Leyte Gulf at 80

Join the U.S. Naval Institute on 11 September 2024 at 1100 EST at the Jack C. Taylor Conference Center, in Annapolis, MD. The topic of the discussion will be Leyte Gulf at 80.

Often appropriately described as the “greatest naval battle in history,” the battle of Leyte Gulf (23–26 October 1944) was actually a series of battles in which both sides exhibited courage and resourcefulness yet suffered from confusion born of poorly conceived command relationships and ineffective communications. Marked by awe-inspiring heroism, failed intelligence, brilliant deception, flawed strategy, effective tactical planning, great controversies, and a host of lessons learned, this gargantuan battle involved hundreds of ships, included nearly 200,000 participants, spanned more than 100,000 square miles, and resulted in the deaths of thousands of sailors from both sides. Every facet of naval warfare at the time was involved, it is clearly one of the great naval battles in history and has been the subject of countless books and articles in the 80 years since those massive fleets clashed in the Western Pacific.

[GregoryMills-ur]

Mr. Pocklington:

I attended this interesting discussion at the Naval Academy and want to highlight one significant item. I happened to be sitting a few feet from the gentleman at the microphone who identified himself as the son of Lt JG Royal Snyder who was lost in this action aboard the USS Johnston. I believe that he was asking a deeply personal question about the value of Johnston's response to the obviously hopeless situation experienced during her final moments of battle. The other panelists gave reasonable answers to his inquiry, but I was tremendously impressed by your summation of the duties of command and the role that CMD Ernest Evans took to protect his charges in Taffy 3. I would urge anyone to review this segment of the video starting at 1:11:07 for Bill Snyder's question and your thorough response which clearly defines the dichotomy of duty to crew and duty to mission and country. CMD Evans had stated during his ship's commissioning that "I intend to go in harms' way" but the circumstances he found himself in put that promise to the ultimate test. His actions confirmed that commitment and I believe were supported by his crew and his nation.

[kennethdeanmiller]

At 1:11:05 A man who's father was on the USS Johnston asks a great question. And BRAVO to Drach for giving that man the answer that he already knew but didn't want to admit. And also the answer Drach gives too in my mind is exactly what Captain Evans must have been thinking because he was a very galante man & I'm sure he would not have risked the lives of his crew any further than he already had unless he knew there was a serious NEED to do so. He was trying to protect six escort carriers & each one had about 900 sailors. So 6 × 900=5400 + sailors that Captain Evans & the other destroyers & destroyer escorts were trying to protect & those carriers can barely make 18-20 knots. And most of the Japanese ships are considerably faster.

[matthewnewton]

I’m not sure this myth of Taffys 1, 2 and 3 being vastly outmatched by Kurita’s Center Force is necessarily accurate. Between the multiple escort carriers in the task force there were something like 400 planes. Remember- both entire fleets during the Battle of Midway only had 400-500 aircraft put TOGETHER. Meaning, both the American and Japanese fleets combined.

So, especially during the early war 400 planes was enough to do enormous damage to a Japanese fleet. The Americans would have loved to have 400 available aircraft during Coral Sea, for example. Or even Philippine Sea.

Granted, some of them weren’t properly armed, some of them started off the battle with ground attack munitions loaded on their wings. But after Taffy 2 gets into the action, which is fairly quickly- there were multiple carrier decks to land on (which happened throughout the morning- planes landing on whichever deck would take them).

This kind of air power had an enormous effect on the battle. The great and heroic last stand made by the destroyers and destroyer escorts of Taffy 3, was not entirely in vain, as it did give the carriers time to make their escape, and to fuel up and arm their aircraft. Even then, some planes took off with nothing but a few rounds of cannon fire ammo. All they could do was strafe the decks of these huge Japanese ships. But ultimately it was impossible to fend off all 400 aircraft.

And THAT is what causes Kurita to turn around and hightail it out of there.

[roderickcampbell]

I am very deeply impressed by all these folk and the presentation. Respect!

[ELOestimates]

The Formosa Air Battle should be credited with the overall depletion of Japanese recourses that would no longer be available

[davidlavigne]

While all the panelists, including the moderator Alex Pocklington were astute, I want to draw attention to Trent Hone's great analysis of the Japanese strategic aims all along during the war. From Pearl Harbor and the invasion of the Philippines onward, they always felt that if they could cause enough casualties and destruction to the Americans that we would pack it in and negotiate for peace. The idea of a Kentai Kessan, or decisive battle to bring this about was one of their goals. Even after they realized this wasn't going to materialize in the way they conceived it to, they never gave up on the idea that we would not stomach the casualties. The Japanese should have studied our civil war where we demonstrated the American resolve to endure hardship and loss.

[hazchemel]

My grandfather's doctor suggested he take a nip of whiskey before bed, to improve circulation to the feet.
Doctors did this, but carefully, as his doctor said, "Tom, you are one of the few men I trust to take only one shot."

[markmclaughlin]

My Father Kenneth McLaughlin WT/3 served on USS Gambier Bay.

[akosmetatos]

At 24 min he says in the beginning everything was going good? What about Iron bottom sound?

[DarylIrwinAyo]

today there is far less fog of war than before, more target seeking weapon, US needs more hulls conventionally to protect other assets and counter enemy submarines

[michaelcoe]

Sirs, with no offense to yourselves or the institute, this was in moments intensly interesting; but was largely a series of rambling and disjointed narratives that gave no coherence to the timeline of the engagements.