Az 1919-es magyar–román háború

Felhasznált források:
Bandholtz, Harry Hill. Napló nem diplomata módra – Román megszállás Magyarországon. Magyar Világ Kiadó, 1933.

Támogatók:
Bartus Sándor
Zalán Rosta
Ottó Ferenc Ács
Szabó Artúr
Knowledge Universe
Bence Karlik
Lili Eszter Torma
Sasha Nagy
Bence Lakatos
László Kémenes
Koppány Kémenes
Barnabás Mesterházy
Pippin
Péter Győri
SKY
Togrim
Szabolcs Molnár
R Vercsi
Tarczi Ottó
Nardai Máté
Vid
FILM_HUNGARY
Furák Eszter
Zsolt Lekvarka
Péter Benyó
László Farkas
Miklós Pákozdi
Furák Eszter
Éva Szabóné
Márk Fülöp
Imre Farkas
Akos Bacso
Viktor Bella
István Mag
Komjáti Jordán
Lukács Ferenc
Danoobian
Zoltán Petneházi
Nóra Szikora
Dániel Berki

Partnereink:

[gregor_man]

Micsoda káosz volt ez az egész időszak... Jó előadás volt, köszönöm. Nekem sosem volt meg a tehetségem ahhoz, hogy egy ilyen komplikált eseménysorozat leírását jól megjegyezzem, de azért nagy vonalakban sokminden megmarad ebből az összegzésből. Az ember nyilván felteszi magának a kérdést, hogy akkor ki is volt itt a hunyó, de a válasz végül is az, hogy mindenki. Itt nem lehetett okosnak lenni.

[florinprisecaru]

The past is the past. As a Romanian, I want there to be no conflict between us ever again.

[stanciuflorin]

A balanced documentary..let's hope that there will never be another war between our nations..1000 years of division is enough..We can value each other and I think we have more things in common than what divides us .

[hecklerkoch]

*G. D. Feldman (ed.), **_German Imperialism, 1914–1918: The Development of a Historical Debate, _** London, 1972:*

<<On 23 April 1917 a meeting between Hindenburg and Ludendorff, the Chancellor, the Foreign Secretary, Arthur Zimmermann, and the Head of the Political Section of the Government General in Belgium was convened at Kreuznach, in the Rhineland, to discuss war aims. The German High Command (Oberste Heeresleitung - OHL), confident at this time that the U-boat campaign would bring Britain to her knees ‘in at latest 2–3 months’, forced through its conception of a peace of extensive conquest. In the west, (...) the valuable French mining region of Longwy-Briey was to be won for the Reich. (...) Belgium was to remain ‘in German military control until it is politically and economically ready for a defensive and offensive alliance with Germany’. Liège and the Flemish coast were to be either permanently occupied or held on a ninety-nine-year lease (...). Belgium was to lose its south-east corner to the Reich, Luxembourg would become a German federal state. (...) In the east, Germany was to acquire Courland and Lithuania, Hindenburg and Ludendorff’s own military colony. Buffer zones were to be carved out of the newly established Poland to protect key German territories, most notably heavily industrialized German Silesia. German oil interests in Romania were also to be secured. Austria-Hungary was to be handed parts of Serbia, Montenegro and Albania, as well as territory in Romania’s western Walachia.(...) At a meeting on 17 and 18 May 1917, [the ambassador of Austria-Hungary in Romania, Count Ottokar] Czernin not only received a German guarantee of the Habsburg Empire’s integrity but also, in exchange for giving over Poland after the war, acquired rights to Romania and a sphere of influence in the Balkans.>> (pp.32-33)

[dominikgyenese]

Ez egy kaotikzs időszak volt egész európában. Ebből is látszik, hogy egy háborúnak nincs egyszerűen csak vège.

[meszaroslali_]

Hasonlót csinálhatnál csak a csehek bevonulásáról. Egyébként nagyon jó videó, mint mindig!

