Peter van Inwagen - What are Possible Worlds? (Part 2)

'Possible worlds' are all the ways in which a world can be. A 'world' is a complete state of cosmic affairs: all the infinite variations of innumerable parts and their myriad relationships. Possible world's have become an indispensible philosophical technique for exploring modalities—issues of possibility and necessity that are essential for examining God.

[dvaccaro]

I love these plebs comments saying that philosophy is just blubbering: the internet gives you access to things you just don't understand and you don't deserve it :)

[Nephelokokkygia]

In this episode contemporary philosophy necessarily gets us Further from Truth

[stevecoley]

Joy, beauty and harmony (heaven) is the exact opposite of misery, ugliness and conflict (hell).

[jeanettesdaughter]

I dwell in possibility a surer house than prose, more numerous for windows, etc. I’d rather simply read some ED and other poets, and writers. Everything conceivable is there! Ways things could be. We sure need alternatives!

[jamesruscheinski]

How does language fit into possible worlds?

[ismireghal]

Is there anything gained by assuming possible world not connected to ours by space/time at all?

[claudetaillefer]

Peter van Inwagen is talking nonsense. Modal logic is typically understood as a theory of "logical consequence" between sentences (statements) involving possibility or necessity (modal operators), a maximally consistent set of such sentences. Modal realism, as advocated by some philosophers (e.g. David Lewis), is a metaphysical doctrine and not a theory of logical consequence between modal sentences. To quote Quine, this is a dubious business!

[firstnamesurname]

Again, '... To Believe is not required ...'

[braininahat]

Peter van Inwagen is a good philosopher, a great writer, but this little talk is far from informative. I'm still skeptical about the uses of possible worlds semantics. I think philosophers have taken it too far -- especially David Lewis -- almost to the point where they're looking for ontological objects that correspond to their linguistic expressions, or some deep structure, sort of like Wittgenstein did in the Tractatus. Language works whether or not it's precise, vague, or nonsense. It's not the job of the philosopher to explain how language or meaning must "really" work. If we aren't cognizant of anything deep in using such expressions, then it's the job of the philosopher to explain how language works without such awareness. Philosophers should be archaeologists, not cosmologists, when it comes to language.

While philosophy has rather embarrassing limitations -- philosophers still can't refute idealism, solipsism, or David Lewis's ridiculous claims -- it's still a very practical skill. I say "skill" because that's what it primarily is. And as a skill, it requires someone to teach you how to do it properly, lots of corrected practice, and some natural ability for you to be really good at it. I know people have the conceit that other people don't reason better than they do, but that's a lie. I reason better than all of you, frankly, but then I've had training in philosophy. If you had training in playing the piano, building houses, or making violins, I wouldn't walk around thinking I could do those things as well as you. But because philosophy is a different type of skill, people don't see it the same way. In fact, though, my training in philosophy creates a bigger gap in ability between me and you than the gap that would exist if you studied pottery making and I didn't for four years. It's not a pleasant thought to entertain, but then the truth is sometimes not comfortable.

[kjustkses]

Still so funny when grownups talk about many worlds.

[KaiseruSoze]

Assume what I say is true... blah blah blah ... it's necessary. How is that not subjective? Jesus!

[AliVeli-grfb]

i really dislike philosophy, I haven't seen any philosopher talk straight to point, I haven't seen any philosopher talk sense without blabbering. well in this age of science their stupidity is much more obvious