The Hard Problem of Consciousness

The hard problem of consciousness is a philosophical concept that refers to the difficulty in explaining why and how subjective experiences or qualia arise from physical processes in the brain. It was famously formulated by philosopher David Chalmers in the 1990s.

Consciousness, in this context, refers to the state of being aware of one's own thoughts, sensations, emotions, and perceptions. It is the subjective "what it is like" to experience something, such as the taste of chocolate, the feeling of pain, the color red, or the sense of love.

The hard problem of consciousness arises because while we have made significant progress in understanding the brain's functions and how it processes information, we still lack a satisfactory explanation for why these physical processes give rise to subjective conscious experiences. In other words, why does the firing of neurons and the processing of neural information lead to the subjective experience of, for example, seeing the color red or feeling happiness?

There are several other problems related to consciousness, such as the easy problem of explaining how the brain processes information and performs cognitive functions, but the hard problem is specifically concerned with the subjective and qualitative nature of consciousness itself.

Many theories and approaches have been proposed to tackle this problem, ranging from materialistic explanations that seek to link consciousness solely to physical processes in the brain to more dualistic or panpsychist ideas that posit consciousness as a fundamental aspect of the universe. However, as of my last update in September 2021, the hard problem of consciousness remains an open and challenging question in both philosophy and neuroscience.

[Ajay]

I think the problem might just be one of nomenclature. If someone has spent a lifetime studying the science of colour then they do have some knowledge of the subject. Also when they see actual colours they are not necessarily adding to that knowledge. They have then in fact started acquiring knowledge about a new subject which is the experience of colour. There! I've solved your "hard problem" (joking! 😊)

[DomusUlixes]

Well, it's actually quite simple in the case of your colour example.

Let's look at the physics, you assert that the woman "knows" about colour. Yet both physics wise, and neurologically, that cannot be! Naming a colour means your brain classifies a neurological input. In this case as "red". Without ever having had that input, the link isn't there yet. The link isn't established until it is said. Of course, in reality her colour receptors likely have died off. But we know from historical analysis that many ancient civilization didn't have the colour blue, and therefor just had more variations of green.

As to consciousness, we know from physics experiments, that classifying something by an observer (either computer or human) has a physical effect on the experiment. (Also not necessarily persistent) you are, factually, part of a participatory universe that isn't independent of all acts of observation. The moment your brain discretizes via an action potential, this physics demand is achieved.

But just as a fair warning. Because of the proven participatory universe, the world doesn't make you conscious, but because you are, the world is as it is.

Let me know what you need references about.

[jscoppe]

I would say you CAN have complete knowledge about a topic without having experienced it. Experiencing it is not necessarily adding knowledge, just more data/information. Knowledge is conclusions made/acquired based on gaining data/information through experience (whether it be first hand through sense or second or third hand through other external detection mechanisms). And I think it's bold to claim that an artificial human that has all the exact same inputs and outputs would have anything different than what we call consciousness. How would you know it doesn't have that? Really just seems like you're applying some supernatural element without justification.