Lacan and Phenomenology (1): Lacan as 'phenomenologically oriented'?

While by the time of Seminar III, Lacan had declared his opposition to phenomenology (via an attack on "the myth of immediate experience"), it turns out that he is perhaps more indebted to phenomenological philosophical ideas than may have initially been expected. We cite Alain Badiou's account of Lacan's break from phenomenology, while also stressing how certain phenomenological ideas (the notion of the subject and the importance of the speaking subject's account of their own understands and experiences) would prove foundation to Lacan's work. By means of reference to Lacan's paper 'Beyond the Reality Principle' and his doctoral thesis, we consider how, in his early work, Lacan can be said to have been "phenomenologically oriented".

[gdhjdnsjsjdj]

Great stuff. Maybe there's an interesting overlap here with more recent phenomenology, i.e., Gallagher's factual reduction and phenomenological interview as developed by Danish phenomenologists.

[fredwelf]

I liked the similarity of the epoche and free association. I wonder how you would critique Adorno’s reception of Husserl.

[jankan]

I doubt that Husserl was talking about direct experience or lived experience in such a naive way. On the contrary, we take the lived experience for granted and can seriously investigate and understand it philosophically only after we have performed the epoche.

[aso]

I suggest you educate yourself way more about phenomenology if you think it naively assumes immediate access to the world. There's an entire genetic phenomenology.