The Modal Collapse Objection to Divine Simplicity

Dr. Craig discusses Divine Simplicity with Ryan Mullins and Cameron Bertuzzi.

#williamlanecraig #reasonablefaith #philosophy #divinesimplicty

We welcome your comments in the Reasonable Faith forums:

[jilesbo]

This is a very important topic. Thanks for the link to the full discussion.

[simonocampo]

there are very strong thomists responses to the modal colapse, but this is a very interesting discussion.

[bobdinkytown]

Heard James Gifford talking about how Calvinistic thinking (amongst other things) roots from divine simplicity. Was having a bit of trouble keeping up with him, but now makes prefect sense. Still have to work through how some of the other things he talked about (early heresies) are rooted in this doctrine.

[stmartin]

Just Thomism blog by Dr James Chastek helps here. '3 Step Approach To Eternity' or 'Sola Volunte' or 'Craig Contra Divine Simplicity' are posts that come to mind.

[Sam-upuj]

Misunderstanding of divine simplicity. God’s actions don’t contribute essentially to himself. There could be a world where god never created. That’s totally okay for god to do. His actions don’t convert potency into actuality. God would still be just as good and just as loving even if he never created. Rather what got essentially IS (not what he DOES) is the sole contributor to his actuality.

Said with all charity, keep on doing what ur doing!!

[AidenRKrone]

I don't understand anything that's being talked about here. All I know is that I find the doctrine of divine simplicity to be nonsensical and un-understandable.

[drewm]

Spinoza recognized this, which is why he believed that all facts are necessary facts.

[GulfsideMinistries]

Craig makes a few subtle mistakes. Yes, all God knows, He knows necessarily. What He knows, however, primarily and absolutely, is Himself. And on Divine Simplicity, that means the knowledge and self are, in fact, self-same. Since God is pure actuality, and since by His act everything else receives actuality (including any actual potentiality in a thing), then in knowing Himself God knows not only all that actually is but all that could be. So omniscience just is His own existence.

But that doesn't negate divine freedom, and therefore, it does not entail fatalism. For there is no necessity that God be this rather than that. God could have freely chosen to create this rather than that, for instance. In that case, He would have know this, rather than that, to be actual, and that, rather than this, as potential. God, then, remains absolutely free and all facts are contingent on His free choice to determine His own existence. This rests on the distinction between absolute necessity and necessity by supposition, which Craig seems to ignore. You can review that in ST Ia.19.3.

Finally, Craig conflate potentiality and possibility. I am fairly certain he understands the distinction. That he conflates them here is disheartening, because it makes him appear dishonest. It amounts to little more than a strawman, so that people who don't know the difference aren't informed that not only does it exist but that it is really foundational.

[fndrr]

Not really acknowledging the Thomist answers to this. I also don’t see how Craigs version of Molinism avoids this problem.

[deividuque]

el problema de todo esto es que la metafisica tomista se refiere a la realidad y utiliza la logica como herramienta, lo contradictorio seria en el caso que Dios estuviera en el mismo plano ontologico que la creatura libre, pero no es asi Dios conoce necesariamente lo que nosotros realizamos contingentemente y o hay ninguna contradiccion, dr craig por favor deje de simplificar a Dios a categoria logicas por favor

[leonardu]

Divine Simplicity is laughably absurd. Although i will say it's kind of ironic seeing Dr Craig raise this objection, seeing as the same logic can be applied to his criticism of 'PAP' when it comes to discussions about Libertarian Free will. He says Divine Simplicity is absurd because it would mean that everything happens necessarily and i completely agree with that assessment, but it think the same criticism can be validly applied to his "Sourcehood view" of Libertarian free will and his reject of 'PAP'. I'm just holding him to consistency.