[peternegabor]

Elképesztően jó ez a csatorna, hiánypótló!😊

[hecklerkoch]

*Joseph Held, "The Heritage of the Past: Hungary before World War I", in Ivan Volgyes (editor), **_HUNGARY IN REVOLUTION. 1918-19. Nine Essays, _** Univ. of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, 1971, pages 6-7:*

<<The basic problem in Hungary was that less than half of the population were ethnically Hungarian. After the Ausgleich the Hungarians made at least one attempt to solve the cultural problem involved in the situation with the nationality law of 1868. The intent of this law was to arrange for a compromise between the non-Magyar nationalities and the Hungarians. The fact was, however, that the nationalities demanded more than cultural nationalism. They were in the process of establishing ties with their co-nationals — the Rumanians, Serbians, Czechs — living outside the monarchy or in the Austrian half, and were working for political independence. Moreover, the nationality law was seldom observed in Hungary; the rights of the nationalities were violated continuously by the Hungarian government. Their schools were closed and confiscated; their protests were suppressed by the police; their leaders were jailed for long periods of time. Hungarian propagandists spoke of a country of thirty million Hungarians, and of the sacred right of Hungary to “Magyarize” its nationalities.>>

[loserock]

Nagyon érdekes téma! De nem érthető meg a magyar-csehszlovák háború nélkül.
Emlékszem, hatalmas élmény volt, amikor a régen suliban tanultakon túl elkezdtem részletesen utána olvasni!

[hecklerkoch]

*Alexander Watson, Ring of Steel: Germany and Austria-Hungary in World War I, Basic Books, New York, 2014:*

<<The defining feature of the Central Powers’ occupation regimes was their exploitative nature. Administrators were quite frank about their goal; as Major von Kessler, the head of the German Economic Staff in Romania, put it, the occupation authorities’ most pressing task was ‘to get out of the land what can be gotten out’.(...)
<<Large quantities of diverse resources were extracted from the occupied territories. (...) Above all, the food produced there, while not worth much in monetary terms, was invaluable in sustaining Germany and Austria-Hungary under siege. Ludendorff stressed in his memoirs how ‘the occupied territories helped us with food supplies’ and even asserted that after 1916 ‘we should not have been able to exist, much less carry on the war, without Rumania’s corn and oil’. Major General Franz von Wandel, Prussia’s Deputy War Minister, also rated their enforced contribution highly when he told the Reichstag in March 1916 that it was thanks to the economic committees tasked with resource extraction in conquered regions that ‘our men in the field are so well fed’ and that ‘large supplies [can be] conveyed from the occupied territories into the home country’. (...) The capture of Romania’s full granaries in December 1916, in the midst of the acute shortages of the ‘turnip winter’, was timely, and through rigorous exploitation Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and the Ottomans were also able in subsequent years to exchange very extensive resources for the worthless, unbacked currency they introduced into the occupied country.>>
<<Moreover, official export figures do not tell the full story. Armies lived partly off the land. German forces in Romania, for example, themselves consumed 267, 879 tons of food and fodder from the occupation zone between 1916 and 1918. (...) On top of official exports and military consumption, significant amounts of food were dispatched privately to the homeland, ensuring that the armies’ statistics never fully represented the extent of resources removed from conquered territories. Within the German occupying forces, soldiers were permitted to send 5-kilogram food parcels to friends and relatives; extensive use was made of this privilege. In just eight months in 1916–17, troops in Romania sent home enough foodstuffs to fill 1, 002 wagons. A further 18, 000 tons were brought back by men on leave.>>(pp. 414-416)

[hecklerkoch]

*A.J.P. Taylor, _The Habsburg Monarchy, 1809-1918 : A History of the Austrian Empire and Austria-Hungary_, Hamish Hamilton, London, 1948:*

