The Kalam Cosmological Argument: Responding to Four MORE Objections (Equivocation)

In this video, I respond to four different objections to the Kalam Cosmological Argument which all claim that the Kalam commits the fallacy of equivocation. I hope to show that these objections don't hold up when placed under scrutiny.

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Music:

Airport Lounge - Disco Ultralounge by Kevin Macleod:

[tooskepticool]

New sub. Im a transcidental presupositionalist

[Richard-fvxc]

illumilands, Well done! The Repeated claims of fallacious argumentation that we see on You Tube are usually presented as if there is no answer, and any attempt at rebuttal is quite often met by silence!

[snuzebuster]

Re: Objection 2. We can make a KCA (KCA2) based solely on the material cause and it would be just as valid as the original KCA. So, then if the KCA is sound, KCA2 should also be sound and the conclusion that their must be a material cause for the universe would have to be just as true. That's a BIG problem. I'd say it points to the KCA being unsound. I haven't listened to how you deal with the equivocation on begins to exist yet. To argue that the KCA can be reworded to say "efficient cause" would be special pleading, because it can equally be reworded to say just "material cause." What is the justification for cherry picking between the two?

[snuzebuster]

No, having an unequivocal definition of "begins to exist" that fits both cases is not enough to prove the argument does no equivocate. What you have to show is that there is no significant difference between the terms as they apply to the case being studied. Another way of putting it is your unequivocal definition has to be sufficient to cover any possible significant differences between the referents of the term. For example, take this argument.


P1. Every person is a human being
P2 Zorg is a person
C: Zorg is a human being


Definition of person: A sentient being that stands upright. Zorg is a sentient being that stands upright, but Zorg is not a human being because Zorg is from another planet. We have an unequivocal definition of the term, but it is not adequate to cover the actual differences between the two cases, and it is no different for the use of the term "begin to exist" in the KCA. The definition is unequivocal but the argument still equivocates.


In the case of Craig's definition it is insufficient because it does not include "There is some time previous to t at which x does not exist" which is true for the type of beginnings that inform the causal principle, but it is not true for the beginning of the universe.


Maybe you will argue that the argument I gave is wrong because P1 was wrong. Right, and that is because the term person isn't adequately defined in the argument. Maybe we accepted P1 because in our experience it is true, but Zorg fits our definition of person, so... Right, the beginning of the universe fits the definition of begin given. but it was an inadequate definition to cover the real the difference between the two cases. Once we have an adequate definition then the truth of P1 comes into question both in my example and in the KCA.

[snuzebuster]

Yes, the argument commits the fallacy of equivocation because we are talking about two different senses of the term "begin to exist." Craig's definition is just a fig leaf intended to obscure the differences in the sense of "begin to exist" when referring to the beginning of the universe and the beginning of everything else in our experience. The latter is the type of beginning that informs the causal premise, but if it is arguably not the type of beginning that the universe had, then the argument is still an equivocation fallacy.


I might add that it can also be said to equivocate in the sense of the term "thing" because the "things" in P1 are the things of our experience, i.e., complex proper parts of the universe, and the "thing" implicit in P2 is the universe as a whole.


Another, maybe the best way to argue it is that we don't really know if P1 is true if "everything" includes the universe as a whole. But if it does not then the argument makes no sense. I often argue against it in this way because it's hard to get people to see the implicit equivocations.

[jyasenrogers]

Hello, I was in a debate with an atheist about the Islam cosmological argument. I successfully refuted all of his objections except for one. He said that if the origin of the universe predates the universe, then there’s no need for a transcendent cause. Because I stayed earlier in the debate that whatever causes the universe to exist is timeless, spaceless, and immaterial, and that there are only two things that are timeless, spaceless, and immaterial, which is abstract objects like numbers, or a transcendent creator with a mind of its own. Any thoughts on how I can go about his objection?