Joshua Greene's Moral Philosophy.

In this video we will summarize a much cited paper by Joshua Greene entitled: Beyond Point-and-Shoot Morality: Why Cognitive (Neuro)ScienceMatters for Ethics.
The paper explains what dual process morality is and argues that science can help advance ethics (along with other marvelous things).

We will not be able to go into the details on everything so if you want to be spoiled please read the article for yourself:

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[Mon]

Sorry for going a bit overboard with the jokes <3 <3

[bp]

I'm now picturing Kant flexing in the mirror

[MC-ousn]

If anyone's interested in a dissenting view on this topic, I would recommend Iain McGilchrist's "The Matter with Things". What Kahneman and others call system 1 and system 2 thinking he assigns to the right and left hemispheres of the brain respectively and advocates for the use of intuition over the use logic.

[alanjones]

My moral habits derive from my empathies and an ability to reflect and reason about caring and fairness, about the welfare of others. Both Haidt and Greene conflate the moral habits of individuals with absolutist, either/or thinking, with the dogmas of ideologies. The conflation allows rulers and members of tribes to restrict and direct the expressions of their empathies. It also allows them to rationalize-justify all manner of immoral behaviors.

I read Greene and Haidt having first become familiar with John Dewey and pragmatic ethics. When I read Greene's "Moral Tribes, " including his account of "deep pragmatism, " I was surprised that he neglected to refer to the literature of pragmatic ethics. Hugh Lafollette has a nice summary of pragmatic ethics that you will easily find online. Erik Asp has studied how brain damage (especially damage to areas known important for empathy) can affect moral development and cause moral people to become amoral.

[lolroflmaoization]

I would argue that it favors consequentialist ethics because people who haven't thought about ethics deeply have simplistic and inconsistent theories of what is right and wrong where the simplistic deontological model that comes out of immediate emotive reactions and consequentialist reactions when considering it more deeply, infact it would be wrong to ascribe a theory to them, as it's going to be quite the inconsistent jumbled mess.

But anyways there are many quite technical ethical theories that require a lot of system 2 thinking to develop, as well as some quite sophisticated criticisms against consequentialist theories that don't just depend on intuitions regarding specific cases, and i think the fact that most philosophers have landed on non consequentialist theories is at least some evidence that extended and systematic use of system two thinking doesn't really lead to consequentialist theories when taken as part of a project that extends for longer periods of time rather than just thinking on individual cases unlike what the subjects discussed in the paper do.

Also another problem is there is a link between metaethics and ethics, we can't decide which ethical theory is correct before deciding on the correct metaethics and metaethical epistemology required for us to know that theory, and i think metaethical work tends to favor non consequentialist theories, despite the fact that's it is not dependent on intuitions about individual cases, but that could be just my impression .

[katewilson]

I really REALLY want to hear your take on “the righteous mind” by Johnathan Haidt

[Xob_Driesestig]

3:17 You pronounce Luffy as Luhffy? Let me guess, you also call Zoro, Zolo? Unsubscribed!
On a more serious note, while I do think that the average consequentialist theory requires more analysis than the average deontological theory, there are simple consequentialist theories (e.g. embracing consequentialist cluelessness) and really complex deontological theories that require a lot of thought (e.g, contractarianism requires a whole lot of system 2 analysis).
I do wonder about whether the reason why lawyers, judges, etc prefer deontological theories, while economists, staticians, etc prefer consequentialists theories is in part due to the fact that their dearly bought skillsets mesh well with those theories.
So let me attempt to present a stronger case for using System 2 in our moral reasoning:

Premise 1: We should be at least a little bit morally uncertain
Three reasons for accepting this premise:
1) Moral philosophy is complex and difficult.
Choosing between different moral theories is not easy because each theory has both strengths and weaknesses. Also, personal biases, such as cultural, religious, or evolutionary heuristics, can color our moral judgment. These biases are often difficult to ignore completely, making it likely that we make mistakes in our moral reasoning.
2) There is moral disagreement.
Significant moral disagreement exists on many ethical issues, even among intelligent and knowledgeable people. This suggests that it is unreasonable to have a high degree of confidence in our own moral views, given that others, who are equally capable, may come to different conclusions.
3) Human hubris.
People are often more overconfident about their beliefs than is warranted, as psychological research shows. This also applies to moral beliefs, where people tend to be more biased. It is therefore plausible that we should be less certain of our moral beliefs than we often are.

Premise 2: We should take into account all moral theories we find plausible and not just pick our favorite moral theory and run with it:

Why? This violates the principle of dominance. Say you have to choose between option A and option B. Say you have 60% credence in your favorite theory which considers both options permissible, but 40% credence in another theory that considers B impermissible. Just running with your favorite moral theory allows you to pick option B, even though option A is permissible for both theories. (How we take into account different moral theories is another matter, but let me do some self-promotion and say that philosophers have developed concrete ways to this, such as 'sortition' and 'convex randomization')

Premise 3: Some of the moral theories we should find at least somewhat plausible are consequentialist theories.
Because their arguments are really strong, and even if you don't think so, many of the most famous moral philosophers do, so there's a chance you missed something.

Premise 4: Some of these consequentialist theories require system 2 reasoning
See video

Conclusion: When we commit to moral reasoning, we should use system 2.


Also let me just copy paste some criticisms of dual process theory that I left on a previous video for those of you who haven't seen it:
Dual process theory is unfortunately not very scientifically rigorous (the replication crisis hasn't been kind to dual process theory; the evidence for it is sparse). If system two is 'conscious' and 'intentional' and system one is 'unconscious' and 'unintentional', then by implication there are no intentional + unconscious cognitive processes. This seems false. Think about typing or driving; it is driven by intent but you're not consciously thinking about where to place your hands and fingers. How do we even differentiate between being conscious and unconscious? If I consciously think about whether I want to buy one brand of chocolate or another, while being unconsciously influenced by advertisements, is that system 1 or system 2 thinking?


However, this criticism is not a deathblow for the point this video is trying to make, since we can just replace 'system 1' with 'less time spent thinking about it' and 'system 2' with 'more time spent thinking about it'.