<<Faced with the danger of national competition, the Magyar gentry dared not fulfil the provisions of the Nationalities Law of 1868; on the other hand, to make their work easier, they demanded a knowledge of Magyar from all the inhabitants of Hungary. No state school, elementary or secondary, was ever provided for any national minority; the secondary schools which the Slovaks had set up for themselves were closed in 1874; Magyar was made compulsory in all schools in 1883.
The highest expression of this policy was the Education Law promoted by [Prime minister, Count] Apponyi in 1907, which imposed a special oath of loyalty on all teachers and made them liable to dismissal if their pupils did not know Magyar. Similarly, the Magyar gentry attacked any political display by the nationalities -drove their few members from parliament and condemned their organisations.
By these means, the Magyar gentry gained and kept a monopoly of state employment and of the liberal professions. At the beginning of the twentieth century, 95 per cent of the state officials, 92 per cent of the county officials, 89 per cent of the doctors, and 90 per cent of the judges were Magyar. Eighty per cent of the newspapers were in Magyar, and the remainder mostly German: three million Roumanians had 2, 5 per cent of the newspapers, two million Slovaks had 0, 64 per cent.>> (p. 186)

[hecklerkoch]

*Myra A. Waterbury, **_Between State and Nation. Diaspora Politics and Kin-state Nationalism in Hungary, _** Palgrave Macmillan New York, 2010:*

<<The dual monarchy marked the beginning of a modern Hungarian state, but the Magyar nationalism that drove the movement for independence ran up against the reality that ethnic Magyars were not a majority of the population in the territory of Hungary [in 1867, minorities were 53.4 percent of the population]. The liberal nationalist thought of 1848, which had envisioned an enlightened Magyar-dominated state that granted equal rights to all ethnic and linguistic minorities, was soon replaced by a more exclusionary and chauvinistic form of Hungarian nationalism. Once Hungarian independence had been more or less achieved through the dual monarchy, this was seen as the legitimization of Magyar nationalism and its goals of elevating Hungarian language and culture as the national standard. Hungarian chauvinists now expected and demanded Magyarization from the subject nationalities, based on the “supposed superiority of the Magyar culture.” The empowerment of minority cultures was seen as a threat to the newly acquired unified political control of the Magyar elite.
While the Nationalities Law of 1868 paid lip service to the country’s multiethnic character, the new Hungary was to be a “single political nation; the indivisible Hungarian nation . . . and country’s official language Hungarian.” In 1875, the government of Prime Minister Tisza intensified the program of forced Magyarization, closing Slovak and Romanian-language schools and limiting minority cultural activities. This disrupted the previous trend of voluntary Magyarization, causing the rate of assimilation to slow greatly after 1850 to only 9 percent.
Not surprisingly, this form of Magyar nationalism also spawned counternationalisms among the other minority groups. Even the more liberal nationalism of 1848 spurred some national minority groups to fight on the side of the Austrians, calculating that their chances of autonomy would be better met in a large, multiethnic empire rather than in a more independent Hungary. In the decades following the 1867 compromise, minority elites, forced to choose between assimilation or exclusion, turned to their own indigenous nationalist groups or sent their children away for mother-tongue instruction and training as the new generation of minority nationalists that would fight for independence against the dominance of the Hungarian state.>> (p.29)

[hecklerkoch]

*C.A. Macartney, **_The Habsburg Empire, 1790 - 1918, _** Faber&Faber, London, 2014, (pp. 1149 - 1152):*

