What If The Allies Won The Battle of Arnhem (Operation Market Garden)?

What If The Allies Won The Battle of Arnhem (Operation Market Garden)?

Operation Market Garden began on 17 September 1944 amid Allied high hopes of defeating disorganised German forces in retreat from France. It ended instead with defeat for the Allies. The operation was later famously dubbed "A Bridge Too Far". But what if the Allies had won?

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00:00 Intro
00:25 What was Market Garden?
01:58 Why was it so important?
02:45 Why is it so interesting?
04:28 Could the Allies have won?
06:08 What if the Allies won?
09:06 Conclusion

#gusmcdollgames, #history, #arnhem, #marketgarden, #operationmarketgarden

[gusmcdollstrategy]

What If The Allies Won The Battle of Arnhem (Operation Market Garden)?

Operation Market Garden began on 17 September 1944 amid Allied high hopes of defeating disorganised German forces in retreat from France. It ended instead with defeat for the Allies. The operation was later famously dubbed "A Bridge Too Far". But what if the Allies had won?

If you enjoy these videos, please like, comment and subscribe, and support us with a donation on:
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00:00 Intro
00:25 What was Market Garden?
01:58 Why was it so important?
02:45 Why is it so interesting?
04:28 Could the Allies have won?
06:08 What if the Allies won?
09:06 Conclusion

#gusmcdollgames, #history, #arnhem, #marketgarden, #operationmarketgarden

[tw]

The paratrooper on the left at the very start is my grandad. He was 19 when he jumped at oosterbeek in the first wave. The photo was staged after.

[frankteunissen]

When talking about the possibility of success at Arnhem, everyone always overlooks one big problem:
Arnhem lies West of the river IJssel. If you want to turn East into Germany from Arnhem, you have to cross the IJssel and that is no less of an obstacle than the rivers Maas, Waal and Rhine. And nothing had been foreseen for crossing the IJssel, nothing at all. There was no plan for a lightning push from Arnhem to Zutphen or Deventer where the only bridges across the IJssel were at the time. XXX Corps would hardly have been in a state to effect such a push, not after advancing more than 100km in a few days.
In other words: even an Allied victory at Arnhem wouldn’t have brought an end to the war any closer at all. Failure was part of the plan.

[steveashforth]

My dad was there. Here's a 'run down' of his first day in Operation Market Garden. He was a member of the 156th Parachute Battalion, which was actually a re-numbering of the 151st Battalion of the 4th Para Brigade, when it was brought back to the UK earlier. It was re-numbered to fool the Germans into thinking it was a new outfit. 156 Bttn. was to be used in case of an emergency during the D Day landings. But, because the ‘emergency’ didn’t arise it was never used. There were numerous cancelled operations between D Day & Operation Market Garden & the troops were ‘chomping at the bit to get into action’. The 4th Parachute Brigade formed part of the second day's parachute landings at the Battle of Arnhem. The take offs had been planned for soon after 07:00 on the 18th, but due to fog & mist, the first take offs didn’t start until 11:30, 4 hrs behind schedule. No one knew this at Arnhem because of communication problems involving the radio equipment. At 21:09 the first men of the Brigade's paratroops (my dad included) jumped from between 800 and 100 feet (244 and 30 m), to the west of Arnhem through German machine gun fire, yet despite the enemy having encroached to within range of the drop zone, the brigade landed with only minor casualties. The entire drop of the second wave was over in 9 minutes. There were three objectives, first the high ground overlooking Johanna Hoeve farm, next the woods near to Lichtenbeek House and finally the high ground at Koepel. 156 Para headed for the first objective.
Three hours later 156 Para had covered about 6 miles (9.7 km), and as darkness fell they came up against a strong German defensive position & came under fire from German 88mm guns, which they were unable to outflank in the dark. The battalion's commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel des Voeux, out of contact with brigade headquarters, decided to stay where they were for the night and continue the advance in daylight. Dad never spoke too much about any of his war time activities. Anything I have, I had to 'coax' out of him. I'm glad I did.

[zenmen]

Imagine taking Deelen Airfield by coup de main, and flying in supplies and reinforcements - just as close to Arnhem bridge as the drop zone, far more valuable, plus it was the site of a huge Luftwaffe HQ covering the Bomber Offensive, so capturing or disrupting that HQ would have had huge benefits, firstly in limiting Luftwaffe defensive capability, and secondly, in terms of intelligence.

[davemac]

5:50 - seizing and holding the Nijmegen [highway] bridge on the first day *was* part of the plan, but the plan was compromised by Gavin's decisions in forming his divisional plan.

