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Autopoietic Enactivism and the Free Energy Principle - Prof. Friston, Prof Buckley, Dr. Ramstead
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This fascinating exchange between leading scholars explored connections and tensions between the Free Energy Principle (FEP) and enactivism. Moderator Tim Scarfe teed up the dialogue by noting critique of FEP from an enactivist paper. Karl Friston, as founder of FEP, was interested to discover whether he is an enactivist. Chris Buckley brought expertise from robotics and physics, while Maxwell Ramstead offered in-depth knowledge of both FEP and enactivism.
Ramstead outlined core enactivist views - embodied cognition, rejecting computationalism, dynamical systems focus. He distinguished "high road" anti-representational versus "low road" more moderate variants. Enactivism emerged from autopoiesis, which emphasizes structural recursion and self-generation of constraints. Buckley shared coming to FEP as a skeptic from robotics and behavior-based AI. He welcomed reconciling operational closure concerns within FEP.
A tenet of enactivism is rejecting information-theoretic explanations. Friston and Ramstead argued information theory inheres in dynamical systems physics. Ramstead contends the split is baseless, stemming from misreading early proposals as mutually exclusive. He laments enactivists’ philosophical insularity and dogmatism against information approaches.
Discussing boundaries, Ramstead asserts FEP’s Markov blanket formalism captures organizational dependencies akin to enactivism’s operational closure. Blankets are flexible, not fixed veils. Generative models likewise represent systems’ relational organization. Friston emphasizes blankets separating and coupling systems. Both internal and external states are integral.
On goals, Buckley advocates an intentional stance - using goal language pragmatically if beneficial. Goals emerge from beliefs about dynamics rather than reward functions. Friston elegantly deduced goal-directed behavior mathematically falling out of FEP in a particular regime. The group explored how systems act “as if” they have goals or models without explicit representations. This helps reconcile enactivist and computational views.
Ramstead repeatedly critiqued enactivists’ commitment to firm divides, like between mind and world. He argues FEP integrates perspectives, dissolving false dichotomies. Friston emphasized FEP’s consistency with other principles like maximum entropy, foreseeing links with relational quantum physics.
Overall, the conversation was constructive and conciliatory in intent. All parties agreed on seeking compatibility and community between research programs. However, Ramstead levied significant critique of enactivists’ philosophical assumptions and resistance to information theory. While appreciating the spirit of engagement, he contends some differences originate from enactivist misunderstandings. The discussion revealed a complex intermixing of resonance and tension between these leading approaches to cognition.
We address critique in this paper:
Laying down a forking path: Tensions between enaction and the free energy principle (Ezequiel A. Di Paolo, Evan Thompson, Randall D. Beere)
Other refs:
Multiscale integration: beyond internalism and externalism (Maxwell J D Ramstead)
MLST panel: Dr. Tim Scarfe and Dr. Keith Duggar
TOC:
00:00:00 - Introduction & Participants' Backgrounds
00:04:01 - Core Views of Enactivism
00:15:02 - Dynamics vs Information Theory
00:22:20 - Concept of Operational Closure
00:30:00 - Good Regulator Theorem
00:40:00 - Role of Intentionality
00:51:31 - FEP & Ecological Psychology
01:00:00 - Goals in FEP
01:10:00 - Emergence of Goals
01:20:00 - Importance of Intentional Stance
01:31:15 - Future of FEP
01:40:00 - Observer Dependence in FEP
01:50:00 - Metrological Aspects of FEP
Ramstead outlined core enactivist views - embodied cognition, rejecting computationalism, dynamical systems focus. He distinguished "high road" anti-representational versus "low road" more moderate variants. Enactivism emerged from autopoiesis, which emphasizes structural recursion and self-generation of constraints. Buckley shared coming to FEP as a skeptic from robotics and behavior-based AI. He welcomed reconciling operational closure concerns within FEP.
A tenet of enactivism is rejecting information-theoretic explanations. Friston and Ramstead argued information theory inheres in dynamical systems physics. Ramstead contends the split is baseless, stemming from misreading early proposals as mutually exclusive. He laments enactivists’ philosophical insularity and dogmatism against information approaches.
Discussing boundaries, Ramstead asserts FEP’s Markov blanket formalism captures organizational dependencies akin to enactivism’s operational closure. Blankets are flexible, not fixed veils. Generative models likewise represent systems’ relational organization. Friston emphasizes blankets separating and coupling systems. Both internal and external states are integral.
On goals, Buckley advocates an intentional stance - using goal language pragmatically if beneficial. Goals emerge from beliefs about dynamics rather than reward functions. Friston elegantly deduced goal-directed behavior mathematically falling out of FEP in a particular regime. The group explored how systems act “as if” they have goals or models without explicit representations. This helps reconcile enactivist and computational views.
Ramstead repeatedly critiqued enactivists’ commitment to firm divides, like between mind and world. He argues FEP integrates perspectives, dissolving false dichotomies. Friston emphasized FEP’s consistency with other principles like maximum entropy, foreseeing links with relational quantum physics.
Overall, the conversation was constructive and conciliatory in intent. All parties agreed on seeking compatibility and community between research programs. However, Ramstead levied significant critique of enactivists’ philosophical assumptions and resistance to information theory. While appreciating the spirit of engagement, he contends some differences originate from enactivist misunderstandings. The discussion revealed a complex intermixing of resonance and tension between these leading approaches to cognition.
We address critique in this paper:
Laying down a forking path: Tensions between enaction and the free energy principle (Ezequiel A. Di Paolo, Evan Thompson, Randall D. Beere)
Other refs:
Multiscale integration: beyond internalism and externalism (Maxwell J D Ramstead)
MLST panel: Dr. Tim Scarfe and Dr. Keith Duggar
TOC:
00:00:00 - Introduction & Participants' Backgrounds
00:04:01 - Core Views of Enactivism
00:15:02 - Dynamics vs Information Theory
00:22:20 - Concept of Operational Closure
00:30:00 - Good Regulator Theorem
00:40:00 - Role of Intentionality
00:51:31 - FEP & Ecological Psychology
01:00:00 - Goals in FEP
01:10:00 - Emergence of Goals
01:20:00 - Importance of Intentional Stance
01:31:15 - Future of FEP
01:40:00 - Observer Dependence in FEP
01:50:00 - Metrological Aspects of FEP
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