Thomist vs Molinist Predestination (Fr. Dominic Legge) | Ep. 262

I'm joined by Fr. Dominc Legge to discuss the differences between Thomist and Molinist predestination.

We'll be taking questions from Patrons and Super Chatters

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[turegoodoverlooked]

Ha, providence is wild. Was thinking yesterday "I wish Matt Fradd would talk to someone about the difference between Molinism and the Thomistic understanding of predestination". Well, here we go.

[julioalonzo]

This was great! Please bring Fr. Dominic more often!

[chrisraper]

The fact that the guest of this show was unfamiliar with "compatibilism" and describes Molinism as God "foreseeing" people's decisions (as opposed to "conceiving") shows me that he is seriously deficient in his knowledge of the alternatives to Thomism for reconciling human freedom and divine sovereignty.

[mananabobea]

From Dominican Republic I congratulate Fr Dominic and pray to God that help you to understand his will.

[katiehendricks]

how did I miss Watching now, devastated I missed it

[rampayge]

I’m reading “Grace, Predestination, and the Salvific Will of God” by Fr. William Most; he does a great job with dissecting both sides of the issue and figuring out what works and what doesn’t!

[justinmora]

We had Aquinas 101 videos assigned to us in my Medieval Philosophy Class at Loyola Marymount University!!!!

[thorobreu]

Matt I want you to know that the "sarcastic tone" joke was really funny, and I'm sorry it wasn't recognized at the time

[jeffreykalb]

A friend told me this Catholic joke:
Once there was an elderly woman riding on a train. Seated across from her were two priests, the first a Jesuit, the second a Dominican. The woman noted the vast difference in their official habits, and then went on to ask them in what other ways they differed. The Dominican responded: "My order was founded by Saint Dominic, and fought the Albigensian heresy." The Jesuit then added: "My order was founded by Saint Ignatius, and fought the Protestant heresy." The woman responded: "I see, and are there other differences?" The Dominican piped in: "Have you ever met an Albigensian?"

[MirKat]

I didn't even know Molinist was a thing. But hey you learn something new everyday. Great job guys!!

[PresbyterianPaladin]

I feel Fr. Legge in several places mischaracterizes or misrepresents the Molinist position for example his comments around the 33 minute mark about Molina's conception of free will violating the act-potency distinction because it would make our wills capable of moving from potential to act without themselves being acted upon seems woefully ignorant of Molina's doctrine of general concurrence. As Kirk MacGregor points out in his book "Luis De Molina":

"During the first and second trimesters of year three (1556 – 57), Molina read Aristotle’s Physica (Physics) and was influenced by his theory of causation. According to Aristotle, there are four types of cause: material cause, explaining what something is made of; formal cause, explaining the form or pattern an entity follows to become that entity; efficient cause, explaining the actual source of change; and final cause, explaining the intended purpose of change. Regarding efficient cause, Molina subdivided this notion into primary causation, particular (direct) causation, and general (universal or indirect) causation. Molina held that God is the primary cause of everything that occurs; in the words of Alfred Freddoso, God “created the original constituents of the universe ex nihilo, and no creature can exist or possess causal power through any interval of time unless God conserves it and its powers in being at every instant in that interval.”41 However, this does not mean that, for everything that occurs, God determines it or is morally responsible for it. Molina maintained that God is the particular or direct cause when God does determine something (for which thing he would be morally responsible) by producing an effect by himself, since God’s causal power by itself controls the specific nature of the effect.42 But Molina insisted that creatures possess authentic causal power as well and are therefore particular yet secondary causes. Nonetheless, for creatures to exercise their causal power, God must simultaneously and indirectly cooperate with them to produce the intended effect. When God so cooperates with creatures, God acts as a general cause of the effect, and Molina dubbed God’s simultaneous and indirect action his general concurrence (concursus generalis).43 The term general indicates that the specific nature of the effect (i.e., good or evil) is in no way attributable to God’s causal contribution, although that contribution is necessary in order for any effect to be produced at all. Rather, the goodness or badness of the effect is due solely to the creatures, who are the particular causes of the effect. To illustrate, Molina observed that the sun causally contributes to human acts of sin by providing heat and light on earth, without which humans could do nothing. Hence the sun is a general or indirect cause of human sin. Obviously, however, the sun is not morally responsible for human sin, for none of its causal input determined the production of sinful actions. Human beings freely choose to channel the sun’s causal input toward sinful actions and are therefore solely responsible for them.44" (MacGregor, 53-54)

Thus Molina's conception of free will in no way contradicts the act-potency distinction. This becomes even more obvious when we note (as MacGregor does) that:

"In the third trimester of year three, Molina turned to Aristotle’s De coelo (On the Heavens) and De generatione et corruptione (On Generation and Corruption). Chief among Aristotle’s cosmological works, De coelo supplied Molina with an argument for the existence of God from motion or change. Based on the reduction of potency to act, Molina perceived that if something is moved from one state to another, it must be moved by something already moving. But since an infinite regress is impossible, the thing, upon tracing back the causal chain, must ultimately be moved by an unmoved mover, who is God.51 On a related note, De generatione helped Molina perceive the distinction between contingent being and necessary being. Contingent being can come into existence and pass out of existence, while necessary being simply exists and can neither come into existence nor pass out of existence. In other words, it is logically possible for contingent being not to exist, but it is logically impossible for necessary being not to exist.52 This distinction enabled Molina to propose a second argument for God’s existence based on contingency and necessity. Molina reasoned that since contingent being, by definition, cannot bring itself into existence, there must be a reason why contingent being exists. Hence contingent being must have been brought into existence by necessary being, which Molina identifies as God.53 The conditional demands that which is absolute." (MacGregor, 55-56).

As such it would be absurd for Molina not to have recognized that the act potency distinction (which he was thoroughly familiar with) was somehow at odds with his conception of free will, if it actually were. But as we saw his doctrine of concurrence shows there is no such problem. I would expect Fr. Legge to know this, which is why I would say he is mischaracterizing or misrepresenting Molina and the Molinist view.

[zackm]

People don’t realize that classical protestants/Reformed Christian’s are completely Augustianian/Thomist in matters relating to predestination/free will/Soteriology

[jddeklerk]

I, a Calvinist pastor, really enjoyed this and agreed with everything that Fr. Legge said here about the topic.

[DSTH]

For any who might be interested, at Catholic Critique (WordPress) see "Harmony and Differences on Predestination in Catholic Theology"

[StSylvester]

This is the best video you've ever made (that I've seen). Tough subject, but very, very important. Well done.

[Giovanibeyond]

Watching from Brazil! God bless you, Matt.

[stephanelarochelle]

It would have been interesting to have a Molinist to explain his view ... Not that Fr Legge did not explain it well, but he is clearly a Thomist.... Interesting presentation!

[RubenKaramañites]

Fr. Dominic Legge is almost a genius thank you

[winstonbarquez]

Fundamentally, we do not know all the answers in the dynamic relationship between divine grace and human freedom. This is one of the mysteries of God's action in the world.

[michaelventer]

As a Calvinist myself, this conversation was very good. Thank you. Yes, I think Fr Dominc handles this subject very delicately. Grace is undeserved by defenition. On the Compatabilist view we may say that the Holy Bible teaches human responsibility and God's sogvereinty as both 100% true, and so all the time. One can see this as two true axioms from where Compatabilism might be deduced. Molinism, as an Libertarian Free Will Theodicy, are from the presupposition of Incompatabilism first and foremost. This commits them to all sorts of interesting exegetical problems in my view.Thank you for a great video and conversation. Soli Deo gloria.