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Seminar by Professor Baogang He, Asia Research Centre, 20 October, 2017
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"The Domestic Politics of One Belt, One Road: The Authoritarian Investment Model”
Within the ‘One Belt One Road’ (OBOR) literature, the geo-economic and geopolitical arguments tend to dominate the discussion. Beijing’s authoritarian infrastructure-exporting model, however, is an ambitiously holistic approach that aggregates industry, investment, aid and trade policy, and what has often been omitted from OBOR analyses, especially in the English-speaking world, is a comprehensive appraisal of the role that domestic Chinese politics plays in shaping OBOR. This talk seeks to address this deficiency. Divided into four parts, the first part of the talk is an examination of individual leadership and its bearing on the OBOR hegemonic project, as well as the CCPs organisational structure and decision-making processes vis-à-vis OBOR. The second part investigates the mobilisation of OBOR – specifically at the ministerial, provincial and SOE levels. The third section analyses China’s management of dissent – both its ability to exert control domestically, but also the attempts made to manage opposition extraterritorially. The fourth section serves as a discussion of the impact that the above factors have upon overall OBOR implementation.
Within the ‘One Belt One Road’ (OBOR) literature, the geo-economic and geopolitical arguments tend to dominate the discussion. Beijing’s authoritarian infrastructure-exporting model, however, is an ambitiously holistic approach that aggregates industry, investment, aid and trade policy, and what has often been omitted from OBOR analyses, especially in the English-speaking world, is a comprehensive appraisal of the role that domestic Chinese politics plays in shaping OBOR. This talk seeks to address this deficiency. Divided into four parts, the first part of the talk is an examination of individual leadership and its bearing on the OBOR hegemonic project, as well as the CCPs organisational structure and decision-making processes vis-à-vis OBOR. The second part investigates the mobilisation of OBOR – specifically at the ministerial, provincial and SOE levels. The third section analyses China’s management of dissent – both its ability to exert control domestically, but also the attempts made to manage opposition extraterritorially. The fourth section serves as a discussion of the impact that the above factors have upon overall OBOR implementation.