<<No Hungarian regime ever thought of Hungary except in terms of Magyar supremacy; they differed only in their views of how far down it was necessary to go with the process of Magyarization, and in the degree of vigour and purpose with which they pursued the aim. And the general trend was always in the same direction (...).
The conduct of administration and justice were Magyarized, down to the lowest level, not only in all internal transactions, but, largely, in the outer services: notices to the public, even in purely non-Magyar districts, were in Magyar only, as were all proceedings in the Courts; a defendant could employ an interpreter, but had to pay for his services. The Magyar national culture was treated as the only one deserving respect, or even legitimate, in Hungary; the others were, at best, tolerated contemptuously, but attempts to cultivate them, above the humblest level, even where specifically authorized by the Nationalities Law, were regarded as potentially or actually treasonable; always discouraged, and whenever a quarter-plausible excuse could be thought up, forbidden. The smear of treason attached even more to any attempt to give political expression to the philosophical assumption of the Law itself: the possibility of a Hungarian patriotism not identified with Magyarism.
Every administrative device, including manipulations of the franchise itself (which was more restricted in Transylvania, the chief danger area, than in Inner Hungary), was employed to stifle any such movement.
For the extremists, the only ultimately satisfactory solution was, as it had been in the 1840s, that the country should become entirely Magyar. Some measures adopted were pure eye-wash, designed to produce an appearance of achieved reality, not to achieve it. Such was the Magyarization of all place-names, even of villages founded, and inhabited since their foundation, exclusively by non-Magyars, and the official ostracization even of ancient and familiar alternatives to them, such as Pressburg, Oedenburg or Steinamanger. (...)
But determined efforts were made also actually to transform non-Magyars into Magyars, not only by the negative method of denying a man advancement in the official or even the social world unless he Magyarized, but through the educational system. The Nationalities Law itself laid down that the language of Pest University should be Magyar, which meant that knowledge of the language was a precondition for the degree which admitted its holder to the senior branches of the Civil Service, or to many professions.
On the lower levels, the hands of the authorities were somewhat fettered by the fact that the educational system was so largely in the hands of the Churches, whose autonomy the Nationalities Law affirmed, and some tradition-bred quirk of national psychology forbade open violation of this provision of the Law. In fact, the non-Magyar confessional secondary schools were subjected only to the reasonable requirement, enacted in 1883, that Magyar language and literature should be compulsory subjects of instruction in their two top forms. But the Orthodox Churches possessed only a handful of such schools, and permission to add to their number was repeatedly refused.>>

[gyorgybalogh]

Elkezdtem nézni, de a pár perc után kikapcsoltam. Bocsáss meg kérlek, de rossz volt hallgatni, nézni! Nem a Te kiváló munkáddal volt bajom, hanem azzal ami akkor történt....

[hecklerkoch]

*Nicole M. Phelps, **_U.S.-Habsburg Relations from 1815 to the Paris Peace Conference. Sovereignty Transformed, _** Cambridge Univ. Press, New York, 2013:*

<<Not only did Hungarians continue fighting after the armistice in an effort to retain Slovakia and Transylvania, they also adopted a series of governments that were unacceptable to Wilson and the other delegates at Paris. Wilson and Allied leaders had feared that the combination of wartime uncertainty and the existence of the Soviet Union would prompt a series of communist revolutions in Europe. Their fears came true in the cases of Germany and Hungary. Several soviets, or workers’ councils, were established in southern Germany, competing with the liberal Weimar government while a communist government led by Belá Kun came to power in Hungary in 1919. At that point, most American sympathy for the Hungarian cause – in place since 1848 – was eclipsed by the stronger American opposition to communism. (...)
After Kun’s government fell, however, the situation was far from resolved. Admiral Miklos Horthy came to power and used the title “regent, ” implying a continuation of the Hungarian kingdom. In addition, royalists in Hungary assisted Karl in two attempts to regain the Hungarian throne, demonstrating the continued popularity of monarchy – and, indeed,
Habsburg monarchy – among a noteworthy segment of the Hungarian population. Only after Karl was exiled to the island of Madeira in 1921and Regent Horthy’s government agreed to accept sovereignty over a sizable reduced territory was the Treaty of Trianon finally signed, officially ending World War I as far as Hungary was concerned. The Hungarian government
received U.S. diplomatic recognition in December 1921.
The delegates at the Paris Peace Conference also worked on determining the borders of the new Central European states. Establishing those borders took almost two full years, however. Much of the difficulty stemmed from American and British efforts to create states that included the smallest number of minorities possible, whereas the French government aimed at
granting the new states militarily defensible frontiers.>> (pp. 263-264)

[gel_rt]

@hecklerkoch8236 Mi a faszért idézi be valaki a fél internetet? Úgysem lesz soha egyetértés

