Leibniz's Law - The identity of Indiscernibles (Discussed and Debated)

Join George and John as they discuss and debate different philosophical ideas, today they will be looking into Leibniz's Law.

Leibniz's Law claims that if X and Y share the exact same properties they are identical, and so they are the same entity. As such no two distinct entities can share the exact same properties. This seems like a common sense principle however with a little philosophical investigation we notice some problems. Watch as George and John discuss further.

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[PhilosophyVibe]

Get the Philosophy Vibe paperback anthology book set, available worldwide on Amazon:

Volume 1 – Philosophy of Religion

Volume 2 - Metaphysics

Volume 3 – Ethics and Political Philosophy

[NnannaO]

My boy on the left went off 🤣🤣. Thank you, guys, for the excellent content.

[akashicman]

The counter argument of the functionality of haecciaties concerning the ice sculpture wow you have outdone yourselves

[garyhughes]

What a fascinating topic. These debates are really interesting. Pls keep them coming.

[legendsplayground]

I like how one person is being a skeptic while the another is teaching the law. It really does make me understand the law better, love your content, Jesus bless.

[daviddivad]

this law is usefull to show in philosophy of mind that mental states (e.g; qualia and intentionality) cannot be reduced to physical things, since we can point out properties that are distinct.

[joev]

I for the life of me do not understand why your videos donˋt get more views. Anyway, great content as always.

[joecoolmccall]

I really like this channel because the questions and give and take care ones that I am actually thinking but can't put into words yet.

[ChateauLonLon]

Have you guys ever thought about covering Spinoza? I know his work in Ethics is most popular, but his ideas on divine law and sacredness in the Theological-Political Treatise are super interesting too. Or maybe something about natural knowledge/natural law and the two lights of knowledge (Reason and philosophy for intellectual truths and imagination and the mind's predisposition toward morality for moral truths)?

Best!

[mugsofmirth]

The "personal identity" objection raised at 5:45 reminds me of the quote that goes something like "one can never cross the same river twice". I paraphrased the quote and I don't remember who it is attributed to but it seems to me the same general concept. In a sense I suppose it could be said that we are not identical to ourselves from moment to moment since at the microscopic level our bodies undergo constant change - however, this seems to me to be a very pedantic and therefore meaningless point of view, at least when considering shorter time frames where the subject in question doesn't change much. Fascinating discussion though.

[philosophyforum]

In philosophy class, the prof basically denied the identity of Indiscernibles. He was unwilling to consider extrinsic properties. I find that strange. Seems to me Leibniz was correct at least on the surface. I don't find the idea of haecceities convincing, and I would not maintain the law for objects when they change their properties. I would, however, maintain it for people because people have two things that objects do not have – a consciousness and a first person experience. I don't know if that qualifies as an intrinsic or extrinsic property though – maybe a third kind of property. As far as comparing an object with itself in the past goes, I would point out that if extrinsic properties of an object include every instance of its experience through time, this challenge to the law is no different than comparing the object to itself.

[evinnra]

Apparently I'm not getting this last point against 'hexeity' or suchness. There are no possible worlds in which my 'suchness' would be totally different (or different in any way whatever ) where my identity would still remain the same. To me it's a nonsensical counter claim. Could someone offer an example to support this claim that the identity of a person or a non living thing remaining intact in a possible world while it is having different intrinsic suchness ?

[rk-bylh]

could you help me explaining the Liberation Praxis, through a video on it

[ashokmacho]

Pls do come up vth russell incomplete symbol role in his discription

[GeorgeCilley]

This entire concept falls apart in face of the Uncertainty Principle.

[zogrush]

Nothing can be identical because you need to be in the exact same space within space to have identical properties

[raiyanahmadsaadi]

9:00 reply to objection -- but bro, why would you apply a concept meant for animate objects to inanimate objects? you yourself know that animate objects and inanimate objects tend to differ from each other.

But still, the logical objections can be made clear if one delves into the following discussions- # origination or generation of entities/objects and their termination in Leibniz's outlook,
# Morphology or transformation of objects
# Identity of an object as it exists by itself and the process of identifying the same object by a different observer/object.
^^Clarify the above points and the discussion will become crystal clear.

[sdlkfjhasiodf]

the two balls are not identical when we consider atoms, or the bacteria living in them they only appear identical

[CjqNslXUcM]

Haecceity is seems like nonsense, but I don't think personal identity is a good objection in the first place. Of course you are a different person than you were in the past, even though people refer to you as the same person in continuity.