21d Anselm's ontological arguments - objections to the modal ontological argument of Proslogion 3

[Cookiecutter]

I have heard variations of this argument such as "Could God build a rock so heavy he couldn't lift it?". The answer that makes the most sense is to say that God cannot do the logical inconsistent. He cannot make a square octagon or make 2+2=purple. He can do anything possible, but not impossible.

[Legomyegoorj]

So which of the two options is more plausibly true? That is the question to ask.

[chekitatheanimatedskeptic]

I do think that premisses 1 and 2 dont exactly hold. I would like to know your thoughts about it.
To say that NECESSARY existence is greater implies that Necessity of one's existence is some how "better than" Contigency.
But if something do not necessarily exist how can one even compare both? Being CONTINGENT or NECESSARY is not what really matters in a comparison, what matters is to exist for the comparison to be valid. One CANT be greater in comparison to what does not exist.

[MistyGothis]

The error in this argument is not in premise 8. Premise 8 is a red herring. The problem in the argument is step 6. Step 6 does not follow from step 5.

[Legomyegoorj]

Sure it does. What kind of Greatest Possible Being wouldn't exist in the actual world but only in some possible worlds?

[chekitatheanimatedskeptic]

Other problem with 3 and 4.
Defining god as the greatest being is not like begging the question?
Examples:
3. Alah is by definition the greatest possible being.
3. Thiamat is by definition... etc.

What if one explains that a necessary being is only ONE and that ONE does not need to be god?
The confusion with 3 is that the premisse is already implying the conclusion that god is necessary because we define it by being necessary.
If a nucleation event is THE necessary being even god is contingent

[chekitatheanimatedskeptic]

(cont 2): THAN it follows that we can only compare to NECESSARY beings.
Another thing:
It appears to me that between 1 and 3 there is a slight different meaning because the word GOD and BEING can be related in different ways. Although it can be just the metaphisics implied.
Example: if BEING has the meaning of a sentient being it can be regarded as =/= from EXISTENCE; the same aplies to the word god.
In this case the debater would have to make a case about sentient being greater too. Or not?

[teddobson]

The attributes of the greatest possible being defy compilation. Therefore, since there can be no universally acceptable definition of the greatest possible being, the concept is itself a contradiction. It is a fiction to declare that any human has the capacity to conceive of such a thing. Since the thesis is premised on the absurd notion that it is possible to conceive of a perfect being, and that such a being is God, the contradiction is inherent in the impossibility of definition.

[chekitatheanimatedskeptic]

(cont 3) I have a doubt about PREMISSE 2 also. I think one the options that should be given would be: (E) god does not exist.
That is because (E) is different from contingency (B) and from impossibility (D).
I hold that is different from (B) because something can exist and be contingent in one's metaphisic (like humans in the perspective of theists);
I hold that is different from (D) because something being called impossible is just a matter of knowledge, and logic also depends on it.

[MistyGothis]

That's a different argument. Each argument needs to be taken on its own terms.

In this case, the argument confuses the analytic sense of an assertion with the synthetic sense. Analytically, God is defined so that he must exist necessarily if he exists. If he doesn't, then that doesn't have to conflict with the fact that synthetically, in reality, God only exists as a possibility.

[Cookiecutter]

Omnipotence is the power to do anything, not the ability. For example, God has enough power to create the world. He has the energy required to destroy things (including himself) but cannot destroy himself because he does not have the evil that is required to do such a thing. It is like a car that has enough gas to go from here to Michigan, but cannot fly there.

[markIOP]

the mistake is 1st:How can one think of something with out nothing to justify it
2nd point the greatest of all beings is all both good and evil this must be true
3rd what is in the mind stays in the mind and can not be made real no matter who the dreamer
is. Therefore the whole argument is false ( i.e. I think of an apple know matter how I think what
I think I can not bring into existence a real apple )
The rest of the argument is without justification and futile

[chekitatheanimatedskeptic]

(cont 4) so IMPOSSIBLE =/= impossible to EXIST =/= not existant
The difference is rather obvious. Something is called IMPOSSIBLE because or indutcive and dedutcive tools can't explain something, or because we do not observe something. So saying that something cannot exist because it is impossible is at the core an argument from ignorance. Just because we cant explain, understand, observe something, it does not mean it does not exist. What one calls impossible today, can be possible tomorrow.

[MistyGothis]

(part 2)
5. No merely possible being is the Greatest Possible Being. (1)

6. (C) is false, God is not merely possible (3, 5)

7. Either (A) or D) is true. (2, 4, 6)

8'. The claim that God does not exist doesn't imply a contradiction. (premise)

9'. (A) is false (8')

10'. (D) is true (2, 4, 6, 8)

11'. It is impossible for God to exist.

[MistyGothis]

(part 1/2)
Just for fun, here's my ontological proof for the impossibility of God. You'll note the reasoning is virtually identical to that in your own proof. This proof shares the same error as yours.

1. Necessary existence is greater than contingent existence.

2. Exactly one of these is true: (A) God is necessary, (B) God is contingent, (C) God is merely possible, (D) God is impossible.

3. God is by definition the Greatest Possible Being.

4. (B) is false, God is not contingent (1, 3)

[nextexhale]

Concerning number 8, I can see no implied contradiction in the claim that God exists. To say that a Greatest Conceivable Being actually exists doesn't have any inherent logical impossibilities such as a "square circle" or a "married bachelor." The idea is not formally errant. As such, number 8 appears to be true.