Lecture of Opportunity | John Maurer: A history lesson on the Battle of Jutland

Professor John Maurer, "Battle of Jutland," Lecture of Opportunity, U.S. Naval War College, May 31, 2016.

This year marks the 100th anniversary of the Battle of Jutland, the largest sea fight of World War I. On May 31, 1916, the main fleets of Germany and Great Britain clashed in a hard-fought battle in the North Sea off Denmark’s Jutland peninsula. The battle was a trial of strength at sea between the fleets of a rising challenger, with aspirations to world power, and the reigning superpower, accustomed to thinking itself the indispensable leader of the international system. On the outcome of this battle in the cold waters of the North Sea (or so it was widely thought), nothing less than the fate of empires was at stake. To whom did the future belong—the rising power or the keeper of the system? A single day of combat between the steel giants making up the British and German fleets could decide the vital question of world power or decline for these competing empires. Professor Maurer’s lecture examines the background to the battle, the course of the battle on the day itself, the strategic consequences of the battle, and concludes with some “so what” thoughts about what we in the twenty-first century might learn from remembering an important battle.

Bio: Dr. John H. Maurer serves as the Alfred Thayer Mahan Professor of Sea Power and Grand Strategy in the Strategy and Policy Department.

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Disclaimer: The views expressed are the speaker's own and may not necessarily reflect the views of the Naval War College, the Department of the Navy, the Department of Defense, or any other branch or agency of the U.S. Government.

[egmcdonald]

This lecture is truly exceptional. Many of the details that are usually not present in documentaries are mentioned here and described in significant detail. It would be nice to be able to view the slideshow but for those who already have knowledge on the subject it's not really necessary. The lecturer understands the key ideas of the great war at sea, and that what was going on, or the "historical trends, " was much greater than a single war/conflict.

[WildBillCox]

Professor Maurer does an excellent job of presenting a clear view of pivotal events, amalgamated from several vectors; the economic, the political, the inevitable conflicting quests for personal glory, the arms race, the mass media lauding qualities of national prestige and destiny-sometimes with a little help from its friends. One does not need the slideshow to get his message, though it might've been nice at times. As an "armchair admiral" with considerable interest in the evolution of warship design (part of a keen desire to understand the causes of World War 2) I found the lecture very informative and interesting.

[tylerrichards]

By far the best lecture of any I’ve seen on this channel. This guy does a helluva job

[FEStanley]

Fascinating view of Jutland before during and after in its historical context from across the pond.

[Bob.W.]

Jellicoe had absolutely nothing to gain by taking risks. He knew, as was said, that he was the only man who could lose the war in an afternoon. He held the field at the end and the blockade held. Beatty and his flag officer Seymour are another story. Thx.

[inaz]

A few things should be added to this presentation. The British armor piercing shells were defective, and exploded on contact. Von der Tann was famously hit and survived because of this fault. The German battle cruisers were also very well built, as two of them earned nicknames: 'Iron Dog' and 'the ship that will not die'. Beatty was an idiot, and his flag officer was incompetent. I would also agree with those who say that Lusitania was a legitimate war target. She was known to be carrying munitions illegally, and Churchill himself had hoped that the ship would be destroyed to force the U.S. into the war.

[casparcoaster]

Most gripping recitation of the Battle of Jutland (my oldest son married a danish girl, moved from Fairfield Iowa to Aalborg 20 years ago) ive heard in my short life

[parrot]

Marvelous presentation, outstanding. Considering the eventual overwhelming percentage of persons over the months and years who will be given the opportunity to view this gem of a lecture-via the web; versus the sole live audience present the day it was given, I would’ve thought it prudent to have put a bit more effort into incorporating the slides with his lecture in this video, and perhaps if possible more than one single static video camera. Just a thought….

[davidharner]

Excellent talk, would have been good to see the slides.

