Truth, Objectivity, & Rorty - Simon Blackburn (2005)

Simon Blackburn gives a talk on truth and discusses his book Truth: A Guide for the Perplexed. The lecture was given in 2005 at the University of Toronto. Note, this is a reupload and the audio has been improved.

00:00 Aim of Talk
00:52 Relativism vs Absolutism
06:03 Minimalism
12:01 Relativism
16:41 Postmodern Background
22:20 Richard Rorty
37:06 Response

#Philosophy #Epistemology #Rorty #Relativism #Postmodernism

[Philosophy_Overdose]

00:00 Aim of Talk
00:52 Relativism vs Absolutism
06:03 Minimalism
12:01 Relativism
16:40 Postmodernism
22:20 Richard Rorty
37:06 Response

[bairestom]

I think Blackburn might be underplaying the “relativist”position a bit too much, especially by merely pointing to some French post-structuralists as well as Nietzsche and Freud. Even calling that position “relativism” seems to lose any productive grasp on the diversity and focus of each thinker in this group. Perhaps a better way to think about them is attaching to them a “pluralistic” position? Painting them with a broad brush with the idea of “my truth, your truth, their truth” as well as having Rorty as the spokesman of the bunch is a lazy move. These thinkers (and many others left unmentioned) have a lot to offer, if only one does not become absorbed into old biases (e.g., the analytic/continental divide and the reputations of each side).

[quantumfineartsandfossils]

wow 1:47 in this is an auditory, mental glasss of GOLD

[tomisaacson]

I absolutely love the story about the interfaith conference 😂

[jmeden]

Simon is an excellent expositor of his own ideas, as well as those of people to which he has extended the principle of (interpretive) charity.

What’s missing here — and the absence is glaring — is that the analytic philosopher’s understanding of what it means to create and defend a philosophical position is itself not a given, and in fact needs defending.

To see what I’m getting at, read Heidegger’s work on technology and then ask yourself: Is he attempting to “prove” that technology is never neutral?

Heidegger certainly has a firm position on the question. But his method does not invoke proof, nor would he be offended if an intelligent reader couldn’t come around to adopting his position.

Take a step back and think about that for a minute.

[gregorfrey]

The map represents because we have learned to use the map in a representing way. Of course part of the learning is being entrenched in a causal context. But the causal setting wouldn't lead to the representational character of the map if it weren't by peoples ways to use it. This is the horizontal character of representation. We don't need to abandon "representation" and its embedding in a causal setting, but we have to take care to "deflate" it.

[christofeles]

Interesting that all the propositions employed as examples of settling truth are empirical-- capable of affirmation or denial through investigation. This is typical of the British approach. It seems to lead to a very parochial understanding of what philosophical reflection concerns itself with. Hume, rather than Kant, continues to furnish the paradigm, unfortunately.

[celestialteapot]

a good argument for dialectical materialism?

[gregorfrey]

A smaller point: maximizing true instantiations of "p is true if and only if p" is pointless, because they cannot be false.