"About 48 hours prior to take-off, when the entire plan appeared to be shaping up well, I personally directed Colonel Lindquist, commanding the 508th Parachute Infantry, to commit his first battalion against the Nijmegen bridge without delay after landing, but to keep a very close watch on it in the event he needed it to protect himself against the Reichswald. So I personally directed him to commit his first battalion to this task. He was cautioned to send the battalion via the flat ground east of the city." (Letter General Gavin to Historical Officer Captain Westover, 17 July 1945)

Gavin confirms he ordered Lindquist to commit a battalion to the capture of the Nijmegen bridge before the jump. He also confirms he told Lindquist not to go to the bridge by way of the town but to approach it along some mud flats to the east.
The British wanted him, he said, to drop a battalion on the northern end of the bridge and take it by coup de main. Gavin toyed with the idea and then discarded it because of his experience in Sicily. There, his units had been scattered and he found himself commanding four or five men on the first day. For days afterward, the division was completely disorganized. (Notes on meeting with J.M. Gavin, Boston, January 20, 1967. James Maurice Gavin, Box 101 Folder 10, Cornelius Ryan Collection, Ohio State University)

Captain Chet Graham was assigned as the regimental liaison officer with division headquarters. "I sat in on a high level briefing at division headquarters. Colonel Lindquist was told by General Gavin to move to the Nijmegen bridge as soon as Lindquist thought practical after the jump. Gavin stressed that speed was important. He was also told to stay out of the city and to avoid city streets. He told Lindquist to use the west farm area to get to the bridge as quickly as possible as the bridge was the key to the division's contribution to the success of the operation." (Chapter 9, Put Us Down In Hell – A Combat History of the 508th PIR in WW2, Phil Nordyke 2012)

As Gavin finished his briefing, the British General [Browning] cautioned him: “Although every effort should be made to effect the capture of the Grave and Nijmegen bridges, it is essential that you capture the Groesbeek ridge and hold it.”
General Gavin did have some appreciation of this. At an earlier meeting with his regimental commanders, he [Gavin] had told Colonel Roy Lindquist of the 508th Parachute Infantry that even though his primary mission was to hold the high ground at Berg en Dal near Groesbeek, he was also to send his 1st Battalion into Nijmegen to take the key road bridge. Gavin told Lindquist to push for the bridge via "the flatland to the east of the city and approach it over the farms without going through the built-up area." Gavin considered this so important that he stood with Lindquist over a map and showed him this route of advance. (September Hope – The American Side of a Bridge Too Far, John C McManus 2012)

So what went wrong?

Lieutenant Colonel Warren’s 1st Battalion arrived at De Ploeg at around 6:30 p.m., about five hours after landing, without encountering any significant resistance. Warren ordered his troopers to dig in and strengthen the roadblock on the Nijmegen-Groesbeek highway to prevent German movement south from Nijmegen. Meanwhile, Captain Ben Delamater, the battalion’s executive officer, got the command post organised. "The regimental commanding officer [Colonel Roy Lindquist], with his radio operator and two Dutch interpreters from the British army soon followed us onto our first objective. The planned defenses were being set up when several civilians wearing arm bands and carrying Underground credentials of some sort told the colonel that the Germans had deserted Nijmegen, that the town and the highway bridge were lightly held. The regimental CO had been instructed that if the initial mission were accomplished to 'go ahead and take the highway bridge if you can.' This division order was perfectly understood in relation to the primary missions and was not a weak, conditional order as might be supposed offhand.”
“The regimental and battalion COs then planned to send one platoon of C Company [led by Lieutenant Bob Weaver], plus the S-2 section, plus two light machine gun squads on a reconnaissance patrol to approach the bridge from the south." (Chapter 10, Nordyke 2012)

A battalion S-2 patrol led the way and reached the Nijmegen bridge during the daylight hours. Trooper Joe Atkins, HQ 1st, told that story: "I was called on to take the point going into Nijmegen. As we entered the city, a crowd of people gathered around us, and we had to push our way through. Three of us in the lead became separated from the other troopers behind us by the crowds of Dutch people. We three continued to make our way into the city until we came to the bridge. At the bridge, only a few German soldiers were standing around a small artillery weapon. I had a Thompson sub and a .45 pistol. The other two were armed with M1 rifles. They covered me as I jumped up and yelled, ‘Hände hock’ (‘Hands up!’)
The Germans were so surprised; the six or seven defenders of the bridge gave up without resisting. We held the prisoners at the entrance to the bridge for about an hour. It began to get dark, and none of our other troopers showed up. We decided to pull back away from the bridge, knowing we could not hold off a German attack. The German prisoners asked to come with us, but we refused, having no way to guard them. As we were leaving, we could hear heavy equipment approaching the bridge." (Chapter 6 - Nijmegen Bridge, The 508th Connection, Zig Boroughs 2013)

