Instant Threat Modeling - #19 API Security

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Threats:
- API1:2019 Broken Object Level Authorization
- API2:2019 Broken User Authentication
- API3:2019 Excessive Data Exposure
- API4:2019 Lack of Resources & Rate Limiting
- API5:2019 Broken Function Level Authorization
- API6:2019 Mass Assignment
- API7:2019 Security Misconfiguration
- API8:2019 Injection
- API9:2019 Improper Assets Management
- API10:2019 Insufficient Logging & Monitoring

Instant mitigations:
- Centralised authorization mechanism - OWASP Access Control Cheatsheet
- OWASP Authentication Cheatsheet and Session Management Cheatsheet
- Verify the API response against the UI design, don't serialize the objects.
- Introduce lockout mechanism, rate limiting - OWASP Blocking Brute Force Attacks doc
- OWASP Top 10 2013 A7 - Missing Function Level Access Control - make sure before running each method that the user is allowed to execute it.
- Verify the server-side backend code against the API design - OWASP Mass Assignemnt Cheatsheet
- A base threat model for the corresponding components - web or mobile front-end, back-end frameworks and operating systems
- OWASP Injection Prevention Cheatsheet - validate all input against specific format. Cast input to a pre-defined types with prototype validators.
- Introduce asset inventory - servers, environments, API deployments and their versions - list of all endpoints
- OWASP logging cheatsheet and C9 in the OWASP Proactive Control doc.

Instant Threat Modeling by Jakub Kaluzny (SecuRing).
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I am your 700th subscriber as this video was so helpful.

Masjid-dsem
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This is extremly helpful. Thank you very much for taking the time to produce free & good videos.


Also, I worked with SecuRing in the past. They are good, professional, knowledgeable and communicative pentesters.

MrTimeWarps
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If there are good practices for apis that can be applied globally, why do we need a diagram or even the need of threat modelling for apis? Arent all api threat modelling coming to the same conclusions?

shikida