[FreddieExPath]

From what I understand only the Battlecruiser of Beatty's squadron down at Rosyth institudet the sloppy ammuntion handling procedures they paid so dearly for at Jutland. The rest of the Grand Fleet up at Scapa did not.
Paradoxically the ships of Beatty's squadron, from what I understand, instituted this horrendous practice of stacking the gun barbettes with ready round propellant charges, as a result of their experience at the battle of the Dogger bank in 1915, where the British were very impressed with the brisk initial rate of fire opened up by the opposing German battle cruisers, as a result of the German battle cruisers entering the battle with ready rounds stacked in their gun barbettes.
In fact the Germans almost lost the battle cruiser SMS Seydlitz in same fashion as the British battle cruisers at Jutland, as a result of these sloppy ammunition handling procedures. But, besides flooding the affected barbettes, the Seydlitz was only saved from blowing up by 2 technical differences to their ammunition compared to the ammunition on the British battle cruisers.
1st, the main 1st propellant charges (Ladung 1) on the German battle cruisers were encased in brass cartridges (as a result of the German guns having slide rather than interrupted screw type breech blocks) rather than in canvas cylinders, as employed by the British (whose guns had interrupted breech blocks). Thus delaying the spread of fire from one stacked propellant charge to the other.
And 2nd, the German propellant charges (Kaltes pulver) had a higher ignition temperature than the cordite employed by the British.
Needlessly to say, the Germans made the opposite conclusion to the British after their defeat at Dogger bank, and tightened up their ammunition handling procedures. While the captains on the British battle cruisers of Beatty's squadron to their cost fatefully chose to disregard their own ammunition handling safety procedures after Dogger bank.
How the captains on the battle cruisers of Beatty's squadron came to institute their fatally sloppy ammunition handling procedures after Dogger bank is somewhat unclear however, as so far no written orders to do so have been found in the Admiralty archives from what I know. Apparently one or more of the battle cruiser captains instituted this change in ammunition handling procedures on their own initiative, with the silent consent of their immediate superior adm. Beatty. Some of the captains may even have instituted this practice even before Dogger bank, though it took Jutland to expose it full on.
As regard professor Maurer's mention of the British having a quality problem with their armor penetrating main gun shells, it may not necessarily have been a decisive factor if the British had managed to keep the German battleships locked in battle at Jutland. After all the Japanese beat the Russians at Tsushima with HE shells rather than armour piercing shells.
As for Beatty becoming less aggressive after taking over from Jellicoe, it's one thing to criticize your top dog for being too passive. To be the top dog yourself is something totally different.
And after what he experienced at Jutland, I don't blame him for becoming a bit less cocky and more carefull with his business.
All in all, though the British lost the most ships at Jutland, I think they came away learning the most lessons. With the British fleet acting much more aggressively in WW-2 than in WW-1, night & day, as well as giving subordinate commanders more room for initiative.
Personally I'm rather amazed the Germans didn't act more aggressively with their surface fleet during WW-1. The consequences of loosing a large portion of their High seas fleet wouldn't have been any worse to them, compared to how things actually ended, as a result of in the main restricting their operations to Skagerrak and the eastern part of the North sea for the rest of WW-1.
IMO they had everything to win and little to lose with a high risk strategy, but the German admirals didn't dare to challenge the Kaiser's "my private plaything" attitude towards his beloved fleet strongly enough.

[hughfraser]

First class presentation. Informative and objective, and great to see the strategic context being mapped out.

[fXBorgmeister]

The Geddes Axe - the stroke that ended an Empire.

[TomFynn]

His translation of "Nimbus" is 100% correct. And I say this as a German. An analogue would be "halo". Not the game but the halo on angels etc. in old religious paintings.

[jayelm]

Fair winds and following seas for all involved on that tragic day. 😢

[mikeyboy]

Why is Lavrenti Beria lecturing on Jutland?
Kidding aside, brilliant lecture thx.

[hoppish]

Whoa, the building of the HMS Dreadnaught did not dissuade the USN from building all big gun battleships. Indeed the design South Carolina class predates Dreadnaught, only Congress’ tight purse strings prevented the US Navy from having the “first” all big gun Battleship.

[stevengarland]

Yeh, can't see the slides. Who signed of on production techniques!

[octavia]

This is the first I've heard of Jellicoe even knowing about the ammunition handling issue in the battlecruisers. I don't believe that's actually true. And Beatty's famous remark is misquoted.

[louishuber]

Great lecture. Would rather see the slides than the speaker.

[leeneon]

And German fleet withdraw, sounds like good Oh see you tomorrow morning, empty seas.