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Michel Ghins - What metaphysics for laws of nature?
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Michel Ghins (Université Catholique de Louvain) speaks at the Synergia Reading Group about: What metaphysics for laws of nature?
Abstract
The metaphysical theory of laws I propose resorts to both categorical and dispositional properties. It is thus a mixed view of laws. I defend a propositional conception of laws, as distinct from an ontological conception. I distinguish scientific laws, nomological formulas and laws of nature. Scientific laws are identified in the context of well-established scientific theories. Nomological formulas, such as Newton’s formula for the gravitational force, describe the manifestations of powers. Laws of nature say that some entities necessarily behave in compliance with a nomological formula if certain conditions are realized (stimulus, ceteris paribus, no finks or antidotes). The categorical properties are the (directly and indirectly) observable properties. Properties such as mass, charge are, I contend, observable properties. Powers are not observable, but I show that their reality is defensible on the basis of experience. A property can’t be both categorical and dispositional. Gravitational masse and having the power to attract bodies in conformity with Newton’s formula are distinct properties. Such a metaphysics, I submit, besides resolving the classic inference and identification problems also permits to account for functional quantitative laws and conservation laws. This metaphysics complies with mild empiricist requirements. It is close to experience and allows for the contingency of nomological formulas.
Abstract
The metaphysical theory of laws I propose resorts to both categorical and dispositional properties. It is thus a mixed view of laws. I defend a propositional conception of laws, as distinct from an ontological conception. I distinguish scientific laws, nomological formulas and laws of nature. Scientific laws are identified in the context of well-established scientific theories. Nomological formulas, such as Newton’s formula for the gravitational force, describe the manifestations of powers. Laws of nature say that some entities necessarily behave in compliance with a nomological formula if certain conditions are realized (stimulus, ceteris paribus, no finks or antidotes). The categorical properties are the (directly and indirectly) observable properties. Properties such as mass, charge are, I contend, observable properties. Powers are not observable, but I show that their reality is defensible on the basis of experience. A property can’t be both categorical and dispositional. Gravitational masse and having the power to attract bodies in conformity with Newton’s formula are distinct properties. Such a metaphysics, I submit, besides resolving the classic inference and identification problems also permits to account for functional quantitative laws and conservation laws. This metaphysics complies with mild empiricist requirements. It is close to experience and allows for the contingency of nomological formulas.