Captain Chet Graham, the regimental liaison officer with division headquarters, decided to obtain a status of the progress toward the capture of the Nijmegen highway bridge. "I went to the 508th regimental CP and asked Colonel Lindquist when he planned to send the 3rd Battalion to the bridge. His answer was, 'As soon as the DZ is cleared and secured. Tell General Gavin that.' So I went through Indian country to the division CP and relayed Lindquist's message to Gavin. I never saw Gavin so mad. As he climbed into his Jeep, he told me, 'come with me - let's get him moving.' On arriving at the 508th regimental CP, Gavin told Lindquist, 'I told you to move with speed.' "
At about 8:00 P.M., Colonel Lindquist ordered Lieutenant Colonel Warren, the commander of the 1st Battalion, to seize the Nijmegen highway bridge. It was an order that Warren wasn’t expecting. “This was the first time the battalion was told it was to secure this bridge. By the time the battalion minus [Company C, one section of 81mm mortars, and one section of machine guns] was assembled from its rather wide defensive positions, it was well after dark.”
“A Dutch Underground worker [Geert van Hees] who had contacted regimental headquarters had stated that the highway bridge over the Waal River was defended by a noncommissioned officer and seventeen men. This Dutch patriot also volunteered to guide the battalion into town.” (Chapter 10, Nordyke 2012)

[petersmit]

Market Garden was a gamble worth taking. Many lost their lives for taking this gamble but many more where lost after this didn't work out. It's complicated but you cannot win wars without taking risks. And risks get people killed. War sucks.

[marcusher]

Interesting one of the positives that came out of Market Garden apparently is that the corridor that was taken and held forced the Nazis during the Battle of the Bulge to go through the Ardennes to try and get to Antwerp rather than straight across. This slowed them down and increased the distance they needed to travel.

[mhpjii]

Excellent video contribution that raises compelling issues and questions! Subscribed

[Jackal]

I still think that 1st Airborne's best chance at securing (and holding) the bridge @ Arnhem (and ultimately succeeding) was allowing all 3 parachute battalions to be dropped south of the bridge so they could rapidly seize and hold both ends. I actually think they could have held on until XXX corp arrived and it's interesting that General Gale (commander of 6th Airborne) and somewhat more experienced than General Urquhart stated that he would have insisted on this change to the operation to the point that he would have resigned his command over it if he did not get his way.

[nickdanger]

From the moment Dutch generals learned of the route that Horrocks' 30th Corps columns proposed to take, they had anxiously tried to dissuade anyone who would listen, warning of the dangers of using exposed dike roads. "In our military staff colleges, " Bernard says, "we had run countless
11
studies on the problem. We knew tanks simply could not operate along these roads without infantry."25 General Horrocks, himself, was uneasy about the plan. In fact, in his biography, he gives the indication that he was well aware of the tough terrain, claiming that "the terrain made the desert seem like child's play."26 Furthermore, Horrocks states there was only one road on which to make their approach, giving the impression that no alternate routes were considered. This would confirm Prince Bernhards claim that the Dutch were never consulted on this important issue.
MARKET GARDEN: WAS INTELLIGENCE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE FAILURE? pdf

[douglascoggeshall]

2022-08-17 ... The Allied defeat at Market Garden mirrored Napoleons Waterloo defeat ... "A damned close run thing" was Welligton's perspective after victory at Waterloo ... In 1944 it was the German's turn to get the good roll of the dice ... Indeed, a bridge too far (by just a hair) for the Allies ...

[ackbarfan]

Unity of Command 2's a-historical missions give a good guess at what could've happened with Market Garden's victory.

[danielgreen]

My Neighbour was an Arnhem Veteran and was in the Recce Corps Polar Bear Squadron and was tasked with marking the drop Zones and Reconnaissance He Swam across the Rhine to escape the Pocket in the end and until his Death in the mid 90s went back to Holland on many occasions
Ian kershaws Book It never snows in September is an excellent Book and explains very well the view from the opposition

[lawrencewestby]

The British lost 8000 men, casualties and captured, at Arnhem. I think Montgomery ignored that fact when coming up with his 90% success number.

[gerardhunt]

My mother's village was liberated 2 weeks after Market Garden was over.