[hecklerkoch]

*Norman Stone, **_Hungary: A Short History, _** Profile Books, London, 2019:*

<<The Austrian Crown Council deliberated, and Tisza, alone, spoke against: the Rumanians would come in, and anyway the Empire did not need any more Slavs, such as would accrue if Serbia were smashed. But in the end he gave way. He knew that Greater Hungary had come about because of Bismarck, and that one of the main boulevards in Budapest (now Bajcsy-Zsilinszky) was named after Kaiser Wilhelm I, and he voted for war. He told the Belgian Minister, ‘Mon cher, l’Allemagne est invincible.’ War followed against Serbia on 28 July, and there were paroxysms of enthusiasm in Budapest. Even Count Apponyi said in Parliament, ‘At last’ (‘végre’).(..)
In his memoirs, Count Czernin, Archduke Franz Ferdinand’s main adviser, said: ‘we were bound to die, we were at liberty to choose the manner of our death and we chose the most terrible.">> (p.94)

[christianszilagyi]

Nagyón érdekes a Magyar történelem.
Az arany az cseng aranykor a Boldog békeidők (1867-1914).
Az ezüst peng Pengős ezüst korszak a Magyar történelemben (1927-1938) amig stabil volt.
A réz pedig kong Rákosi -korszak a Magyar történelemben amikor még a Rákosi Viperát is Parlagira kellett átnevezni.😁

[hecklerkoch]

*Bruce F. Pauley, **_The Habsburg Legacy: 1867-1939, _** Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., New York, 1972:*

<<The coup de grâce for the Habsburg Monarchy was the collapse of the Bulgarian front on September 27 [1918]. Common sense dictated that the Austro-Hungarian army could not hope to hold a second theater of war; Allied military occupation of the Monarchy was now only a matter of weeks, unless forestalled by an immediate armistice. On October 4 Vienna frantically begged [US president] Wilson for a cease-fire on the basis of the President’s Fourteen Points. Since the Tenth Point had called for the federalization of the Dual Monarchy, [Emperor of Austria-Hungary] Karl now made a hasty effort to comply. On October 16 he issued a manifesto asking Reichsrat deputies to form national councils as the foundation of a confederation of autonomous states linked only by a common allegiance to the Habsburg dynasty.
Karl was not simply being opportunistic in making this eleventh-hour move. He had been a convinced advocate of federalism and national equality long before mounting the throne. The tragedy was that federalization of the Monarchy was not even thinkable until the late summer of 1918 when most German Austrians and Magyars were finally convinced of the inevitability of defeat. Yet by then the “submerged” nationalities were in no mood to consider anything short of outright independence. Only a reform imposed by the West would have stood any chance of success at this late date. But this would have necessitated an Allied occupation of the Monarchy.(...)
The idea was opposed, however, by President Wilson, who rejected, as a matter of principle, the use of American troops for the enforcement of political reforms. In any event, it would have been incomprehensible to Allied public opinion if their leaders had suddenly reversed the policy of complete national independence for the Monarchy’s nationalities.(...)
Whatever slight possibility there might have been for the success of a last-minute reform was ruined by the stipulation in [Emperor] Karl’s manifesto limiting federalization to the Austrian half of the Monarchy. The restriction meant that the Czechs and Slovaks, Rumanians, Ruthenes, and South Slavs would be politically separated, with some of them remaining under Magyar domination.
Even though Karl, in issuing the manifesto, took care not to violate his oath to the Hungarian constitution in which he had pledged to defend the kingdom’s territorial integrity, the Hungarian Diet used the attempted federalization of Austria as a pretext for renouncing the Ausgleich and seceding from the Dual Monarchy. With the old order crumbling on every side, the Magyar ruling class clung to its delusion that Hungary’s integrity could be maintained by the mere act of separation from Austria. Instead, the secession of Hungary only set a precedent for nationally conscious members of its own minorities.>> (pp.63-64)

[TheSkulo]

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