Russian Tactics: Stupid but Effective?

In this video Stanimir Dobrev and I discuss Russian Tactics in the Ukraine War, particularly issues on command level, cohesion, training and combined arms. Additionally, we also cover where Russian tactics are effective and how they operate.

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00:00 Intro
01:13 Command Level Issues
04:45 From Column to Skirmishing Line
05:59 Lack of Cohesion
10:44 "Pre-Combined Arms"
15:52 Platoon etc. sizes
17:11 Effective Tactics
18:09 Wagner Tactics on Assault
22:27 What is an RPO?
23:23 No Breakthrough
24:49 No more Convicts in the Future?

#RussianTactics #Tactics #ukrainewar

[isrgn]

Thermobarics use two stage warheads, first aerosolizing a fuel to achieve a good fuel / air ratio, then igniting it, creating a massive pressure wave and flames. Very effective against fortified targets.

[scrooge]

The end is hilarious, Federal Prision System won't let go all the inmates in fear of losing its budget. Bureaucracy at its finest 😂😂

[sixstringedthing]

Mr Dobrev's point about proper battle planning giving everyone up and down the chain of command some decent "buy-in" is a good one. Multiple times throughout my career I've been sent to projects/jobs/service calls with little or no information besides an address and a contact name and basically told to just figure it out when I get there, and those jobs almost always categorically suck. If the "project" turned out to be assaulting a fortified Ukrainian position with old weapons and practically no training I would be more than a little pissed off/terrified.

[ldmitruk]

I really like your talks with Stanimir. They are always informative.

[kylemitchell]

“They go in tight columns” Because of mines

[christopherisgrig]

The Russian RPO-A Shmel is roughly equivalent to the US M202 FLASH. Both rocket flame throwers but the M202 had four rockets (making it a desirable prop for Swarzenagger movies) the M202 also used napalm instead of a thermobaric warhead. While still in the inventory, the napalm warhead for the M202 is prone to leaking so while some soldiers are still trained to use it, it may not be in general issue. The M202 is a big heavy thing with a rather short range. If part of a military aid package to Ukraine, they might prefer the Shmel to the FLASH

[richardthomas]

You are right about mortars being an infantry weapon, and arty being combined arms. You're wrong about the force level. In NATO, the 81mm mortar is a company level weapon. If that army uses 60mm mortars, that is a platoon level weapon (but usually the 60 has been ditched in favor of 40mm grenades)

[laserprawn]

Here's an idea--the guys in the vehicles are leaving so that the artillery that wounded the dismounts does not kill them. This is the reality of a peer war in which your enemy can dominate a section of the battlefield.

[andyf]

thermobarics are scary... long blast wave. makes them really deadly. they keep going on about the 'oxygen being sucked out of the area' but, if you are in that area, you have a blast wave problem first

[nikitaananjevas]

Tend to agree with assessment of Russian stuff work, however, it looks like several assumptions IMHO lead to misunderstandings and incorrect generalisations:
1. deployment from column to line - you tend to forget that in many places Ukrianians are relying heavily on landmines. That greatly restricts ability to maneuver by both infantry and armor. Ukrainians are so smart, that they even are trapping greater Russian assault elements by mass shelling mines by artillery and rockets from the front, rear and flanks of attacking formation
2. I am not sure local attacks on squad/platoon level are constantly performed without at least some recce by Russians. They tend to use small drones for initial recce of Ukrainian positions. IMHO problems progressively increase with planning higher level attacks due to poor information transfer up and down, poor analysis and decision making
3. Exploitation of local successes is almost absent due to 4 main factors: (i) they are unable to suppress defenders' artillery and drones on a larger scale due to absence of air superiority; (ii) HIMARS and similar MRLS in conjunction with good recce makes it impossible to concentrate and operate bigger reserves of armor and transport to support initial assault. It forces Russians to disperse instead of concentrating. Surely that could be overcome to some degree in sort of se-centric way of planning and coordinating movements of exploiting reserves, but such co-ordination on battalion and higher level is near impossible to current Russian command structure. They have no skills and no communication appropriate for such leadership (iv) you may lynch me, but I do not believe that Russians have numbers and firepower enough for such feats - Ukrainian defense is generally well manned since Ukraine mobilised more troops and density of their defense combined with above mentioned factors currently would prevent any break-through attempt by Russians, even if it would be better planned on a tactical level.

That is why my personal impression that Russians are tactically cornered and try to win attrition war by re-playing mini-Verduns. However, not historical Verdun, but rather original von Falkenhayn's idea, completely spoiled by his overzealous subordinates, who got mesmerised by initial successes of stormtroopers. Originally ~1000 pieces strong artillery was supposed to do the main job of killing the French while stormtroopers were supposed not to take ground or breakthrough, but act as sort of bait, forcing allies to strengthen their defenses by bringing in more infantry to the first and second lines to be piecemealed by artillery fire. But it would hardly work this way under current circumstances: they are unable to control the air and silence Ukrainian artillery for any tactically/operationally meaningful time period.

[visualizestudios]

Its impressive they are winning with Shovels. That shows how effective they are.

[BurtSampson]

"Stupid but effective" the new cope

[joearledge]

You were right about the nominal size of a platoon, 30 to 50 men, 40 on average. Less than 30, most combatants would consider to be an under staffed platoon.

[jprehberger]

Really excellent observations about Russian tactics, training, and motivations! I would like to hear more from Mr Dobrev.

[foilhat]

This was a really good discussion, thanks man.

[Oblio]

one thing Ive noticed about this war is that you always see footage from the Ukrainian side of bombing Russians with drones, or clearing trenches of Russians or clearing a village. You never really see anything from the Russian perspective. Also in interviews with Ukrainian soldiers Ive seen a lot about how bad things actually are for them but they keep their resolve to defend their home. You dont seem to hear a lot from the Russian side in the west unless its about defeatism even tho that doesnt seem to be the case with the Russian resolve to win this war.

[juanargentino]

If it’s stupid but it works, it’s not stupid.

[sue_downing]

Excellent commentary and insight.
and
Don't interrupt the enemy when he is making a mistake.

[terminatoratrimoden]

RGB headphone and a gamer chair. He's one of us, clearly.

[johnjennings]

Not sure I agree with the observation on the russian veichles travelling in file because of poor coordination. I think its done for several reasons - 1 the ground - they cannot advance abreast because only the road is passable. 2 The distance- most of the engagements we see on video happen before they move to skirmish formations - several miles before they encounter the ukrainian lines. 3 mines... Most columns have a limitted number of mine clearing equipment - and what we saw in Vulghledar was most of the equipment was disabled by mines. The tacktic of moving through minefields is to follow the tracks of the clearing veichle. Ukraine is the most heavily mined country in the world by now. It had massive stockpiles of artillery based minelaying, and recieved more though the western delivery of large numbers of M718 mines. We saw some veichles (thinking they were under artillery barrage) try to move into defensive screens for dismounts - only to hit more of the minefields themselves. In Vugledhar, the initial colum made it to Datcha with mine clearance. What appears to have happened next was the ukrainians laid mines behind that force - when the following reenforcement column approached, it ran into the previously layed field.