[theoraclerules]

Yes, hypothetically-speaking, & in 20/20 hindsight with some tactical or operational adjustments such as; 1. The 1st British Airborne Division moving their main drop zones actually onto or much nearer to the Arnhem Bridge rather than at Oosterbeek, some 8 or 9 km distance away from it main target/objective (This Bridge); 2. The Polish Airborne Brigade also dropping simultaneously & together the British along with having more Air Transports (C-47s - Dakotas etc.) being allocated & available for this operation too!
3. The US 82nd immediately taking the Nijmegen Bridge rather than focusing on clearing out some German units in wooded hillside districts east of their objective, of whom they had later discovered that they then had erroneously, over-estimated the strength & potential of these enemy units & that had also held up & delayed the advance of 30th British Armoured Corps there some more critical hours & days, instead of pushing immediately forwards the last 18 km to Arnhem.
4. The 30th Corps itself, should have been equipped with more British & perhaps even additional Canadian Engineering Units with extra & sufficient pontoon bridging-equipment attached to their Corps inventory on such an operation that obviously involved so many various bridge-crossings & in such a short time!
5. This list doesn’t stop here but goes on much farther ….!

However, in my opinion, once the Dutch Resistance had apprised & supplied Browning’s Operational HQ in England, days before with important information & also having it afterwards corroborated, that 2 full SS Panzer Divisions (The very experienced, well trained & equipped, 9th & 10th Hohenstaufen & Frundsberg Divisions) & other ancillary support units had been moved into the Arnhem area & were then camped in this neighborhood there too!
In my view, this whole operation (Both parts of it, Market (Airborne sections) & Garden (30th Corps -Ground forces sections), should have there & then been cancelled & as being deemed as unlikely of achieving total success, because operational success for “Market Garden” could only be achieved by gaining total & immediate Allied possession & seamless military access & use of “ALL OF THE 5 TARGETED BRIDGES” across Rhine & its tributaries in Southern Holland, all in a very limited time period. Then, immediately thereafter, being able to move 30th (XXX) Corps & other supporting British & Canadian Armoured & Infantry units north, through Arnhem & then further on before later turning eastwards into Germany, so as to outflank the main bulk of German Forces resisting the Allies there then in Holland & Belgium! After gleaning this new intelligence regarding SS Troops & Tanks then being already relocated into Arnhem the “risk to reward ratio”, no longer made this operation by then tenable or likely viable by any given measure!! As by failure to capture just one or even more of these bridges or secure any such crossings, automatically rendered this entire operation, as then being effectively unable to achieve its main & overall objective! Effectively, for the Allies to have succeeded, it was capture & hold on to until relieved ALL the bridges & other objectives OR NOTHING would be properly achieved in this operation!!

Hence, I reiterate my own opinion, that this operation should have been canceled & all of these troops & equipment assigned & used in Market-Garden, ought to have then been more effectively reassigned to assist & support the Canadians (& some assigned British units there too!) to clear & get open for shipping & full, unhindered maritime use, the Scheldt Estuary in Belgium/Holland, in order to reopen & get functioning again, the Port of Antwerp for better supplying the Allied armies then, who would have subsequently been much better able to conduct their operations & perhaps also then win the war likely even earlier & faster than it actually did, or might have done without Operation Market-Garden (M-G) ever occurring!! This would have also saved 10 to 15 thousand unnecessary total casualties from these failed M-G operations, & additionally, averted the ensuing civilian famine & social catastrophe that subsequently occurred in the Netherlands 🇳🇱 over that winter 1944/45, where many consequently starved to death then, especially children & the sick & elderly, due directly to the failure of to achieve all the objectives of this operation (M-G)!!
A somber & sobering reflection & reevaluation of these events & actions!! A stark reminder to all that “Actions DEFINITELY DO have REAL Consequences, particularly in wartime!!”

[inyobill]

06:30: The same reasoning Germany used to justyify a claim of victory at Jutland. The force holding the field at the end of the day a is a critical factor.

[csjrogerson]

My father who was in the RASC volunteered for Market Garden. Fortunately his request was denied.

[alpardo]

I read A Bridge Too Far and thought it the best WWII book l ever read. Always thought it was worth the risk, and actually would have had a good chance of succeding if not for the two panzer divisions there(even beat up and understrength) but reading some of these other comments by far more capable historians then l certainly makes it an open question. Loved the movie too, l watch it every two or three years. James Caan just passsd away yesterday, and l loved his scene where he pulled his .45 on the doc and insisted he examine his commander. Don't know if something like that actually happenned, but it was my favorate scene.