfiegreenwood]

At 16:50, why do we use 500-2Q as opposed to 500-2q1-2q2?

[johnchung]

Mr Birch, I have computed different values of the deadweight loss under different market structures. For Bertrand(same as perfectly competitive market where P=MC), deadweight loss is zero. As for Cournot .model, the D.L. is 1/2(180-20)(240-60)=$6400. As for the Stackelberg model, the D.L. is 1/2(140-20)(240-180)=$3, 600. Finally, as for the Collusion(Monopoly)model, the D.L. is 1/2(260-20)(240-120)=$14400. I hope you or somebody can check the answers for me. If the se values are found correct, they may provide some additional information to this video. If not, I hope you can correct them. Thank you

[jenicabunderson]

Thanks for making this! Question: why do you double the slope of the inverse demand function to get the marginal revenue? Could we use calculus to get the same answer?

[liyongpeng]

I am confused if each firm has a different cost function like firm 1 is 20Q1, firm 2 is 30Q2, how I can solve the collusion question?