Why Did MV Golden Ray Capsize? NTSB Releases Report | What's Going on With Shipping?

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September 16, 2021

On this episode of What's Going On With Shipping, Sal Mercogliano - Chair of the Department of History, Criminal Justice and Political Science, former merchant mariner, and adjunct professor of Maritime Industry Policy at the US Merchant Marine Academy - examines the National Transportation Safety Board's Report on the capsizing of the roll-on/roll-off vehicle carrier MV Golden Ray in St. Simons Sound, Georgia on September 8, 2019. Sal breaks down the events of the day, looks at the evidence presented to the NTSB, their analysis and questions their final determination that laid the fault squarely on the shoulders of the ship's Chief Mate. There were many issues at play and while the NTSB looked at the who, what, where, and how, they failed to address the biggest question WHY?

NTSB Report: Capsizing of Roll-on/Roll-off Vehicle Carrier Golden Ray St. Simons Sound, Brunswick River, near Brunswick, Georgia, September 8, 2019

NTSB Marine Investigation

Minorcan Mullet YouTube Channel

With NTSB Report Published, Wreck Removal for Golden Ray Continues in St. Simons Sound

Inaccurate Stability Calculations Found as Probable Cause in Golden Ray Capsizing

gCaptain Golden Ray Archive

Chief officer’s ballast level error blamed for Golden Ray capsizing
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Great stuff Sal. - coming from a risk manager and how the NTSB reports are edited - you have stated clearly a possible issue with human causality - sadly the NTSB editorial process does not get peer reviewed for this and often the logic and accident determination is lost in the engineering ossification . As soon as the vessel left JVF the ballast issue should have been red flagged to the risk company with the LoadCom screaming an issue and never allowed into Brunswick . Your work helps us in a big way and we appreciate everything you do

peterbaston
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I said this on day one.. They didn't want to pump in Brunswick's brown water.. (Brunswick is a big estuary and is fed by many silted rivers.) and were not In Ballast... I live here... Great report...

captsam
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As you were talking about the report I was screaming to myself…. “The Mate entered the values manually so they could sail and was going to add ballast once at sea”…. You then said the exact same thing. Great job, I do enjoy your videos.

gregktm
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This was excellent, from a retired mechanical engineer. Not a naval architect, but I certainly understand the concepts and wondered how on earth this happened. Thanks.

e
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Thank you for walking me through this report. Locally we have seen the aftermath of the actions by those trusted to simply so their jobs aboard the Golden Ray. I hope that you will possibly do a segment on large piece removal of ships. This removal has been plagued with problems. MM

MinorcanMullet
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13:00 This sounds exactly like a Dan Gryder report! Historically, the NTSB has consistently asked the wrong questions, not interviewed relevant people, and ignored eyewitnesses.

Great report, subscribed!

SteamCrane
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I believe the Ch. Mate was carefully adjusting the stability calculations to cover for the operator and maintain his job.
Vessel had to discharge 1, 500 ton of ballast to make the Arrival Draft Restriction, vessel worked cargo with a net result of 373 tons more cargo onboard sailing thus a greater displacement and draft unless extra cargo was ideally located to decrease the Trim. Unless the Arrival Draft Restriction was tidal and not applicable at sailing, I doubt he could have re-ballasted that 1, 500 tons.
Tugs can read the actual drafts and relay to the Pilot if out of specs but paperwork only shows the results based on what you input.

OceanMack
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Educational, incredible analysis, and should be an award-winning YouTube video of the most expensive unexpected wrongdoing in shipping.

kermitshld
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I wish Government would explain our nations concerns in such a manner. I mean this breakdown really puts things into understanding for people that have no real knowledge. You make it very understandable. Must be one heck of a professor. High graduating class.

arthayday
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Been watching Capt. Andy for almost a year now. He’s done an awesome job documenting the removal of the ship! Thanks for your analysis of that report. I was wondering why that happened and you described it so a novice could understand.

clarkehowardjr.
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Sal you review was spot on! I was a summer OD in highschool on the now defunct Suntransport, Sun Oil tanker system. When loading and unloading product on the Pennsylvania Sun. We we would do Manuel soundings of cargo tanks and report to the bridge . They had an automated system to compare to.
Also there were TWO crew mates at each manual soundings station to confirm the readings. Even loading you could see the ship listing . Corrections were done by switching tanks from Port to Starboard and visa versa. Also that old tanker had no ballast treatment system. Brown/Blue water was put in and dumped overboard . Even Butterworthed water when cleaning tanks was 'discarded ' generally out at sea.
This was the summer of 1972. I was a painter/deckhand that summer. Pennsy Sun was scraped in the 80ies. Crazy summer job for a teenager. Saw some real Shit holes . Like Lake Maricibo Venezuela.

yasnac
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Very well done. While on vacation, I actually took pictures of that vessel while it was staging in the river. Unbelievable.

fleeroy
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I don't know how long you've been doing this kind of work but you certainly seem to have extensive knowledge, I found it relaxing to have you rattling off facts, using this video as a source of background noise. 'liked'

evanshawes
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Hey Sal, thanks for the analysis of the official report and the various articles about the event. You did a great job explaining in layman's terms exactly what caused the vessel to capsize. I think you probably nailed the ultimate cause of the incident (bad data used for ballasting and probably intentional). Who was ultimately responsible? I guess we'll have to wait and see.

charlesharrington
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Interesting and informative video Sal.
Here in the UK we have the Marine Accident Investigation Board (MAIB), they only do maritime related investigations, with the majority of their investigators being ex sea going staff.
I think this reports gives us the "How' but not the "Why?" in this incident. I also agree with your opinion regarding the CO not wanting to take on dirty ballast alongside. Hence his winging it till they got to open waters. As they had probably done many times before. Something I'm sure the Master was aware of and probably back in the office they too knew about it.
Sadly commercial pressures often cause poeple to take the risk of short cutting statutory regulations. One of the "Whys" that should have been addressed in this report.
Anyway keep safe, keep well over your side of the Pond and keep on producing such excellent content.

rickymherbert
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Sal, good job explaining some fairly complicated stability and ship management issues. Perfectly plausible that they had to drop ballast on arrival to meet the port draft restrictions, and then the mate thought he had enough stability to maneuver back to deep clean water to re-ballast to meet the seagoing GM requirement. Agree that NTSB haven't come up with recommendations to address this specific situation. Probably there should be a minimum maneuvering Minimum GM for sheltered waters, as well as the normal Minimum seagoing storm GM.

roberttagg
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You will find that Dan Gryder "Probably Cause" (youtube) is equally scathing about the NTSB ability to investigate general aviation accidents and has exposed significant incompetence at the NTSB, you are not alone in your disappointment.

limyrob
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I have been following the Minorcan Mullet for months - this video really explains the background. The theme is the same as so many other mishaps - Look for the simplest explanation and follow the money. I'll be looking for more of your videos.

robertjune
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you dont consider the that :-

- they had to off load ballast to reduce draft (maintain sufficient bottom clearance) for this port when entering
- they put more wieght on ( more draft)
- they could not put more (the appropiate ammount of) ballast on because they would not have had enough bottom clearance for the port
= ie the possibilty that the ship as loaded was not suitable ( too deep draft) for the port

I would appriciate your thoughts / comments on this

johnallen
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From a root-cause analysis standpoint, the NTSB was at a disadvantage because they can't quantify greed (nobody can). They can't chart it. But they could certainly measure its effects. They could reverse-engineer the accident, but they couldn't reverse-engineer people's motivations, which is what you did here with sound logic. Great analysis, very insightful.

kenmercadante