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Stable Matching by Optimal Transport
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Federico Echenique (UC Berkeley)
Online and Matching-Based Market Design
We discuss a model of matching with aligned preferences, which serves to highlight the role of supply and demand imbalances in matching markets. Examples include organ donor exchange, as well as matching markets with transferable utility in which the bargaining over transfers takes place after a match is formed. We establish a connection between stability, fairness, and optimal transport for these markets. Special cases are studied, which yield additional results and insights.
Online and Matching-Based Market Design
We discuss a model of matching with aligned preferences, which serves to highlight the role of supply and demand imbalances in matching markets. Examples include organ donor exchange, as well as matching markets with transferable utility in which the bargaining over transfers takes place after a match is formed. We establish a connection between stability, fairness, and optimal transport for these markets. Special cases are studied, which yield additional results and insights.
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